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In the past few years, criminal procedure scholars have fundamentally
transformed our understanding of the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination. In the whiggish treatment of an earlier generation, the
history of the privilege appeared as the teleological progression of an
indubitable principle derived from the experiences of English religious
dissenters in the seventeenth century.' Thanks to an outpouring of new
1. Dean Wigmore and Leonard Levy provided the formerly standard accounts. See LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINS OFTHE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968); 8 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2250, at 267-95 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
According to Wigmore, the common-law privilege had its origins in opposition to the ex officio oaths
administered by the English prerogative courts to such sympathetic characters as John Lilbume. See
id. at 282-84, 289-92. The evidence for this claim, however, was remarkably weak. Wigmore wrote
merely that the privilege was "immediately communicated, naturally enough" from the prerogative
courts to the common-law courts. Id. at 289. Professor Levy has recently restated his position in a
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scholarship, however, the story now appears to have been far more
complex. The privilege against self-incrimination, it turns out, is not
native to the common law at all; rather, it was borrowed from the
European ius commune of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance.2
Moreover, we now know that as late as the end of the eighteenth century,
no effective privilege against self-incrimination existed for the average
common-law criminal defendant. Because criminal defendants were rarely
represented by counsel, then a right to maintain silence during the course
of the trial would have been, as John Langbein has shown, little more than
a right not to defend oneself at all.'
The revised history of the privilege has provided important new per-
spective on the place of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause
in American legal practice.4 Indeed, the Supreme Court has relied on this
particularly vitriolic article. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 821 (1997).
2. See R.H. Helmholtz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the
European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990), substantially reprinted in THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 17 (R.H. Helmholtz et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter THE PRIVILEGE]; M.R.T. Macnair, The Early Development of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 66 (1990). (As indicated, a number of the most important
revisionist essays on the history of the privilege have been collected and published separately by the
University of Chicago Press. Throughout this Article I cite to the journal editions of the essays rather
than the reprinted versions because of their wider availability on-line.) The ius commune was the law
studied in European universities and applied in continental courts absent local statute or custom to the
contrary. See Helmholtz, supra, at 964 n.12. Variations on the privilege also can be found in
Talmudic law. See LEVY, supra note 1, at433-41; Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In
the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955 (1988).
3. See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common-Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1084 (1994) [hereinafter Langbein, Historical Origins]
(characterizing the criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination prior to the rise of defense
counsel as "the right to commit suicide"), substantially reprinted in John H. Langbein, The Privilege
and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE,
supra note 2, 82; see also John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View
from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 123-34 (1983) [hereinafter Langbein, Shaping]; John
H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 282-84 (1978)
[hereinafter Langbein, Before the Lawyers]. There is little reason to think that practice was signifi-
cantly different in colonial North America. The institutional factors that made the privilege unavailable
to criminal defendants in eighteenth-century England-namely, the absence of defense counsel and the
prevalence of summary jurisdiction-applied with equal, if not greater, weight in the colonies. See
Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1090-1111 (1994). For a description of the expansion of
summary jurisdiction in eighteenth-century New York, see Bruce Philip Smith, Circumventing the Jury:
Petty Crime and Summary Jurisdiction in London and New York City, 1790-1855, at 132-48 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
4. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renre B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 857-60 (1995) (asserting that the mid-nineteenth-century
history of the privilege supports a narrow immunity requirement), reprinted in AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46, 46-49 (1997); Charles R. Nesson & Michael J.
Leotta, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Cross-Examination, 85 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1632-39 (1997)
(arguing against a no-inference rule as applied to nondefendant witnesses invoking the Fifth Amendment
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new scholarship to hold that the risk of foreign prosecution is beyond the
scope of the Clause.5 Nonetheless, the new history of the privilege has yet
to account for the history of the American privilege against self-
incrimination in the first half-century of the Republic. As a result, a
critically important issue remains poorly understood: How and when did
American self-incrimination doctrine become constitutionalized? The
answer to this question, of course, seems at first glance so obvious that few
have thought even to ask the question at all. It seems rather straightfor-
ward that the self-incrimination clauses in most of the early state con-
stitutions and in the federal Bill of Rights constitutionalized the principle
that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."6 Yet, as we shall see, the apparently simple
language of the constitutional self-incrimination clauses belies a consider-
ably more complicated history.
This Article argues that for almost three quarters of a century after the
enactment of constitutional self-incrimination provisions in the United
States, the law of self-incrimination was common-law doctrine rather than
constitutional law. This common law of self-incrimination looked very
different than self-incrimination law today, particularly insofar as it applied
to nonparty witnesses. For witnesses, the common-law privilege func-
tioned as a broad per se bar on a wide range of self-damaging testimony.
The common-law privilege was not, however, a legal rule grounded in pro-
tecting the interests of the witness, dignitary, or otherwise. Rather, it was
one manifestation of a much broader approach to fact-finding in the
eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century courtroom. In the late-eighteenth
and early-nineteenth centuries, a panoply of common-law disqualification
rules, now long abandoned, kept a wide range of witness testimony out of
the courtroom, ostensibly on the rationale that such testimony was fatally
compromised by the witness's interest in the outcome of the case.7 It is
no easy task to explain the disqualification rules. Nonetheless, it seems
safe to say that they formed a distinctive and now difficult to understand
approach to fact-finding. In particular, the common-law disqualification
rules-along with the common-law privilege against self-incrimination-
appear to have been thought by early-nineteenth-century lawyers to serve
two interrelated functions in the common-law trial. First, they were
understood to promote reliability of outcomes in the fact-finding process
on cross-examination); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 419-28 (1995); R. Erik Lillquist, Note, Constitutional Rights at the Junction: The Emergence
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Interstate Commerce Act, 81 VA. L. REv. 1989,
1997-2001 (1995).
5. See United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 n.5 (1998).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See infra subpart I(A).
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in an age before the institutionalization of cross-examination. Second, they
were thought to legitimate those outcomes by protecting the legitimacy of
the oath as a guarantor of the reliability of sworn testimony.
Together, the common-law privilege and the disqualification rules
covered such a broad range of self-regarding testimonial situations that the
constitutional provisions were virtually redundant, hidden from view, and
rarely invoked in practice. Over the course of the first half of the nine-
teenth century, however, the approach to fact-finding that relied on disqual-
ification rules and oaths became the subject of sustained criticism.
Accordingly, the common-law rules that attached to witness testimony in
both civil and criminal cases-the rules disqualifying interested witnesses
from testifying and the broad common-law witness privilege-came to be
seen as unacceptable obstacles to fact-finding. The sources of this critique
of the old common-law mode of fact-finding are not precisely identifiable.
But whatever the sources of the critique of the common-law rules that kept
potentially self-regarding testimony out of the courtroom, the fact remains
that in the mid-nineteenth century the common-law approach to fact-finding
underwent a fundamental reorientation. Courts and legislatures narrowed
the scope of the common-law witness privilege and began the work of abol-
ishing the rules of disqualification for interest.' In the process, courts and
legislatures stripped the constitutional self-incrimination clauses of their
protective common-law shell. Thus, the question of the meaning of the
self-incrimination clauses was squarely presented for the first time in the
1840s when state legislatures enacted a series of statutes requiring wit-
nesses to give self-incriminating testimony in return for a narrowly defined
immunity.9 Led by New York's newly-organized Court of Appeals, state
courts widely upheld the new, narrow immunity statutes and thus in the
mid-nineteenth century gave substance to the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination for the first time in American legal practice.
The earliest courts to constitutionalize the privilege interpreted the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses narrowly, in keeping with the new
theory of fact-finding that had undermined the disqualification rules and the
common-law privilege."° Proponents of the new approach to fact-finding,
however, were unable to develop a satisfactory rationale for any privilege
at all, even a narrow one. Indeed, given the option, they would have
preferred to read the Self-Incrimination Clause out of the Constitution
altogether.
Absent a principled theory of the constitutional self-incrimination
clauses, the narrow approach to the privilege was short-lived. In the last
8. See infra subparts IV(B-C).
9. See infra subpart V(B).
10. See infra subpart V(C).
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decades of the nineteenth century courts abandoned the narrow constitu-
tional self-incrimination rulings of the mid-nineteenth-century state courts.
Led by the United States Supreme Court, federal and state courts reached
back into the available stock of decisions that were based on the broader
common-law self-incrimination rules of the early-nineteenth century to
fashion a new set of expansive and often inconsistent constitutional self-
incrimination doctrines, unmoored from newly transformed fact-finding
methods and rooted instead in a set of tenuous privacy rationales." In the
process, courts set off a search for a coherent rationale for the privilege
that continues to this day.
Part I of this Article briefly introduces the historiographical contro-
versy surrounding the privilege against self-incrimination and argues that
much of the historiographical difficulty finds its origins in the presence of
overlapping, but poorly understood, common-law disqualification rules.
Part II sets out the distinctive structure of the broad early-nineteenth-
century common-law witness privilege. Part III turns to the relationship
between the common-law witness privilege and the rule of disqualification
for interest. Part IV describes the contraction of the common-law witness
privilege during the first half of the nineteenth century and links this
doctrinal shift to the broader shift in common-law fact-finding that led to
the abolition of the rule of disqualification for interest. Part V then turns
to a single jurisdiction-New York-and shows that the passage of a series
of narrow immunity statutes beginning in the 1820s and accelerating
around 1840 caused the courts to confront the relationship of the common-
law rule of evidence to the constitutional self-incrimination clauses. In Part
VI the Article describes the late-nineteenth-century movement away from
a narrow constitutional privilege and the privilege's re-expansion-this time
not as common law, but as constitutional law.
If the history of the privilege has proven to be a highly contentious
field of study, so too-and not coincidentally-is current self-incrimination
doctrine. Crossing the bridge between historical analysis and doctrinal
reasoning can be a risky venture; changes in institutions, practices, and
surrounding legal rules make most moves from historical narrative to
contemporary legal interpretation exceedingly complicated. Thus, the
history of a doctrine can rarely, if ever, be relied on to lead to determinate
conclusions about contemporary legal questions. History can, however,
offer illustrations and examples of ways to think about particular
approaches to legal doctrine-sometimes ways long since forgotten. In this
respect, the history of self-incrimination doctrine that follows suggests an
alternative approach to the confusing and often internally contradictory
contemporary constitutional law of self-incrimination. In particular, Part
11. See infra subpart VI(c).
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VII suggests that the common-law privilege's role in promoting fact-
finding-in guaranteeing the reliability and the legitimacy of criminal trial
outcomes-offers a historically based rationale for reorienting contempor-
ary constitutional self-incrimination doctrine.
I. The Mysterious History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A. The Historiographical Controversy
Scholars have had considerable difficulty explaining the original
meaning of the American constitutional self-incrimination provisions-both
state and federal. Seven of the eleven early state constitutions included one
of several variations on what is now most recognizable as the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. 2 The process by which the constitutional provisions were
drafted, however, appears to have been remarkably haphazard. At the very
least, it was accompanied by startlingly little debate. Leonard Levy argues
that the absence of debate reflected the framers' attempt to codify an
uncontroversial "old rule of evidence that a man 'cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself.""' 3 According to Levy, simple "bad
draftsmanship" accounted for the fact that the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, which first constitutionalized the rule against compelled self-
12. Connecticut and Rhode Island did not frame new constitutions after independence. Of the
eleven remaining colonies, Virginia enacted the first and most important of the self-incrimination
clauses:
That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and
nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for
evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his
vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be
compelled to give evidence against himself, that no man be deprived of his liberty, except
by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.
VA. CONST. of 1776 § 8, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3812, 3813 (F. Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (emphasis added). Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania also enacted self-incrimination
clauses. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 15, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 557, 562; MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XX, reprinted
in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1686, 1688; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.
XII, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1888, 1891; N.H. CONST. of 1784,
pt. 1, art. XV, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2453, 2455; N.C.
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra, at 2787, 2787; PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. IX, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3081, 3083. For a helpful summary and brief history of the state
constitutional provisions, see Ralph A. Rossum, "Self-Incrimination": The Original Intent, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 273, 273-75 (Eugene W. Hickok,
Jr. ed., 1991).
13. LEVY, supra note 1, at 405 (quoting George Mason, the author of Virginia's Declaration of
Rights).
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incrimination, limited its scope to criminal defendants; 4 similarly,
carelessness explained the failure of Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and
South Carolina to include any self-incrimination provision in their
constitutions. 5 More recently, Albert W. Alschuler has focused on the
use of the word "compelled" in the state and federal self-incrimination
clauses. 6 Alschuler takes the view that the framers understood them-
selves to be outlawing particular kinds of compulsion, namely "torture and
other improper methods of interrogation." 7 In a third interpretation,
Eben Moglen argues that the inconsistent promulgation of self-incrimination
provisions resulted from Americans' attempts to write into their bills of
rights what Moglen calls a "syncretic cluster" of rights associated with the
jury trial.' 8  In this view, the constitutional language about self-
incrimination was an inchoate component of an undifferentiated rhetoric of
jury trial rights. 19
The striking feature of the debate, no matter which view one adopts,
is just how little evidence exists for the early meaning of the self-
incrimination clauses; scholars have sought to make reasoned judgments
about the original understanding of the self-incrimination clauses from a
remarkably small number of references to the meaning of the constitutional
self-incrimination provisions.' And therein lies a clue to the early status
of the constitutional self-incrimination clauses.
B. The Source of the Problem: Overlapping Common-Law Rules
The primary difficulty in pinpointing the meaning of the constitutional
self-incrimination provisions in the first years of the Republic has been that
during the half-century or so following the enactment of the Fifth
Amendment, and for close to three quarters of a century after the drafting
of the first self-incrimination clause in the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
the self-incrimination clauses almost never entered the reported arguments
of American lawyers or the reported decisions of American judges. Thus,
other than a few cryptic references in the constitutional conventions and
ratifying debates, there is remarkably little information on how the clauses
worked in practice.
14. Id. at 407.
15. See id. at 405-09.
16. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625 (1996).
17. Id. at 2631.
18. Moglen, supra note 3, at 1120.
19. See id.
20. See United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 (1998) ("[T]here is no helpful legislative
history."); see also id. at 2241 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the Self-Incrimination Clause
"'has virtually no legislative history'" (quoting Moglen, supra note 3, at 1123)).
1999]
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This is not to say that there were no rules regulating self-incriminating
testimony during these years. To the contrary, courts ruled on and litigants
fought over an array of doctrines that kept self-inculpatory testimony out
of the courtroom. The critical distinction, however, is that the rules
pertaining to self-incrimination in these years were common-law rules
rather than constitutional mandates.2" Thus, early-nineteenth-century
lawyers seldom had occasion to consider the meaning or purpose of the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses. Instead, four common-law rules
interacted to establish a common-law approach to silence and confessions
that made the constitutional provisions unnecessary and, hence, invisible.
The confession rule excluded pretrial confessions from subsequent admis-
sion at trial when they had been extracted under oath or by force, threat,
or promise.' The rule disqualifying parties prevented criminal defen-
dants from testifying under oath altogether.' The rule disqualifying
witnesses for interest made a witness that was financially interested in a
civil suit incompetent to testify on his own behalf and uncompellable to
testify against himself.24 Finally, the common-law witness privilege
protected a witness from being compelled by process of the court to make
disclosures that might incriminate him or subject him to civil liability or
moral disgrace.'
Together, these four rules made the self-incrimination clauses wholly
superfluous. Consider, for example, the three core situations that today are
treated as raising Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause issues:
suspects in pretrial examinations; criminal defendants at trial; and witnesses
called to testify before a court or grand jury and asked incriminating
questions.
The Suspect at Pretrial Examination.-The common-law pretrial pro-
cess relied on a system of pretrial examinations of the accused. Justices of
the Peace (J.P.s) interrogated the accused (unsworn) and took down any
21. This helps to explain the Supreme Court's recent confusion in discussing the early self-incrimi-
nation case, United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828). "[F]or all the sweep" of the
opinion, Justice Souter writes, "it makes no mention of the Fifth Amendment." Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at
2225.
22. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234, 234-35 (Cr. Cas. 1783) (rejecting evi-
dence of a confession because it was obtained by "promises of favour").
23. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Note that this Article will generally use the
masculine pronoun because the nineteenth-century sources uniformly used the masculine form and
because the overwhelming number of litigants and criminal defendants in the nineteenth century were
men.
25. On the relationship of the common-law rules pertaining to silence, I follow the lead of Henry
E. Smith, The Modem Privilege: Its Nineteenth-Century Origins, in THE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at
145, 146 (describing the disqualification for interest rule, the confession rule, and the witness
privilege).
[Vol. 77:825
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statement made by the accused for introduction at trial.26 The system was
designed to elicit and to use self-incriminating statements. Yet Eben
Moglen reports that the constitutional self-incrimination provisions were not
understood to mandate changes in the existing common-law confession rule
barring admission of confessions elicited under oath or by force, threat, or
promise. As a result, even in the second and third decades of the nine-
teenth century, lawyers and writers of J.P. practice manuals discussed
pretrial confessions without making reference to the constitutional pro-
visions that had been so recently enacted.
27
The Criminal Defendant at Trial.-The rule disqualifying parties, and
thus criminal defendants, from testifying under oath at their own trials
made the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself a slightly
bizarre and even insignificant proposition. The party disqualification rule
itself ensured that a disqualified defendant could never be compelled to
testify by the prosecution.' In this respect, the constitutional self-
incrimination clauses appear to have been redundant. At the same time,
a rule that prevented defendants from testifying under oath was hardly a
safeguard of defendants' rights. The rule allowed the prosecution to build
its case with the sanction of sworn testimony and prevented the defendant
from being able to rebut that case with testimony of the same gravamen.29
To be sure, even though formally prevented from giving testimony, crim-
inal defendants consistently spoke in their own defense at trial.30 Lacking
defense counsel in the age before lawyerized criminal proceedings, defen-
dants had no choice but to submit what was effectively unsworn testimony.
Yet this de facto need to talk was apparently not the kind of compulsion to
testify that lawyers, courts, or commentators understood to implicate the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses.3'
The Nonparty Witness.-Today, of course, the witness who "takes the
Fifth" represents one of the paradigm cases of constitutional self-
26. See J. M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 271-72 (1986);
Langbein, Historical Origins, supra note 3, at 1059-62; Langbein, Shaping, supra note 3, at 81-84;
Moglen, supra note 3, at 1094-99.
27. See Moglen, supra note 3, at 1123-29.
28. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
29. After 1702, a criminal defendant in a felony case could call sworn witnesses in his own behalf
even though he could not so testify himself. See An Act for Punishing of Accessories to Feloneys and
Receivers of Stolen Goods and to Prevent the Wilful Burning and Destroying of Ships, 1 Anne 2, ch.
9, § 3 (1701) (Eng.); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MiCH. L. RE,. 71, 89-90
(1974).
30. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
31. At the very least, no evidence survives indicating that anyone in the early nineteenth century
argued that the absence of defense counsel raised self-incrimination issues.
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incrimination doctrine. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth
centuries, however, a witness's privilege not to incriminate himself did not
rest on the constitutional self-incrimination clauses. As today, a witness's
testimony under oath was fully admissible against him in subsequent crim-
inal prosecutions;3" thus, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, as today, witness testimony might have been thought to implicate
constitutional concerns. Nonetheless, in the years following ratification of
the state and federal constitutions, the evidentiary rule that protected a
witness from incriminating examination, like the rules that applied to a
criminal defendant at trial and a suspect at a pretrial examination, was not
based on the constitutional self-incrimination clauses. Time and time
again, through the first three decades of the nineteenth century, courts and
treatises provided long strings of citations to case law and treatise literature
in support of the witness privilege, but made no reference to the constitu-
tional self-incrimination clauses. 3
There were exceptions to the general pattern of relying on common-
law, rather than constitutional, authority to support the exclusion of self-
incriminating testimony. One such exception was Samuel Bayard's Digest
of American Cases on the Law of Evidence, 4 published in 1810 and inten-
ded as an American companion to English jurist Thomas Peake's evidence
treatise. Bayard's central concern in his section on a witness's "privileges"
was far removed from self-incrimination; rather his focus was on the priv-
ilege from arrest of a witness entering a state for purposes of testifying. 5
In passing, however, Bayard also mentioned the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as a basis for the privilege against self-
incrimination. 6  In addition to the Bayard reference, an 1818
32. See United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 636, 641 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) (No. 16,707) (holding
that witness testimony is freely admissible in subsequent prosecutions when given under oath);
Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vt. 491, 492-93 (1840) (stating that a witness's self-incriminating
testimony "if freely given, may be afterwards used against the witness" and that the court knows "of
no rule to exclude the testimony being given in evidence against the witness, even in a prosecution of
a criminal nature, although the wimess was compelled to testify under the requisitions of a court of
justice .... The only security of the witness is in silence.").
33. For citations, see the witness privilege cases and treatise sections on the wimess privilege cited
in Parts II, III, and subparts IV(A)-(D).
34. SAMUEL BAYARD, A DIGEST OF AMERICAN CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE INTENDED AS
NOTES TO PEAKE'S COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Philadelphia, William P. Farrand & Co.
1810). Bayard was the presiding judge on the New Jersey Court of Common Pleas for the County of
Somerset.
35. See id. at 123-25.
36. See id. at 124 ("By the fifth article of the Amendments to the constitution of the United States,
a witness is privileged from being compelled to give evidence tending to criminate himself." (emphasis
omitted)). Bayard's reference is notable because it asserted without argumentation that the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applied to witnesses as well as criminal defendants, a
proposition that would be contested when the constitutional provisions were given more systematic
treatment in the 1830s. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. In referring to the Self-
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Pennsylvania case cited the Pennsylvania constitution's self-incrimination
clause along with the common-law authorities.37 If the constitutional
clauses were cited on rare occasions, the fact remains that they were
generally ignored.38
In the context of the early-nineteenth-century common-law trial, the
absence of constitutional self-incrimination doctrines made sense. As we
shall see in the next two Parts, the common-law witness privilege operated
in conjunction with the common-law rule disqualifying witnesses for inter-
est to insulate most witnesses from ever having to give self-damaging
testimony. As long as this set of common-law rules remained in effect,
then, the constitutional self-incrimination clauses would receive little
attention. The common-law rules attaching to witness testimony, however,
came under sustained attack beginning in the 1830s. Hence, the constitu-
tional self-incrimination clauses first emerged as meaningful factors in
American legal practice as they applied to the rules governing how and
when nondefendant witnesses could be compelled to answer self-damaging
questions. Before turning to the attack on the common-law witness testi-
mony rules, however, we must first understand how the common-law
witness privilege and its cognate, the rule of disqualification for interest,
functioned at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Incrimination Clause of the United States Constitution, as opposed to those of the state constitutions,
Bayard took an approach rejected some two decades later by the United States Supreme Court in Barron
v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to
the states. Although Bayard was in the minority in claiming that the Bill of Rights applied to the states,
his view was not uncommon both before and after Barron. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1203-12 (1992) (describing early-nineteenth-
century cases and commentary claiming that the Bill of Rights applied to the states); see also Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1167-68 (1991) (discussing ante-
bellum sources stating that the Second Amendment placed limits on state governments).
37. See Baird v. Cochran, 4 Serg. & Rawle 396, 399 (Pa. 1818) (holding that the state
"constitution protects [the witness] no further than in not being obliged to accuse himself, which plainly
refers to something criminal, penal or infamous, and not barely to matter of interest"). Other than
Bayard's Digest, this is the only mention of a constitutional self-incrimination clause that I have located
in a court or treatise writer's discussion of the witness privilege. Katherine Hazlett, in a forthcoming
article tracing the history of the privilege in federal case law from the 1850s through the 1880s and
1890s, confirms that in the federal system prior to 1854, no case addressed the constitutional self-
incrimination clauses even though a number of cases litigated self-incrimination issues. See Katherine
B. Hazlett, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Nineteenth Century Origins, 42 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with the Texas Law Review).
38. Treatises that discussed the Constitution clause by clause of course referred to the Self-
Incrimination Clause. See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 129 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & L. Lea 1825); 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1782, at 660 (Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1991) (1833). But even in these sources the discussions of the Self-Incrimination Clause are
revealing. Rawle merely paraphrased the Clause in a way that was consistent with the common-law
rule and that made the Clause broader than it actually was. See RAWLE, supra, at 129 (contending that
"in no case shall he be compelled to be a witness against himself" (emphasis added)). Story treated
the Clause as a guarantee against extracting confessions by torture. See 3 STORY, supra, § 1782, at
660.
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II. The Common-Law Witness Privilege in 1800
In addition to being common law rather than constitutional law, the
American witness privilege at the beginning of the nineteenth century was
different from the privilege against self-incrimination that attaches to
witnesses today in three significant respects: the means by which it was
enforced; the breadth of the testimony it encompassed; and the scope of the
immunity required to extinguish it.
A. The Common-Law Witness Priilege as a Court-Enforced, Per Se Rule
Today, the witness privilege is a personal privilege, invocable at the
witness's option.39  And although, as a practical matter, it usually
redounds to the benefit of one party and to the detriment of another, it
protects the witness rather than any of the parties.' In the first years of
the nineteenth century, however, a number of courts and at least one
treatise writer treated the rule against compelling a witness to incriminate
himself as a per se bar on potentially self-incriminating questions; such
questions were prohibited, not merely privileged at the witness's option.
The per se rule against posing self-accusing questions was set out by Isaac
Espinasse, whose Digest of the Law of Actions and Trials at Nisi Prius had
been reprinted in two American editions by 1801. "It is the general rule,"
Espinasse wrote, "that a witness cannot be asked any question, the
answering of which may oblige him to accuse himself . . . ."' In
Espinasse's view the rule was not that a witness could decline to answer
such questions, but that the questions themselves were forbidden. Judges
and counsel, then, could take an active role in preventing potentially self-
incriminatory questions from even being asked.
Espinasse's version of the rule appeared in a number of early-
nineteenth-century cases indicating that judges were to take an active role
in prohibiting incriminating questions.42 Some, including a fantastic case
39. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
40. See id. at 416 ("T]he protection of personal privacy is a central purpose of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination.").
41. 2 ISAAC ESPINASSE, DIGEsT OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AND TRIALS AT Nisi PRIus 728 (2d
Am. ed. Walpole, N.H., Thomas & Thomas 1801) (emphasis omitted).
42. In 1800 the Federal Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts held that a witness could
not be questioned as to discrepancies between his sworn testimony in court and his prior accounts on
the grounds that "he was not bound to criminate himself." Rather than rule that the witness might
decline to answer the question, the court "adjudged the question illegal." The Ulysses, 24 F. Cas. 515,
516 n.2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 14,330); see also Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429 (Pa.
1802) (holding that questions tending to subject a voter to forfeiture were "illegal"); United States v.
Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680, 682 (C.C.E.D. La. 1854) (No. 16,111) (noting that "[i]t was for a time
supposed that questions addressed to a witness tending to criminate him, could not be propounded");
State v. Garrett, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 357, 358 (1853) (holding that North Carolina law allowed such ques-
tions to be asked, but noting the contrary rule in other jurisdictions); Butler's Case, 1 City Hall
838 [Vol. 77:825
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arising out of the aptly named Francisco de Miranda's ill-fated revolution-
ary plots, even suggested that the potential for being asked self-
incriminating questions went to a witness's competence to testify
altogether.43 Other courts held that the trial judge should at least inform
witnesses "whether it will be safe to answer or not."'
Recorder 66, 67 (N.Y.C. 1816) (noting the court's intervention and statement to counsel that he "ha[d]
no right to put [such] a question to the witness").
43. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held that a witness who claimed that his testi-
mony would incriminate himself could not be sworn in to testify. The claim of self-incrimination prob-
lems effectively went to the witness's competency to testify. See Neale v. Coningham, 17 F. Cas.
1266, 1266 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 10,067). Echoing the modem rule, Cranch dissented, reasoning
that "[ilt is not an objection to his being sworn, but is a good reason for his refusing to answer any
question which may criminate himself." Id. (Cranch, J., dissenting). The modem rule bears a trace
of the Coningham holding: Witnesses generally cannot be compelled to invoke the privilege in front
of the jury, and in this sense incriminating questions are prohibited in certain circumstances in the
current formulation of the rule. See 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 138,
at 207-08 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid
to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989).
In addition to the issue of self-incrimination, the case involving Francisco de Miranda raised
questions of presidential war-making authority and separation of powers. In 1806, Colonel William
S. Smith was indicted by the federal government for aiding de Miranda in violation of a statute
prohibiting unauthorized war-making against a foreign state. Smith's defense was that President
Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison had authorized him to attack Spain. Smith sought to call
Madison as a witness to substantiate this defense, and when Madison did not appear in court, he sought
an order of contempt and continuation until Madison's testimony could be obtained. The prosecution
made a number of responses, but prime among them was an argument grounded in the privilege:
Because "witnesses could not be forced to answer questions that might criminate themselves," the pros-
ecution reasoned, "the attendance of those witnesses ought not to be enforced, because the nature of
the evidence expected from them is such as would criminate themselves." United States v. Smith, 27
F. Cas. 1192, 1224-25 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). In the prosecutor's view, even if Madison
had authorized the enterprise, Madison could not be compelled to attend the proceedings because the
privilege, in effect, rendered him incompetent. See id. at 1218-25. The court ultimately sidestepped
this thorny, politically fraught issue and held that Madison was not compellable because his testimony
was not material. See id. at 1224-28. Even if Madison had authorized Smith's activities, the language
of the statute and the restrictions on executive branch war-making powers meant that Smith would still
be guilty of the offense charged. Madison's testimony, therefore, was "not pertinent to the issue, nor
material by way of justification." Id. at 1231.
Accomplice testimony created a broad body of doctrine that is beyond the scope of this Article.
A number of these cases, however, illustrate the extent to which arguments about self-incrimination
were linked to the witness's competence to testify. See, e.g., United States v. Gooseley, 25 F. Cas.
1363, 1364 (C.C.D. Va.) (No. 15,230) (holding, against the objection of the defense, that an accom-
plice was "competent" to testify as to his knowledge of the defendant's acts, despite the "principle that
the witness was not bound to give any evidence which might implicate himself").
44. 1 ESEK COWEN & NICHOLAS HILL, JR., NOTES TO PHILLIPPS' TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 734 n.515 (New York, Gould, Banks & Co. 1839). The 1819 American edition of Chitty's
treatise stated that "[flormerly, when a question was put to a witness, the answer to which would have
a tendency to criminate him, it was the practice for the judge to tell the witness that he was not bound
to answer the question...." 1 JOSEPH D. CHrITY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
426 (Philadelphia, Edward Earle 1819); see also Saltonstall's Case, 1 City Hall Recorder 134, 134
(N.Y.C. 1816) (intervening in a witness's testimony to ask "[clan you answer that question without
implicating yourself?"). The law today gives trial judges considerable discretion in deciding whether
to warn a witness about his privilege to decline to answer incriminating questions; their authority to
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Even when courts did not treat the rule as a per se prohibition, they
often allowed counsel for the parties to object to questions on the ground
that the question might incriminate the witness-whether or not the witness
had shown reluctance to answer.4' Although in some cases it is not clear
how strictly courts adhered to these practices,' trial courts continued into
the 1840s to rule incriminating questions illegal rather than merely
privileged.47
B. The Breadth of the Common-Law Witness Privilege: Civil Interests and
Moral Disgrace
Today the privilege encompasses only testimony having the tendency
to subject the witness to criminal liability; exposure to civil liability or
extralegal sanctions such as moral disgrace does not establish testimony as
privileged. 48  The early-nineteenth-century common-law privilege, on the
warn a witness, however, "should be exercised sparingly and with great caution." 1 MCCORMICK,
supra note 43, § 138, at 516.
45. In an 1807 prosecution in New Jersey, counsel for the defense cross-examined Thomas Van
Orden, a witness for the prosecution. Counsel inquired whether the witness had "been convicted of
petit larceny and punished." State v. Bailly, 2 N.J.L. 396, 396 (Sussex County Ct. 1807). Upon the
objection to the question by the prosecution-not the witness-defense counsel argued that the "witness
having been punished, could not be endangered by the answer." Id. The question, he continued, thus
went "to his credibility, and not his competency." Id. In this case, then, the witness privilege was not
a personal privilege so much as it was a tool used by opposing sides to further the interests of their
cases. Judge William Sandford Pennington of the court of Oyer and Terminer of Sussex County held
that "the great principle of the common law" was that "a witness cannot be compelled to answer a
question, the answer to which, tends directly to dishonor and disgrace him." Id.; see also United States
v. Moses, 27 F. Cas. 5, 5 (C.C.D.C. 1804) (No. 15,824) (sustaining an objection by defense counsel
to a question asking a witness whether he had sold goods stolen by the defendant); Atherton's Case,
1 City Hall Recorder 159, 161 (N.Y.C. 1816) (noting the prosecutor's objection to a question on the
ground that "it was improper to put a question to a witness, the answer to which might tend to
criminate himself").
46. The records of trials at City Hall in New York City indicate several occasions on which
witnesses were "delivered immediately to the police" for having incriminated themselves by their own
testimony. Carpenter's Case, 1 City Hall Recorder 164, 165 (N.Y.C. 1816) (ordering "three
witnesses, sworn on the trial, women of ill-fame, be delivered immediately to the Police, to be dealt
with according to law"); see also Sherman's Case, 6 City Hall Recorder 2 (N.Y.C. 1821) (ordering
a witness for the prosecution into custody after he implicated himself in his testimony). It is possible,
of course, that the witnesses in these cases incriminated themselves for reasons other than in response
to particular incriminating questions.
47. Beginning in the 1820s, a string of New York appellate decisions reversed rulings by trial
courts that incriminating questions were prohibited. See People v. Bodine, 1 Denio 281, 291 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1845); Mitchell v. Hinman, 8 Wend. 667, 671 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Southard v. Rexford,
6 Cow. 254, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826); see also United States v. Craig, 25 F. Cas. 682, 684
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 14,883) (distinguishing between questions that are illegal, such as asking
an attorney to divulge secrets of his clients, and questions that are privileged, such as those that
"disgrace or criminate the witness").
48. See Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 559 (1990) (holding that
a mother, custodian of her child under court supervision, could not refuse to produce her child pursuant
to the court's order by invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the
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other hand, also encompassed questions that exposed the witness to civil
liability or moral disgrace. In the first years of the nineteenth century, the
witness privilege in American practice was repeatedly said to protect
witnesses not just from self-incriminating testimony, but from testimony
that revealed the witness's infamy;49 cast "a shade" over the witness's
character;5' subjected the witness to civil liability;5 or charged the
witness with a debt.5' There may have been, as Henry Smith has argued,
court order arose out of a "noncriminal regulatory regime"); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not attach to the threat of
being found a sexually dangerous person under Illinois's nominally civil Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act). The Court has held that compelled disclosures that increase the risk of being sentenced to death
fall within the privilege, see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), but that when disclosures merely
go to show competency to stand trial, see id. at 468, or may lead to the revocation of probation, see
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), a witness may not claim the privilege.
49. See, e.g., ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, AND PROMISSORY NOTES 79-80 (Hartford, Oliver
D. Cooke 1810) ("It is also laid down as a maxim, that a witness is not bound to answer questions, the
direct object and immediate tendency of which are to degrade, disgrace, and disparage the witness, and
shew his moral turpitude and infamy."); see also People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 250-51 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1830) (distinguishing the witness privilege as it applied to testimony that would subject a witness
to moral infamy from the witness privilege as it applied to testimony that would incriminate a witness
on the ground that while the privilege attached to degrading testimony only when that testimony would
"directly shew the infamy," it attached to incriminating testimony "whether the answer he may give
to the question can criminate him directly or indirectly"); Lessee of Galbraith v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeates
515, 515 (Pa. 1803) ("No one will be compelled to be sworn as a witness, whose testimony tends to
accuse himself of an immoral act."); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429, 437 (Pa. 1802) ("If
[questions] would involve [the witness] in shame or reproach, he is under no obligation to answer
them."); JOHN MORGAN, The Law of Evidence, in 1 ESSAYS t 1, t 9 (Dublin, E. Lynch et al. 1789)
(stating that no witness was "to be examined to prove his own infamy").
50. 1 CHrTY, supra note 44, at 427 ("It has also at length after much discussion been established,
that a witness is not obliged to admit or answer to any matter which tends to throw a shade over his
moral character, although it involves no offense for which he could be indicted."); see also Craig, 25
F. Cas. at 683-84; Bailly, 2 N.J.L. at 396 (both holding that a witness may not be compelled to answer
a question tending to his own disgrace); Wheeler v. Dixon, 14 How. Pr. 151, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1856) ("A witness is not bound to speak when the answer may subject him to a prosecution.., or has
a tendency to degrade his character.").
51. See, e.g., THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 132 (Philadelphia,
Joseph Groff 1802). Peake's proposition generated considerable controversy in the 1806 debate arising
out of the impeachment of Lord Melville. See Smith, supra note 25, at 159-61; see also SWIFT, supra
note 49, at 78, 77-79 (defending the rle that allowed a witness to decline to testify if "his testimony
would render him liable to a civil action").
52. See, e.g., PEAKE, supra note 51, at 132. The breadth of the witness privilege with respect
to protecting a witness's financial interests is evident in the early American case law. In one 1797 case,
for example, the plaintiff called a witness who was interested in the event of the suit, but such that his
interest was aligned with the defendant. "['1o this the defendants could not object, because produced
by the plaintiff to testify against his interest-but the witness claimed the privilege of being exempted
from testifying anything to the contrary to his interest," and the Connecticut Superior Court of New
London County held that indeed the witness was "not obliged to disclose what will make against him."
Starr v. Tracy, 2 Root 528, 528-29 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1797); see also Simons v. Payne, 2 Root 406
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1796) (holding that a witness was competent to testify against the party with whom
his interest was aligned and noting the witness's claim "that he was not compellable to testify against
his interest," but rejecting this claim on other grounds). Close to ten years later, a similar case in the
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certain procedural aspects in which the early-nineteenth-century common-
law privilege was narrower than the modem constitutional privilege.5"
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia came out the same way, but on reasoning grounded in dis-
qualification for interest rather than in the witness privilege. In Came v. McLane, 5 F. Cas. 89
(C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 2,416), a witness called by the defense objected to being sworn "because [he
was] interested as a partner with the plaintiffs." Id. at 89. Unlike Starr, in which the court had held
that interest was no objection to being sworn but would provide the witness with grounds to decline
to answer specific questions, the Came court held that the witness could not be sworn to testify against
his interest at all. Id. Competency and privilege were thus intertwined and implemented to the same
effect.
53. Smith notes that the witness privilege in early-nineteenth-century English practice was easily
waivable by a witness who foolishly answered other questions. See Smith, supra note 25, at 161.
Under modern constitutional self-incrimination doctrine, a witness can, of course, still waive the right
to invoke the privilege by answering other questions, but only if in doing so he has voluntarily dis-
closed self-incriminating facts without invoking the privilege. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367, 373-74 (1951) (holding that "[d]isclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details").
In addition, early-nineteenth-century courts gave conflicting answers to the question of whether
an exclusionary rule attached to improperly compelled testimony. Smith has located a line of English
cases between 1823 and 1847 that negotiated the application of an exclusionary rule to the witness
privilege. Citing Regina v. Garbett, 169 Eng. Rep. 227 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1847), he argues that only
in 1847 did an exclusionary rule attach to the witness privilege. See Smith, supra note 25, at 175. In
Garbett, the court changed the waiver rule, making it easier for witnesses to claim the witness privilege
even if they had already answered questions under oath. Garbett, 169 Eng. Rep. at 235-36. By
narrowing the waiver element of the witness privilege, the court was forced to resolve what to do with
the testimony that had been (now wrongly) compelled under the old, stricter waiver rules. It ruled that
the testimony that had been wrongly compelled was inadmissible. Id. at 235.
It is not clear, however, that the ruling extended an exclusionary remedy to the witness privilege
for the first time. As Smith notes, some of the cases leading up to the Garbeit decision resulted in
exclusion of witness testimony. See Regina v. Owen, 173 Eng. Rep. 818 (Stafford Assizes 1839); Rex
v. Lewis, 172 Eng. Rep. 1190 (Hereford Assizes 1833); Smith, supra note 25, at 171-74. None of
these cases, however, appears to have been about what to do with wrongly compelled self-incriminating
testimony. See, e.g., Rex v. Britton, 174 Eng. Rep. 101, 102 (Winchester Assizes 1833). Instead,
these cases grappled with how to deal with the fact that witnesses had given self-incriminating testimony
under oath. See Owen, 173 Eng. Rep. at 818; Lewis, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1190; Rex v. Tubby, 172 Eng.
Rep. 1084 (Bury Assizes 1833); Rex v. Haworth, 172 Eng. Rep. 693, 694 (Yorkshire Lent Assizes
1829). Because the confession rule that applied to pretrial examinations made confessions under oath
per se inadmissible, a number of witnesses that had incriminated themselves through testimony given
in prior trials sought to shelter themselves from their previous statements by arguing for an analogous
application of the confession rule. See Smith, supra note 25, at 153-56, 171-75. The proper question
for the historian to ask about the existence of an exclusionary rule for the witness privilege is what
happened to self-incriminating testimony given by a witness that had invoked the privilege but whose
invocation of the privilege had been wrongly overruled. This is the situation to which the Garbett deci-
sion attached an exclusionary remedy, but it is not clear from the cases that Smith discusses whether
an exclusionary remedy existed before Garbett.
On the other hand, a discussion by the Vermont Supreme Court in an 1840 case indicates-
although somewhat cryptically-that Smith's point may be correct. In Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vt.
491 (1840), the court wrote:
A rule that the testimony should be given in all cases, but should never after be used for
the purpose of procuring a conviction of crime, would be much more conducive to the
reasonable ends of justice, and at the same time afford full protection to the witness. It
is well settled that the testimony, if freely given, may be afterwards used against the
witness. But such is not the law. I know indeed of no rule to exclude the testimony
being given in evidence against a witness, even in a prosecution of a criminal nature,
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But it is the breadth of the witness privilege in these years that stands out
most strongly.
C. The Transactional Scope of the Common-Law Witness Privilege
After a long and controversial development, the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause is today understood to require a grant of what is
known as "use plus use-fruits immunity" in order to compel a witness to
give otherwise privileged testimony.' Under this standard, a person who
is compelled under a court's contempt power to incriminate himself "may
[subsequently] be prosecuted, but neither the compelled statement nor any
evidence it led to ('fruits') can be introduced in the criminal trial."55
The current "use plus use-fruits" immunity rule supersedes the
broader rule of "transactional" immunity that the Supreme Court
established in 1892 in Counselman v. Hitchcock.56 Under this latter rule,
legally compelled self-incrimination mandated "absolute immunity" from
subsequent prosecution for those transactions about which the witness
testifiedY
although the witness were compelled to testify under the requisitions of a court ofjustice.
It is obvious, then, that the only security of the witness is in silence.
Id. at 493. The suggestion in Chamberlain thus is that no exclusionary rule attached even to wrongly
compelled witness testimony.
Even so, the question of the scope of the early-nineteenth-century witness privilege does not turn
on the presence of an exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule only became important after a breach
of the privilege. So long as courts observed and enforced the witness privilege-and I have indicated
above that a number of courts appear to have been zealous in doing so-the availability of an exclusion-
ary remedy was not an issue.
54. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,457-59 (1972) (holding that in order to compel
incriminating testimony, the government must confer immunity (1) from introduction of that testimony
in subsequent criminal prosecutions and (2) from introduction of any discoveries made as a result of
that testimony); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1964) (holding that a witness
in a state prosecution may not be compelled to give incriminating testimony unless immunized from
the introduction of the testimony, as well as from the introduction of any discoveries made as result
of the testimony, in any subsequent federal prosecution).
55. Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 858. The use plus use-fruits exclusionary rule that attaches
to nondefendant witness testimony is broader than the exclusionary rule that attaches to a pretrial
suspect's statements under the Miranda rule. In the latter case, the fruits of a non-Mirandized statement
are admissible even when the statement itself is not. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
(admitting testimony from a witness to whom police were led by information obtained in a statement
by the suspect that was itself inadmissible under Miranda); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985) (admitting evidence from a subsequent confession despite the inadmissibility of a prior
confession underMiranda). The scope of the pretrial exclusionary rule-which is the functional equiva-
lent of the scope of the immunity required to extinguish the pretrial privilege, see id. at 312 (arguing
that an "expansive view" of the exclusionary rule "effectively immunizes the suspect")-has, unlike
its nondefendant witness analogue, remained virtually unchanged since the late eighteenth century. See
infra note 60 and accompanying text.
56. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
57. Id. at 586 ("In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment [abrogating the
privilege], to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to
which the question relates.").
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The Counselman rule of transactional immunity was, in turn, a depar-
ture from a narrower "testimonial" immunity rule that characterized the
constitutional doctrine in leading American jurisdictions in the 1860s.58
Under the "testimonial" immunity rule, a witness could be compelled to
give self-incriminating testimony under the threat of the court's contempt
power so long as the witness was granted immunity from the introduction
of the testimony itself in any subsequent criminal prosecution. 9 Unlike
the "use plus use-fruits" rule, the "testimonial" rule empowered the state
to use compelled self-incriminating testimony to build a criminal case
against the witness.
Going back still further into the history of self-incrimination doctrine,
however, the common-law witness privilege in the first decades of the cen-
tury carried a broader immunity standard that more closely resembled
Counselman's transactional immunity rule. It should be noted that the
confession rule that applied to self-incriminating statements by pretrial
suspects was characterized by a narrower testimonial immunity as early as
the late eighteenth century." Moreover, there was a deep tension
between the rule protecting witnesses from questions that would subject
them to moral disgrace, on the one hand, and any kind of immunity statute,
on the other. If criminal behavior imputed moral disgrace, it would seem
that no immunity statute could have extinguished the witness privilege.6'
Nonetheless, both courts and legislatures during this period treated trans-
actional immunity as the required standard.
1. Transactional Immunity Cases.-Two prominent federal cases in
this period imply (albeit ambiguously) that the common-law witness priv-
ilege was understood to require transactional immunity. In the first,
Justice Samuel Chase, sitting in 1800 as circuit judge in a prosecution
under the Sedition Act, associated the extraction of self-incriminating
testimony with grants of full immunity from subsequent prosecution.
Chase stated that "[e]very person ... is protected by law from compulsion
to criminate himself; but, I suppose, if [a witness] give[s] his evidence, the
government of the United States is pledged not to institute a prosecution
58. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 911-19.
59. Seeid. at 858, 911-12.
60. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (Cr. Cas. 1783) (admitting fruits evi-
dence because "although confessions improperly obtained cannot be received in evidence, yet any acts
done afterwards might be given in evidence, notwithstanding they were done in consequence of such
confession"); see also AUGUSTIN S. CLAYTON, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
132 (Milledgeville, Ga., S. Grantland 1819) (stating only that improperly obtained confessions are not
"to be read against him [the suspect]"), cited and quoted in AMAR, supra note 4, at 222 n.205.
61. I have not encountered a discussion of the tension between the moral disgrace rule and the
immunity standard in the sources of this period. In recent years, the fact that the privilege can be abro-
gated by conferring immunity on the witness has been understood to undermine privacy-based rationales
for the privilege. But there is no evidence of awareness of the problem in the early sources.
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against him. Of this he may be assured."62 In the second case, the lit-
igants in the 1807 treason prosecution of Aaron Burr disputed whether or
not a witness who sought to invoke the witness privilege was bound to
accept a pardon offered by the government that would have abrogated the
witness's privilege. Both sides agreed that, if valid, the pardon would
eliminate the witness's claim of privilege. Neither side intimated that a
lesser form of immunity could abrogate the witness privilege.63
2. Transactional Immunity Statutes.-The immunity statutes enacted
in common-law jurisdictions throughout the eighteenth century and into the
early nineteenth century offer the best evidence that abrogation of the
common-law witness privilege in the early nineteenth century required a
grant of transactional immunity. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in Kastigar v. United States,' immunity statutes "have historical
roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence. " ' An immunity statute
62. United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 245 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). Chase's
comment was in response to counsel for the defense, who had stated that he "understood that some of
the witnesses who are to be examined to prove the guilt of the accused, were themselves, in the
estimation of the law, equally guilty." Id. Defense counsel requested, therefore, that it be made
"known to those who were in any degree implicated, that they are not bound to accuse themselves, and
may withhold if they think proper, such part of their evidence as has a tendency to criminate
themselves." Id. Chase's response is somewhat mysterious. If the government were required to offer
immunity to all those who responded to questions under legal compulsion, there would be no need to
warn witnesses about their privilege to decline to answer questions, nor would there be any dispute over
whether a witness could refuse to answer a question. The only legal question would concern the scope
of the immunity that the government would be required to grant to a witness after the fact of the
witness's testimony. Moreover, if taken at face value, Chase's proposition would lead to an unwork-
able immunity rule. The rule proposed by Chase would create a strong incentive for wrongdoers to
volunteer testimony related to their wrongdoing because the prosecution would be "pledged" to immu-
nize them against subsequent prosecution. Note that Chase not only suggested a transactional immunity
remedy, he also agreed to give a prophylactic warning to all witnesses.
63. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 63-64 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). Before Dr.
Erick Bollman was called before the grand jury, the government's chief prosecutor, George Hay,
addressed the court for the prosecution. Bollman had provided the federal government with consider-
able evidence, and in return President Jefferson "communicated to [Hay a] pardon," which Hay had
offered Bollman. Id. at 63. Bollman, however, refused the pardon, sensing that it might be seen as
an admission of guilt. See id. Thus when the grand jury sought to inquire into his knowledge of the
Burr affair, the issue arose whether a witness who was offered a pardon but declined to accept it could
refuse to testify before the grand jury on the ground that "no man is bound to criminate himself." Id.
Bollman's counsel argued that the pardon had been refused and therefore Bollman was not insulated
from future prosecution, or, in the alternative, that "no pardon except by statute could protect a party
against criminal prosecution." Id. at 64. The differing interpretations of presidential pardon power
notwithstanding, the salient point is that all parties involved understood a form of transactional
immunity to be the necessary antecedent to compelled self-incriminating testimony.
Note that this sequence was not the same one that is usually cited regarding the privilege in
Burr's trial. The question of whether Mr. Willie, Burr's secretary, could be compelled to testify to the
meaning and authenticity of a letter sent to Burr in cipher has long been discussed as another important
early privilege case. See In re Willie, 25 F. Cas. 38, 40-41 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e).
64. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
65. Id. at 445; see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2281, at 492.
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confers immunity on a witness or a class of witnesses in such a way as to
extinguish the witness privilege. By insulating the witness from the
incriminating impact of his testimony, the immunity statute requires the
witness to furnish self-incriminating testimony under the threat of
contempt.66 Thus, since their beginnings, immunity statutes have been
employed to prosecute consensual crimes that are otherwise difficult to
detect such as illegal gambling, bribery, dueling, and usury.
Today, immunity statutes are constitutionally required to give the
witness immunity both from the introduction of the witness's compelled
testimony and from the introduction of any evidence derived from that
testimony-in other words, "use plus use-fruits" immunity.67 The earliest
immunity statutes, however, consistently conferred "transactional" immun-
ity in order to compel testimony that would otherwise have been privileged.
That is, they granted absolute immunity from prosecution for the trans-
action or transactions underlying the compelled testimony. The first such
statute was a 1710 English enactment designed to crack down on
gaming.6" The statute authorized suits for the recovery of gambling
losses, either by the loser himself or by any person after three months from
the date of the loss, and empowered the latter to sue for treble damages.69
"[Flor the better discovery of the monies," the act provided that defendants
sued under its provisions "shall be obliged and compellable to answer upon
Oath such Bill or Bills as shall be preferred against ... them for
discovering the sum ... so won at play . "70 But the next section of
the statute stated:
Provided always. .. That upon the Discovery and Repayment of the
Money... the Person or Persons who shall so discover and repay
the same ... shall be acquitted indemnified and discharged from any
further or other Punishment Forfeiture or Penalty which he or they
may have incurred by the playing for or winning such Money or
other thing so discovered and repaid ......
Over the next century, Parliament enacted similar grants of immunity from
criminal sanction in connection with a number of crimes that were difficult
to detect without the testimony of persons involved in the crimes.'
66. See MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 143, at 219.
67. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445.
68. See An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 9 Anne, ch. 18, §§
3-4 (1710) (Eng.).
69. See id. at § 2.
70. Id. at ch. 14, § 3.
71. Id. § 4; see generally Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571 & n.13 (1963) (describing the enact-
ment of the 1710 immunity provision).
72. A particularly favored subject for the enactment of immunity provisions was bribery of public
officials, for which Parliament enacted immunity provisions in 1725 and again in 1742. See 8
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The colonial assemblies of New York enacted similar transactional
immunity statutes beginning in the 1770s. One act provided that suspects
examined under oath by justices of the peace regarding private lotteries
were "exempted from . . . Penalty, and from all prosecutions" for their
own illegal lottery activities. 3 In another act, gaming winners were made
compellable to testify in suits by losers for the recovery of the losses of the
latter. Like the English act of 1710, it provided that winners testifying
under compulsory process of the court "shall be acquitted, indemnified and
discharged from any further or other Punishment, Forfeiture, or Penalty
which he or they may have incurred by the playing for or winning such
Money."74 Moreover, in several high-profile colonial cases, colonial
assemblies granted transactional immunity to particular witnesses in order
to compel self-incriminating testimony.75
After the Revolution and into the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, a number of American jurisdictions including New York, contin-
ued to adopt immunity statutes granting transactional immunity.76 New
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2281, at 492. The Wimesses Act of 1806, passed in conjunction with the
impeachment of Lord Melville, also included a transactional immunity provision. See Smith, supra
note 25, at 159-61 (citing Witnesses' Declaratory Bill, 1806, 46 Geo. 3, ch. 37 (Eng.)). In 1825,
Parliament's wholesale reorganization of the law restricting the activities oflabor organizations included
a clause providing
that all and every Persons and Person who shall or may offend against this Act, shall and
may, equally with all other persons, be called upon and compelled to give his or her
Testimony... and that in all such Cases every Person having given his or her Testimony
or Evidence ... shall be and is hereby indemnified of, from and against any Information
to be laid, or Prosecution to be commenced against him or her, for having offended in the
Matter wherein or relative to which he, she, or they shall have given Testimony ....
An Act to Repeal the Laws Relating to the Combination of Workmen, and to Make Other Provisions
in Lieu Thereof, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129, § 6 (1825) (Eng.). In 1828, Parliament enacted a statute
conferring absolute immunity on financial agents for prosecutions arising out of embezzlements in
which the agents
have disclosed such Act, on Oath, in consequence of any compulsory Process of any
Court of Law or Equity in any Action, Suit, or Proceeding which shall have been bond
fide instituted by any Party aggrieved, or if [the agents] shall have disclosed the same in
any Examination or Deposition before any Commissioners of Bankrupt.
An Act for Consolidating and Amending the Laws in England Relative to Larceny and Other Offences
Connected Therewith, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 29, § 52 (1827) (Eng.); see also An Act to Render More
Effective an Act, Passed in the Thirty Seventh Year of His Present Majesty, for Preventing the
Administering or Taking of Unlawful Oaths, 52 Geo. 3, ch. 104, § 3 (1812) (Eng.) (enacting a transac-
tional immunity provision). See generally 2 JOHN Prr TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 1310, at 1176 (3d ed. London, W. Maxwell 1858) (describing parliamentary enactments
rendering the witness privilege "valueless" "by an Act of indemnity").
73. An Act More Effectually to Prevent Private Lotteries, ch. 1542, 1772 N.Y. Laws 674, 676,
reprinted in 5 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 351,
354 (Albany, Lyon 1894) [hereinafter COLONIAL LAWS].
74. Id. at 623.
75. See LEVY, supra note 1, at 383-87.
76. See Frazee v. State, 58 Ind. 8, 10 (1878) (comparing two Indiana gaming statutes, one of
which provided transactional immunity for more serious offenses); Hirsch v. State, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxter)
89, 90 (1874) (addressing transactional immunity statutes related to gaming that were enacted in 1829
HeinOnline -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  847 1998-1999
Texas Law Review [Vol. 77:825
York passed transactional immunity statutes with respect to usury,77
gaming,78 and dueling.79 Very little litigation appears to have been
generated by the transactional immunity statutes, perhaps because it was
well-settled by the nineteenth century that, like the de facto immunity that
resulted from the expiration of a statute of limitations, absolute immunity
from subsequent prosecution abrogated the witness privilege.'
As we shall see in Part V, mid-nineteenth-century state legislatures
began to enact more narrowly drawn immunity statutes conferring
testimonial, rather than transactional, immunity. Ultimately these new,
narrower immunity statutes forced American courts to come to terms with
the relationship between the common-law witness privilege and the consti-
tutional self-incrimination provisions. For now, however, the important
point is that through the 1820s, the immunity granted to certain classes of
witnesses by Parliament, the colonial assemblies, and the state legislatures
of the Early Republic was transactional, conferring absolute immunity from
subsequent prosecution.
III. Explaining the Common-Law Witness Privilege: Common-Law Fact-
Finding in the Age of Disqualification Rules
The witness privilege of the early nineteenth century, then, was
distinguished by four striking features: its breadth, its transactional scope,
and 1841); State v. Hatfield, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 231, 232 (1859) (interpreting a transactional immunity
statute); Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 215, 218 (1851) (discussing an 1848 act conferring transactional
immunity on witnesses); Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 490, 495 (1884) (discussing a statute
granting witnesses "absolute indemnity and complete amnesty against any possible penalty or procedure
against him for any crimination or implication in the offence indicated by the pending prosecution in
which he was called to testify"); In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 528, 539-40 (1858) (discussing an 1858
Wisconsin transactional immunity statute). The 1710 English gaming immunity statute was held to be
in effect under federal common law in United States v. Dixon, 25 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D.C. 1830)
(No. 14,970) (Cranch, J.).
77. See An Act for Preventing Usury, ch. 13, 1787 N.Y. Laws 365, 367 (providing that persons
accused of usury must answer bills of discovery in chancery, and that "upon the discovery and re-
payment... the person or persons who shall so discover, and repay or return the same as aforesaid,
with costs of suit, shall be acquitted and discharged from any further or other punishment, forfeiture
or penalty").
78. See An Act to Prevent Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, ch. 46, 1801 N.Y. Laws 70 (making
offenders competent wimesses and discharging them of all penalties). This act was expressly modeled
on An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 9 Anne, ch. 14 (1710) (Eng.).
79. See An Act to Prevent Duelling, ch. 45, § 4, [1813] 2 N.Y. Laws 192 ("[A]ny person
offending against this act, shall be a competent witness against any other person offending in like
manner, and may be compelled to appear and give evidence in said court touching the premises, but
shall not thereby be criminated himself.").
80. See, e.g., People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) (noting that once the
statute of limitations has passed, a witness cannot claim the privilege); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 2281, at 494-95 (stating that the view that transactional immunity statutes, "by expurgating the
crime, remove the privilege, has prevailed wherever the question has been decided, except in the
jurisdiction of Tennessee, where some doubt has been expressed" (footnote omitted)).
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its treatment as a rule enforceable by courts rather than a personal
privilege, and its common-law, as opposed to constitutional, status. This
Part suggests that these characteristics of the late-eighteenth-century witness
privilege are best explained by reference to the strong parallels between the
privilege and the rule that disqualified witnesses for interest in the outcome
of the case. Indeed, each characteristic that distinguished the witness
privilege of the late eighteenth century from the privilege that attaches to
witnesses today is attributable to doctrinal overlap between the witness
privilege and the interested-witness disqualification rule: Like the disqual-
ification rule, the witness privilege covered witnesses with merely civil
interests at stake; like the disqualification rule, the witness privilege was
enforced actively by courts with or without the request of the witness; like
the disqualification rule, which could only be circumvented by removing
the interest in question, the privilege could only be abrogated by a com-
plete grant of immunity from subsequent prosecution; and like the disqual-
ification rule, the witness privilege rested on a common-law rather than a
constitutional basis. As this quick comparison suggests, and as this Part
describes in greater detail, a strong connection existed between the late-
eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century witness privilege and the disqual-
ification rules. More broadly, the common-law privilege was linked to an
approach to fact-finding that has long since been abandoned-an approach
to fact-finding built around oaths, the common-law rules of disqualification,
and the common-law privilege.
A. The Witness Disqualification Rules
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, individuals with a financial
interest in the event of a civil suit were disqualified from testifying under
oath. Parties were disqualified from testifying on the ground that they
were necessarily interested."1 Similarly, interested nonparty witnesses
were neither permitted to testify in furtherance of their own interests, nor
were they compellable to testify against their interests. s2
Lord Chief Baron Jeffrey Gilbert's treatise on evidence, written in the
early 1700s, formed the point of departure for systematic thinking about
the law of evidence and the rules of disqualification in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.' Though Gilbert's primary focus was on
81. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 575, at 804-05 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1979). Parties, however, were often able to tell their story unswom while in the process of arguing
their case. Indeed, especially when not represented by counsel, this unsworn testimony was critical
to the common-law trial. See Langbein, Historical Origins, supra note 3, at 1048-71; Langbein, Before
the Lawyers, supra note 3, at 283-84.
82. See, e.g., I SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 72 (4th Am.
ed. New York, Gould, Banks & Co. 1839).
83. See ANON. [JEFFREY GILBERT], THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (photo. reprint 1979) (Dublin, Sarah
Cotter 1754). Although modem texts most often use "Geoffrey," Michael Macnair has indicated that
1999]
HeinOnline -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  849 1998-1999
Texas Law Review
written evidence, his central concern with respect to unwritten evidence
was the witness that was "totally excluded from all Attestation ... for
want of Integrity and Discernment."' The central ground for
incompetency was interest in the suit. Interest, according to Gilbert,
was rather a Ground for Distrust than any just Cause of Belief; for
Men are generally so short-sighted as to look at their own private
Benefit which is near to them, rather than to the Good of the World
that is more remote, therefore from the nature of human Passions
and Actions, there is more Reason to distrust such a bias'd
Testimony, than to believe it.85
As a corollary to this rule, a party could not be a witness in his own cause,
for it was "not to be presumed that a Man who complains without Cause,
or defends without Justice, shou'd have Honesty enough to confess it."86
Another class of "Persons excluded from testimony" in Gilbert's exposition
of the law of evidence was made up of those who were "stigmatized" by
the prior commission of one of "several Crimes that so blemish[ed]" the
character as to render their testimony untrustworthy.' As with those that
were disqualified for interest, those that had been convicted of a
"Falsehood and other Crimes against the common Principles of Honesty
and Humanity" ("crimen falsi") could not be trusted to give evidence "in
Matters of such Importance as all Affairs of Justice are."88 Religious
nonbelievers, too, were disqualified on the theory that the oaths that were
viewed as ensuring the truthfulness of testimony would have no meaning
for atheists.89
contemporaries spelled Gilbert's name "Jeffrey." See Michael Macnair, Sir Jeffrey Gilbert and His
Treatises, 15 J. LEGAL HISr. 252, 261 n. 1 (1994). Macnair further indicates that Gilbert's treatise was
written sometime in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, most likely the first ten years, even
though it was not published until 1754, close to thirty years after his death. See id. at 259-60, 266
n.107. Based on persuasive textual evidence suggesting that Gilbert wrote his treatise between the
passage of the Treason Act of 1696, which allowed criminal defendants in treason cases to call sworn
witnesses in their own defense, and a subsequent act of 1702, which extended this right to criminal
defendants in all felony trials, George Fisher further argues that Gilbert must have written his treatise
in this six-year window. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 617
n.161 (1997).
84. GILBERT, supra note 83, at 86.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 94. According to Wigmore, the rule of disqualification for interested third-party
witnesses was originally a corollary to the rule disqualifying parties from testifying under oath. See 2
WIGMORE, supra note 81, § 575, at 804-05. By Gilbert's time, however, the relationship between the
rules had been inverted: The party-disqualification rule had come to be explained as following from the
principle of disqualification for interest.
87. GILBERT, supra note 83, at 100-01 ("But where a Man is convicted of Falsehood and other
Crimes against the common Principles of Honesty and Humanity, his Oath is of no Weight. . .
88. Id. at 101.
89. See id. at 103. Several historians argue that Gilbert's attempt to sort evidence into rigidly pre-
scribed categories of trustworthy and untrustworthy and his total exclusion of the latter can be
understood as the manifestation of a Lockean epistemology that sought to reduce fact-finding to
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According to Gilbert, then, the primary rationale for the disqualifica-
tion rules was distrust of the testimony that the disqualified witness would
have given and fear of the harmful impact that such untrustworthy testi-
mony would have on the fact-finding work of the common-law courts.90
It is not entirely clear, however, that this reliability rationale provided an
accurate description of the beliefs of courts and lawyers in the late eigh-
teenth century. By the latter part of the century, the disqualification rules
had come to be seen by at least some judges as harmful to the fact-finding
mission of the common-law trial. Lord Mansfield, for example, circum-
vented the disqualification rules by shuttling cases into arbitration in order
to obtain party and interested-witness testimony.91
If eighteenth-century lawyers and judges doubted whether the disqual-
ification rules promoted reliable outcomes, reliability alone cannot account
for these rules. Rather, the disqualification rules appear to have performed
other functions in the eighteenth century. Any legal regime that
understood as the manifestation of a Lockean epistemology that sought to reduce fact-finding to
mathematical formulae. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE
CAUSE" 27 (1991); Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of Evidence
Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1155-56 (1990); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious
Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 594 (1990)
[hereinafter Landsman, Contentious Spirit]; Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty": Theories of
Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries, 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 158-62 (1986).
Landsman's analysis presents Gilbert as an exponent of a nonadversarial way of thinking about the law
of evidence. Other historians have suggested that Gilbert's exclusionary principles are best understood
as emerging out of a common-law trial system that had yet to institute cross-examination as its
touchstone for sifting through dubious testimony. See WILLIAM TWINING, The Rationalist Tradition
of Evidence Scholarship, in RErHINKING EVIDENCE 37 (1990); John H. Langbein, Historical
Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172-
76 (1996). This debate over the primacy of institutional context or intellectual currents
notwithstanding, the central point is that Gilbert "conflated questions of admissibility and questions of
weight, and... suggested that both kinds of question could be governed by formal rules." TWINING,
supra, at 37.
90. Gilbert could not, however, wedge the rule prohibiting wives from testifying against husbands
into the reliability principle. Spouses were disqualified from testifying on each other's behalf on the
grounds of ctverture: "[Tihey are not to be believed, because their Interests are absolutely the same,
and therefore they can gain no more Credit when they attest for each other, than when any Man attests
for himself." GILBERT, supra note 83, at 96. But when Gilbert sought to explain why wives could
not be called to testify against their husbands, he was forced to abandon the reliability principle:
[I]t would be very hard that a Wife should be allowed as Evidence against her own
Husband, when she can't attest for him; such a Law would occasion implacable Divisions
and Quarrels, and destroy the very legal Policy of Marriage that has so contriv'd it, that
their interest should be but one; which it cou'd never be if Wives were admitted to
destroy the Interest of their Husbands, and the Peace of Families could not easily be
maintained, if the Law admitted any Attestation against the Husband.
Id. Gilbert's treatment of spousal incompetency anticipated the nineteenth-century shift away from
Gilbert's own reliability-based best-evidence theory of the disqualification rules and toward a public-
policy theory of evidentiary rules. See TWINING, supra note 89, at 37.
91. See Langbein, supra note 89, at 1185-86; James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth-
Century English Courtroom, 12 LAW & HIST. REV. 95, 112-13 (1994).
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disqualified so much relevant evidence was bound to have a substantive
effect on the kinds of cases that could be brought. Thus, the
disqualification rules may have served to discourage frivolous claims or to
channel contracts into written form.92 More importantly for our purposes,
the disqualification rules appear to have served, as George Fisher argues,
to protect the integrity of the oath and thereby protect the legitimacy of the
proceedings themselves.93 As far back as the ordeals, the common-law
trial had placed considerable weight on the sanction of ostensibly divine
guarantors. 4 By the eighteenth century, the ordeal had long since been
replaced by the oath. 5  But unlike the ordeal, the oath was a fragile
guarantor of the reliability of legal determinations: While the result of an
ordeal was ostensibly clear-cut, sworn testimony from opposing witnesses
might be contradictory. Faced with contradictory sworn testimony, the
common law would have been forced to acknowledge the fallibility of the
oath and the fallibility of its own determinations. By disqualifying criminal
defendants, civil parties, and nonparty witnesses with an interest in the
outcome of the case, however, the common law effectively prevented juries
from having to face contradictory sworn testimony.96
The witness disqualification rules, then, were grounded in the twin
principles of guaranteeing the reliability and the legitimacy of trial
outcomes. The disqualification rules precluded the placement of compro-
mised testimony before the court under oath, thereby keeping unreliable
testimony from being entered into evidence and preserving the idea of the
oath as an effective guarantor of truth. The common-law witness privilege
was grounded in these same principles of reliability and legitimacy.
B. The Common-Law Witness Privilege and the Disqualification Rules
1. The Conflation of the Witness Privilege and the Disqualification
Rules.-To late-twentieth-century eyes, the privilege against self-
incrimination and the now-antiquated disqualification rules appear to serve
very different purposes. The disqualification rules prevented a witness
from testifying, whereas the privilege allows a witness to decline to testify
at his option. Accordingly, the privilege appears to protect the person to
whom it applies; disqualification rules, on the other hand, are as likely to
hurt the person to whom they apply as they are to protect him. In the
92. I thank John Langbein, who suggested this explanation to me.
93. See Fisher, supra note 83, at 590-92.
94. On the ordeals, see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON-LAW
113-15 (5th ed. 1956).
95. On the abolition of the ordeals, see id. at 118-19. See also R. Van Caenegem, The Law of
Evidence in the Twelfth Century, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 297, 297-310 (Stephan Kutmer & J. Joseph Ryan eds., 1965).
96. See Fisher, supra note 83, at 624-26.
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early- to mid-nineteenth century, however, the distinction between the two
kinds of rules was less obvious. Whether or not, from the perspective of
the late twentieth century, the disqualification rules ought to have been
associated closely with the privilege against self-incrimination, a remark-
able number of lawyers and judges in the early nineteenth century conflated
disqualification and self-incrimination. As one New York court stated in
1841 while grappling with the relationship between the rule of disqualifica-
tion for interest and the privilege, "It must be admitted that there is no
great difference in principle between calling a party in interest, and calling
a witness whose answer may charge him with a debt, or subject him to a
civil suit .... 97 Indeed, as late as 1880, an article in the American Law
Review argued that the testimonial incompetence of criminal defendants at
common law had been "part and parcel of the prohibition against compul-
sory self-accusation." 98
English jurist Thomas Peake's 1801 evidence treatise exemplified the
contemporary conflation of the witness privilege and disqualification for
interest. The rule of disqualification for interest attached to persons rather
than testimony. It did not distinguish between the different kinds of
testimony, whether self-exculpatory or self-incriminating, that the interested
witness might give. Rather, it applied to all those who had a financial
interest in the event of the suit. By contrast, the witness's privilege in
twentieth-century practice attaches to testimony rather than persons. It
applies to particular kinds of testimony without regard to the status of the
witness as interested or not interested in the suit. Peake's treatise,
however, suggests that in 1800 lawyers and judges did not make this dis-
tinction between privileged testimony and disqualified persons. Consider
the following passage, placed by Peake under the heading "Of Persons who
are privileged from giving Evidence":
I observed before, that no one could be compelled to give
evidence which tended to charge himself with a crime. It has also
been held, that the law protects a man's pecuniary interests, as well
as his person; and that therefore he is not compellable to give any
answer which may subject him to a civil action, or charge himself
with a debt. But as a man cannot, by making his interest the same
as that of the party who has a right to his testimony, deprive such
party of the benefit of it; so neither can he, by voluntarily acquiring
an interest the other way, enable himself to object to give evidence;
and therefore where a subscribing witness to a promissory note
97. Cook v. Spaulding, I Hill 586, 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
98. Win. A. Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to Testify, 14 AM. L. REv. 753,
766, 766-67 (1880).
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afterwards became bail for the maker, he was compelled to give
evidence of the execution."
Peake thus conflated the witness privilege with the disqualification rule by
including in his discussion of rules ostensibly applying to persons (i.e., the
disqualification rules) a reference to rules ostensibly attaching to testimony
(i.e., the witness privilege). Indeed, in the passage quoted here, Peake
shifted from dealing with disqualified persons to discussing types of
privileged testimony and back again. Beginning the passage with a heading
referring to "Persons" privileged from giving evidence, he first discussed
not persons who were privileged but testimony that was privileged:
"evidence which tended to charge [the witness] himself with a crime [or
which] . . . . may subject him to a civil action, or charge himself with a
debt. " "° He then returned to "persons," stating that "a man cannot, by
becoming bail, deprive a party of his evidence.""0 ' Under a heading
ostensibly addressing the rule of disqualification for interest, then, Peake
discussed both the witness privilege and the doctrine of disqualification,
never making any real distinction between the two.
2. Explaining the Conflation of the Witness Privilege and the
Disqualification Rules.-The blurred distinction between the disqualification
rules and the witness privilege may be traced to one primary conceptual
problem: the difficulty of explaining how the disqualification rules pro-
moted truth-seeking when an interested witness gave testimony against
interest. From the standpoint of enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding
process, precluding testimony from a witness whose interest was consistent
with the party seeking to introduce the testimony made some sense. A
witness was not allowed to give testimony when he had a strong incentive
to lie and when the party calling him stood to benefit from that lie. Cases
in which the witness's testimony was likely to cut against his interest,
however, were considerably more difficult to reconcile with the goal of
promoting truth. In particular, two distinct situations were difficult to
explain on the basis of the reliability rationale for the rule of disqualifica-
tion for interest: the practice of disqualifying a witness who volunteered to
testify against his interest (i.e., a witness who sought to waive the
disqualification rule); and the practice of preventing a party from calling
99. PEAKE, supra note 51, at 192-93.
100. Id. at 132.
101. Id. at 132-33. This assertion restated the then-familiar rule that a person could not disqualify
himself by voluntarily acquiring an interest in the suit. See Starr v. Tracy, 2 Root 528, 529 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1797) ("[A] witness may not deprive a party of his testimony by any voluntary interest he
may take upon himself .... ."); Simons v. Payne, 2 Root 406, 407 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1796) ("The
parties have an interest in the testimony of the witnesses, and a witness by his own voluntary act, shall
not deprive him of it.").
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a witness whose interest in the case was adverse to the calling party's
interest (i.e., a party who sought to waive the disqualification rule).
The problem of testimony against interest caused considerable
confusion. Some treatise writers either glossed over the problem by simply
stating that the witness disqualification rule was a per se rule applying to
interested witnesses regardless of whether the testimony favored or dis-
favored the witness's interest."°  Several courts, however, resolved the
dilemma of whether an adverse party could waive the disqualification rule
by holding that when an interested witness was called by the party whose
interests opposed the witness's, the party would be allowed to waive the
disqualification rule. In Connor v. Bradey,103 a New York appellate
court held that a party could waive the disqualification rule when the
witness's interest opposed the party's."°  Connor was an action on a
promissory note, against which the defendant set up a defense of usury.
When the defense in Connor called the unnamed real plaintiff in interest to
prove that the note was usurious, counsel for the nominal plaintiff objected
on the ground that, as the real plaintiff, the witness was interested in the
outcome of the suit and thus incompetent to testify under the rule of
disqualification for interest."~ The defense, however, responded that
because "this interest would operate in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant," the defendant might waive the objection."° The court agreed
and "allowed the witness to be sworn."107 Under the theory of the
Connor court, parties could be trusted to self-regulate when calling witnes-
ses whose interests were opposed to theirs.'
But the Connor court did not stop there. Once the real party in inter-
est was sworn as a witness, the court allowed him to decline to answer
questions, citing his "interest[] . . . in the contract from the
beginning."l9 The Connor court thus allowed a party to waive the dis-
qualification rule, but also permitted the interested witness to invoke the
witness privilege to defeat the party's waiver. By allowing the witness to
invoke his interest to refuse to answer specific questions, the court
collapsed much of the distinction between the witness privilege and the rule
102. See, e.g., OLIVER L. BARBOUR, THE MAGISTRATE'S CRIMINAL LAW 380-81 (New York,
Gould & Co. 1841) ("It is a general rule of evidence, not to admit the testimony of a wimess who is
to be a gainer or loser by the event of the cause .... "); 2 ESPINASSE, supra note 41, at 708-09.
103. 1 Ant. N.P. Cas. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
104. Id. at 136.
105. Id. at 135.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 136; see also Baird v. Cochran, 4 Serg. & Rawle 397, 399 (Pa. 1818) (holding
that when a witness's interest was aligned with the plaintiff's, the witness was not disqualified when
the plaintiff objected to the witness's competence because the "plaintiff ... could have no reason to
object to his testimony").
109. Connor, I Ant. N.P. Cas. at 100.
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of disqualification for interest. The disqualification rule was no longer a
per se incompetence rule, but the witness privilege was broad enough to
cover testimony against the witness's civil interests.
3. Zephaniah Swift and the Conflation of the Witness Privilege and
the Disqualification Rules.-The Connor court did not completely collapse
the distinction between the witness privilege and the interested witness
disqualification rule. Under Connor, the disqualification rule was waivable
by a party, whereas the witness privilege was waivable by the witness. A
different approach to the problem of testimony against interest, however,
wholly dissolved the distinction between the two rules. Under this theory,
the disqualification rule was waivable not by an adverse party, but by the
witness himself. Accordingly, an interested witness could testify willingly
against his interests but could not be compelled to do so.
Connecticut jurist Zephaniah Swift was the most articulate advocate
of this last approach to the problem of interested witness testimony against
interest. Swift had written on the law of evidence in some detail as early
as 1796 in Volume Two of his six-volume treatise, A System of the Laws
of the State of Connecticut,"' and he subsequently expanded this treat-
ment in his 1810 publication, A Digest of the Law of Evidence."' Like
his contemporaries, Swift maintained that a witness was disqualified for an
interest in the lawsuit. He argued that even "if the interest be ever so
trifling, provided it be certain, it shall prevent a person from being a
witness."" 2 For Swift, however, the rule of disqualification for interest
was not an absolute prohibition on the testimony of interested persons.
Swift clarified that a "person may be admitted voluntarily to testify against
his interest, but cannot be compelled."" 3
According to Swift, the rule of disqualification for interest extended
only to testimony consistent with the interest of the witness. Witnesses
testifying against interest, Swift believed, were not disqualified; they could
testify voluntarily, but could not be compelled to testify."4 In Swift's
formulation, the witness privilege and the noncompellability aspect of the
disqualification rule were intertwined. Both protected witnesses, not
parties, and both were invocable only by the witness." 5
110. 2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 233-60
(Wyndham, Conn., John Byrne 1796).
111. SWIFT, supra note 49.
112. SWIFT, supra note 110, at 241.
113. Id.
114. See id. Gilbert appears to have supported a similar position on self-defeating interested
witnesses: "[I]f a man's swearing for his Interest can give no Credit, he must certainly give most Credit
when he swears against it." GILBERT, supra note 83, at 99.
115. Swift made this association between the disqualification and witness privilege rules explicit
in his 1810 Digest. In his treatment of unwritten evidence, which took up most of the book, he first
set out the rules relating to witness disqualification "for want of understanding," for religious nonbelief,
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For Swift, then, the rule that a witness was disqualified on account of
interest did not mean that the witness was wholly incompetent to testify;
rather, it meant that no party could force the witness by process of the
court to testify against his own interest. Swift reasoned that this principle
of witness testimony was made clear by analogy to the testimony of parties:
It is clear that no party in a suit can be compelled to produce
evidence against himself, and the Courts will not grant leave to a
stranger, to inspect the books of a corporation, to obtain evidence in
his own favour against them. It would be extraordinary to say, that
a man may be called as a witness in a suit to which he is no party,
and be compelled for the benefit of one of the parties, litigant to
disclose a fact, which might subject him to a civil action, when the
parties themselves cannot be called upon. . . . It would seem the
doctrine, that a party cannot be compelled to produce evidence
against himself, must be abandoned, if a witness can be compelled
to testify against his interest." 6
Parties could not be compelled to testify against themselves; neither could
they testify in their own favor. Swift thought it would be absurd to say
that an innocent third party could be called into an ongoing suit and forced
to give testimony that could subject him to a civil action so long as the
parties themselves were not compellable to do the same:
Though a witness voluntarily testifying against his interest, unless he
has some other counter-balancing motive, will be entitled to credit;
yet if he is compelled to do it, he is placed under such a strong bias,
and inducement to prevaricate, that the law will not expose human
frailty to so dangerous a temptation.' ' 7
There were two sides of the disqualification rules. On the one hand, the
disqualification rules precluded a witness from testifying on behalf of his
own interest. On the other hand, they prevented a witness from being
compelled to testify against his own interest. If one side of the witness
disqualification rule served to prevent witnesses from testifying even if they
wanted to, the other side of the rule was functionally indistinguishable from
the witness privilege."'
for infamy on account of criminal conviction, and for interest. SwiFr, supra note 49, at 44, 44-73.
Swift then moved on to discuss "persons admitted to testify against their Interest." Id. at 44, 77-81.
As in 1796, Swift wrote that a witness was not "compellable to testify against his interest, or to answer
any question that will render him liable to an action, charge him with a debt, or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture." Id. at 77. He clarified, though, that a witness "may voluntarily testify against
his interest, in which case he is considered to be the best witness that can be had, and no objection can
be made to him by either party." Id.
116. Id. at 79.
117. Id.
118. Swift made the connection between the witness privilege and the rule of disqualification for
interest abundantly clear when he placed the "unquestionable maxim in criminal cases, that no man is
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4. The Impact of the Conflation of the Common-Law Witness Privilege
and the Disqualification Rules.-When the disqualification rule was under-
stood to give the witness the option of whether or not to testify against
interest, it was easily assimilable to the witness privilege. The proposition
that an interested witness was not incompetent to testify against his interest
but could himself decline to give such testimony made its way into the law
of Connecticut"9 and New York, z" as well as the federal common
law.'' Moreover, Swift's association of the witness privilege and the
disqualification rule was adopted by the prominent American jurist Simon
Greenleaf, who closely associated the maxim nemo tenetur with the third-
party interested witness disqualification rule2-so much so that he led
future scholars to suggest he was deeply confused about the relation
between the two.12'
Furthermore, the connection between the rule of disqualification for
interest and the witness privilege serves to explain the shape of the witness
privilege in the early nineteenth century. As this Article has sought to
establish, the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century witness privilege
was common law rather than constitutional law.24 In this respect, the
association of the witness privilege with the common-law rule of disqualifi-
cation for interest helped to preserve the common law as opposed to consti-
tutional status of the witness privilege. The doctrinal difficulty that
occupied treatise writers and courts during the earliest years of the nine-
teenth century was not the relationship between the witness privilege and
bound to criminate himself: Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare," under the heading "Ofpersons admitted
to testify against their Interest." Id. at 77, 77-79.
119. See Starr v. Tracy, 2 Root 528, 528-29 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1797); Simons v. Payne, 2 Root
406, 407 (Conn. 1796).
120. See Jackson v. Myers, 11 Wend. 533, 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (conceding that the plaintiff
might have called a witness who was a "party in interest" even though the witness's "interest was
against [the plaintiff]," but noting that "such [a] party in interest could not be compelled to testify" and
that the party in interest "was not a competent witness for the defendant" with whom his interest was
aligned); Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. 174, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (ruling that a party directly inter-
ested in a case involving debt could not be compelled to testify against her interests); People ex rel
McCall v. Irving, 1 Wend. 20, 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) (holding that "[a] party in interest cannot be
compelled to testify without his consent" and asserting that to allow compulsion of parties without their
consent "might lead to great abuses").
121. See Came v. McLane, 5 F. Cas. 89, 89 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 2,416) (ruling that when a
defendant calls a witness who is a partner of the plaintiff and the witness objects "to being sworn for
the defendants, because interested as a partner with the plaintiffs," the court will not "compel him to
swear contrary to his interest").
122. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 330 (Boston, Little &
Brown 1842).
123. See Smith, supra note 25, at 149, 150 (arguing that Greenleaf was "not so careful" in his
approach to the distinction between the witness privilege and the disqualification rule and that his
conflation of the two was "novel").
124. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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the constitutional self-incrimination clauses, but rather the relationship
between the witness privilege and the rule of disqualification for interest.
We have also seen that the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-
century privilege encompassed testimony that was against a witness's civil,
interests or exposed him to moral disgrace."z In cases such as Connor
and for treatise writers such as Swift, the conflation of the two rules
supported a broad witness privilege encompassing testimony that was
against a witness's civil interests or that indicated moral disgrace, in
addition to testimony that was self-incriminating.1 6  Indeed, the
disqualification-rule doctrine that a witness was incompetent to testify
against his civil interests was easily rearticulated as a privilege doctrine
allowing the witness to invoke a privilege against so testifying.
Similarly, for those who interpreted the witness privilege as a per se
bar on self-damaging testimony, the interested witness who was precluded
from testifying-willingly or otherwise-could just as well be said to have
possessed an unwaivable privilege from testifying against his interest.
Even the transactional scope of the early-nineteenth-century privilege can
be explained by reference to the theory of the disqualification rules. For
so long as a witness feared that his testimony might lead to his subsequent
prosecution, that testimony-like the testimony of an interested witness-
would be compromised and subject to the pressures of the witness's self-
interested motives.
Yet if the peculiar shape of the early nineteenth-century witness
privilege is rooted in its relationship to the disqualification rules, the
relationship between disqualification for interest and the witness privilege
ultimately contributed to the constitutionalization of the witness privilege.
For as lawyers, courts, and legislatures began to question the disqualifica-
tion rules, the witness privilege, too, came under considerable criticism
from those who saw the disqualification rules as obstacles to fact-finding
in the common-law trial. As a result, the protective shell of common-law
rules that had insulated the constitutional self-incrimination clauses began
to be chipped away. And the contraction of these common-law rules
forced courts and commentators alike to articulate for the first time the
relationship between the constitutional self-incrimination clauses and the
common-law witness privilege.
125. See supra subpart 11(B).
126. Swift wrote that "a witness is not bound to answer questions, the direct object and immediate
tendency of which are to degrade, disgrace, and disparage the witness, and shew his turpitude and
infamy." See SWIFT, supra note 49, at 79-80.
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IV. The Transformation of Common-Law Fact-Finding and the Narrowing
of the Common-Law Witness Privilege
A. The Transformation of the Law of Evidence, 1780-1850: The Decline
of the Disqualification Rules and the Rise of Cross-Examination
A new approach to fact-finding established itself in common-law
courts during the nineteenth century. Courts shifted away from reliance on
oaths and disqualification rules and moved toward an approach centered on
allowing juries to make credibility determinations with the aid of lawyers'
cross-examinations of witnesses."2  Prior to the critical decades at the
turn of the nineteenth century, the common law of evidence was characteri-
zed by (1) a focus on written evidence, (2) the exclusion of a great deal of
unwritten evidence through the disqualification rules, and (3) a heavy
reliance on the power of oaths."2  Around the turn of the century,
however, lawyers and judges began to reorganize the law of evidence
around the practice of examination and cross-examination by counsel. z9
At bottom, this transformation appears to have been driven by the
increased presence of lawyers in common-law proceedings, especially crim-
inal cases, and the newly aggressive tactics of examination and cross-
examination that lawyers developed in the late eighteenth century.30  As
127. See C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 14 (1997) (arguing that
"[t]he main problem" of nineteenth-century evidence law is accounting for the shift from "the old
exclusionary rules about competency of witnesses" to the "exclusionary, rule-based system that began
to govern testimony given in court").
128. See Langbein, supra note 89, at 1172 (arguing that "the central event in the formation of
modern law of evidence was the rapid development of adversary criminal procedure in the last quarter
of the eighteenth century"). Scholarship on the history of the law of evidence has long viewed the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the period from which the vast majority of the rules of evi-
dence derived. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127 (3d ed. 1944); JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 2 (Boston, Little
Brown & Co. 1898); John Henry Wigmore, A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence,
in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 691, 694-96 (Ernest Freund et al. eds.,
1908). For Wigmore, however, the "spring-tide" of evidentiary rules in the late eighteenth century was
the product not so much of changes in the law of evidence as it was the result of changes in the legal
literature. According to Wigmore, the appearance ofnisiprius reports after 1790 generated a medium
for the formal establishment of rules of evidence. The new report literature created a "sudden
precipitation of all that had hitherto been suspended in solution." Wigmore, supra, at 696. The claim
of the more recent scholarship, however, is that the emergence of a welter of new evidentiary rules was
not "a mere illusion of the historical record," but rather an important turn in the theory and practice
of the common-law trial. Langbein, supra note 89, at 1172.
129. See TWINING, supra note 89, at 37; see also Langbein, supra note 89.
130. See Langbein, supra note 89, at 1201-02. Other candidates for the cause of the shift in the
law of evidence include the influence of Jeremy Bentham's withering, if endlessly repetitive, critiques
of the common-law rules of evidence, and the rise of an ostensibly democratic political culture in
Jacksonian America. Bentham's role is discussed below, but I see him more as an important player
in an already-present trend toward the liberalization of the law of evidence. As George Fisher notes,
the argument from Jacksonian democracy is undermined by the shift away from rigid rules of evidence
in English practice during these years. See Fisher, supra note 83, at 661. Fisher discounts the
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lawyers came to dominate the common-law trial, the modem law of evi-
dence developed, centered on the practice of cross-examination, with
exclusionary rules based on the model of the hearsay rule; "[c]ross-
examination replaced oath as the fundamental safeguard for the receipt of
oral evidence, defeating the competency regime that had disqualified the
parties for interest, and allowing the hearsay rule to assume its ultimate
character." 3' Although English treatise writers of the early nineteenth
century continued to cite Gilbert with apparent approval, treatises tended
more and more to adopt an approach that placed lawyers, cross-
examination, and oral testimony, rather than witness disqualification, at the
center of the common-law trial.'32 In American practice, the lawyers'
literature of the Early Republic similarly reconceptualized the role of the
lawyer in the common-law trial. William Wyche of New York, author of
a late-eighteenth-century treatise on New York practice, strongly supported
careful evaluation of the credit of a compromised witness rather than
disqualification. According to Wyche, "[iut has been the unanimous and
rational inclination of great judges, in modem times, to confine the
objection to the credit, instead of the competency of witnesses, leaving the
"lawyerization" argument, countering that even though lawyers do not appear to have played a signifi-
cant role in criminal trials prior to the 1780s, there is no good reason to think that they did not play
an important role in civil trials. Id. at 660-61. If they did, Fisher's argument reasons, the law of evi-
dence could have relied more heavily on lawyers' cross-examinations long before the nineteenth
century. See id. at 661. Based on the evidence that I have seen, however, the new factor in common-
law trials was the emphasis on cross-examination as a means of sifting through contradictory testimony.
As explained in the following discussion, practitioners' manuals and periodicals placed new emphasis
on cross-examination and the lawyer's role in furthering the fact-finding process. See infra notes 132-
38 and accompanying text.
131. Langbein, supra note 89, at 1194 (citations omitted). To be sure, the nineteenth-century
approach to the law of evidence was not completely new; characteristics of the eighteenth-century
approach to the law of evidence persisted well into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Testimony of
Quakers, 1 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 141, 141-42 (1829) (framing the law of evidence, much as Gilbert
had, as "a wid[e] field for moral and philosophical disquisition"); see also TWINING, supra note 89,
at 71-72 (emphasizing continuity in common-law approaches to the law of evidence since the eighteenth
century).
132. In particular, writers like Thomas Peake and William David Evans, expanded greatly upon
Gilbert's central focus on the best evidence rule as the principle that explained the law of evidence.
See TWINING, supra note 89, at 42-46. Peake, for example, noted that he had needed to completely
revise Gilbert on oral testimony because "the rules of evidence in this respect have been so much
altered, and so much light has been thrown on them by modem decisions, that, comparatively, little
is to be collected from ancient books that is satisfactory on the subject." PEAKE, supra note 51, at xi.
Peake noted that "competence and credibility," which had been "so frequently confounded together,"
were now, thanks to Mansfield, "accurately defined, and well understood." Id. (emphasis in original).
Similarly, Espinasse remarked in 1801 that in recent years "great light has been thrown upon the
distinction between interest which affects the competency of a witness, and influence which only goes
to his credit." 2 ESPINASSE, supra note 41, at 710; see also R.J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS app. 128-33 (William David Evans trans., 1826) (discussing the best
evidence rule and emphasizing the difference between questions of admissibility and weight), discussed
in TWINING, supra note 89, at 44.
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question of their veracity open to such observations as the superior wisdom
and experience of the court may justly inforce." 33 Placing his faith in
a fact-finder's in-court observations, Wyche was deeply distrustful of the
system of disqualification rules and oaths with which the common-law trial
had sought to make determinations of fact."3
Zephaniah Swift represented a more halting and uncertain transition
to the new, lawyer-driven approach to the law of evidence. Swift equivoca-
ted between distrust of innovations in the common law and a new instru-
mentalist approach to judging that freely disowned established rules of law
when convenience so dictated.' 35 In 1810 Swift wrote:
The rules of evidence are of an artificial texture, not capable in all
cases of being founded on abstract principles of justice. They are
positive regulations founded on policy; and though they do not
profess to be always able to arrive at the truth, and must admit
133. WILLIAM WYCHE, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK IN CIVIL ACTIONS 159 (2d ed. New York, T. & J. Swords 1794).
134. In Wyche's view, truth was best determined by allowing the finder of fact to observe
witnesses under oral examination and cross-examination. Id. at 161-62. Wyche had a concern for the
truthfulness of a witness's testimony while under oath, a concern that Gilbert, with his reliance on the
oath to generate factual testimony, did not share. Wyche saw that even well-intentioned witnesses were
prone to error. "The imperfection of man," Wyche wrote, "will frequently render him liable to
deception." Id. at 160. "[F]acts are too often seen through a jaundiced eye." Id. Thus, Wyche
argued, in gauging the credibility of wimesses, the mere fact of the oath is insufficient. Instead, "it
is expedient to discuss the opportunities which the witness had of making just observations, and his
condition, circumstances, and temper of mind, at the time to which his evidence relates." Id. By way
of illustration, Wyche recounted the story of"a servant of the Portuguese ambassador [who] was seized
and ill treated by the populace [because] a substantial citizen [was] ready to depose, that he saw him
throw a fire ball into a house, which instantly burst into flames." Id. at 160 n.t. After being
confronted with the charge, however, the servant explained that he had merely been following
Portuguese custom in returning a piece of bread that had been lying in the street to the shop next door
to the house that had burst into flames. When the servant's story checked out, he was released. See
id. Wyche chalked the episode up to "an easy mistake, the wimess being on the other side of the way,
and intent on having the supposed criminal secured; to which we may add, that the consternation
occasioned by that portentous calamity would prevent an accurate observation." Id.
135. At times, Swift adopted a view that welcomed the overruling of "inconvenient" or
"unreasonable" rules. 1 SWIFT, supra note 110, at 46, 47. Indeed, Morton Horwitz has argued that
Swift led the way in the establishment of a new instrumentalist approach to the law in early-nineteenth-
century America that freely disowned inconvenient rules. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 23, 25-26 (1977). Yet Swift also argued that
"departure from well known, and established rules," could require courts subsequently to "retrac[e
their) steps, and recurH] to original principles." SWIFT, supra note 49, at viii. Swift wrote that,
[t]hough in some cases at first view, it might seem that a more perfect rule than the
Common-law might be adopted; and this has sometimes seduced Courts to depart from
it; yet when such new rule came to be traced through all its consequences, and applied
to the various cases that occurred, the wisdom of the Common-law has soon been
discovered, and generally acknowledged. It is extremely difficult at a single view, to
foresee all the consequences of a new principle. Of course, it is the safest method to
follow the guide of experience where it can be found.
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testimony which may be doubtful, and reject that which, in the
ordinary occurrences of life, might be relied on .... 136
Swift conceded that, despite its faults, the common law of evidence
"undoubtedly furnish[ed] the best criterion to ascertain the truth of facts,
consistent with the nature of human testimony." 37 Nonetheless, he advo-
cated narrowing the scope of the witness disqualification rules as a reform
calculated to improve upon the common law's fact-finding capacities. 3 '
Jeremy Bentham presented the critique of eighteenth-century evidence
law in its most radical form. Bentham's role in instigating changes in the
law of evidence has been questioned in recent years. 3 9 In particular, as
C.J.W. Allen has observed, accounts of the development of evidence law
that focus on Bentham's influence have difficulty explaining the rise of the
hearsay rule that Bentham vehemently opposed. 1"°  Nevertheless,
although English jurists such as Mansfield, some of the early English
treatise writers, and Americans like Swift and Wyche manifested some
amount of discomfort with the common-law disqualification rules, it was
Bentham who first set out to systematically demolish the whole of the
eighteenth-century law of evidence.' 4'
For Bentham, the law of evidence, with its hard-and-fast disqualifica-
tion rules, was an unmitigated disaster.42 In the practice of everyday
life, after all, decision-makers would hardly undertake to evaluate evidence
without considering all the relevant data. But this was precisely what the
exclusionary rules of the common law provided for. In everyday decision-
making, Bentham observed, "[e]vidence is the basis of justice; exclude
136. SWIFT, supra note 49, at xi.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 47-51, 53-54.
139. See generally ALLEN, supra note 127 (arguing that Bentham's influence on the nineteenth-
century law of evidence has been exaggerated). Allen suggests, however, thatBentham's influence may
have been greater in the United States than it was in England. See id. at 10-11.
140. See id. at 21-23, 181-86. For examples of the approach that places Bentham at the center
of the story, see A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 168, 171 (2d ed. 1914) ("Benthamism exactly answered
the immediate want of the day."); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND POLITICAL THEORY 21, 31 (1982) ("Bentham's attack inspired the great statutory reforms of the
law of evidence of 1843, 1851, and 1898. . . ."); 13 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 128, at 42 (approving
Lord Henry Brougham's statement that "the age of law reform and the age of Jeremy Bentham are one
and the same").
141. Bentham's primary writings on the law of evidence were written between 1802 and 1812, but
not published in English until the 1820s. See ALLEN, supra note 127, at 18; WILLIAM TWINING,
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 189 (1985).
142. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (London, Hunt& Clarke 1827)
[hereinafter BENTHAM, RATIONALE] (discussing the problems flowing from improper exclusions of
evidence); JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 4 (M. Dumont trans., London,
J.W. Paget 1825) [hereinafter BENTHAM, TREATISE] (characterizing evidence law as a "fixed design"
of "expenses, delays, and vexations").
1999]
HeinOnline -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  863 1998-1999
Texas Law Review [Vol. 77:825
evidence, you exclude justice." 43 Thus, according to Bentham, "with
a view to rectitude of decision, to the avoidance of the mischiefs attached
to undue decision, no species of evidence whatsoever, willing or unwilling,
ought to be excluded.""
American rhetoric in opposition to the disqualification rules existed
prior to the English publication of Bentham's writings on the law of
evidence. As early as 1805, a bold law reform pamphlet written by
Philadelphian Jesse Higgins criticized the rule of disqualification for
interest as "expos[ing] to full view the prodigious evil of our jurisprudence,
to shew the absurdity of common-law, and to suggest a competent remedy
for that evil by a reform." 45 But in the 1830s the vehemence of the
attacks on the disqualification rules increased as Bentham's influence made
itself evident in the pages of American legal journals."'4 Employing
arguments Bentham had advanced, an outpouring of articles picked apart
the disqualification rules. 47 Disqualification, it was argued, encouraged
143. 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 142, at 1.
144. 1 id. at 1.
145. ANON. [JESSE B. HIGGINS], SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES, OR THE REFORMATION OF
LAWSUITS AND JUSTICE MADE CHEAP, SPEEDY, AND BROUGHT HOME TO EVERY MAN'S DOOR:
AGREEABLY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ANCIENT TRIAL BY JURY, BEFORE THE SAME WAS
INNOVATED BY JUDGES AND LAWYERS, at iv (2d ed. Philadelphia, B. Graves 1805). The difficulty in
common-law proceedings "of getting at the truth in court," claimed Higgins, explained the expense and
delay plaguing the court system; the rules of the common law were "so contrived as to cut off the very
means of getting at the truth." Id. at 37. In place of the "intolerable expense, delay, and uncertainty
of lawsuits" at common law, id. at 38, Higgins proposed a system modeled on the principles of
arbitration, in which the fact-finding inquiry would be unhampered by arcane restrictions and
exclusions. Id. at 31. "[The natural and sure way to get out the truth [was] by questioning the
parties, and letting them altercate and question each other .... " Id. at 38. Higgins thus echoed Sir
Thomas Smith's famous line from the sixteenth century, "and so they stand a while in altercation."
SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114 (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982)
(1565). The Sampson pamphlet, which advocated a wide array of law reforms including codification,
is indicative of the extent to which reform in the law of evidence was linked to antebellum law reform
generally, and codification in particular.
146. Bentham's influence is palpable in the arguments advanced by the journal articles against the
disqualification rules. Just as evident, however, is a certain hesitation to invoke the controversial
Bentham by name. An American Jurist article advocating the abolition of the disqualification rules
stated: "Some distinguished names might be mentioned in support of the principles contended for in
this examination, but they are purposely omitted . . . ." Testimony of Persons Interested in a Suit, 3
AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 20, 26 (1830).
147. See, e.g., Competency of Parties as Witnessesfor Themselves, in LAW REFORM TRACTS No.
4, at 1 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1855) (decrying the lack of a rationale for the party disqualifica-
tion rule); The Evidence of Parties, 14 MONTHLY L. REP. 229, 229 (1851-52) (arguing that the disqual-
ification rule was "inconsisten[t]" and "absurdD"); Of the Disqualification of Parties as Witnesses, 5
AM. L. REG. 257, 267 (1857) (arguing that many of the disqualification rules should be abolished); On
the Competency of Witnesses, 3 AM. L. MAG. 333, 350-51 (1844) (noting that with the advent of the
jury system reliance on the exclusionary rules is inappropriate and that judges should strive to "open
the doors as wide as possible to all facts calculated to assist in attaining equal justice in the
controversy"); Rules of Evidence (No. I1l)-Incompetency of Witnesses from Interest, 6 AM. JURIST &
L. MAG. 18, 22, 44 (1831) (promoting the adoption of rules allowing interested witness testimony);
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fraud, offered a "bounty...' to the dishonest,"" 4 exempted wrongdoing
individuals from "liabilities to which they ought to be subject,"149 and
rested on an implausible view of the impact of interest on a witness's
veracity. 50 Above all, for the journal writers (as for Bentham) the
disqualification rules obstructed the "discovery of truth." '
Bentham's role appears to have been to supply a rhetoric that could be
put to use in promoting an independently existing opposition to the disqual-
ification rules. As a means of furthering fact-finding in the common-law
trial, the journals were considerably more sanguine than Bentham about the
role of lawyers. In Bentham's view, lawyers were at the heart of the
problem.'52 But according to The American Jurist and Law Magazine in
1838, the lawyer alone had both the professional skill and the incentive to
draw out the truth from witnesses. "To elicit the whole truth, requires
skill, power, and adequate motive. Effective, successful interrogation is
the work of labor, and will never be undertaken except when some duty
requires it."' 53 Just a few years later, American legal periodicals were
widely reprinting a short article titled "Golden Rules for the Examination
of Witnesses." The article offered the practitioner a series of tips for
drawing testimony out of witnesses at trial: "Except in indifferent matters,
never take your eye from that of the witness .... Be mild with the
mild-shrewd with the crafty-confiding with the honest-merciful to the
young, the frail or the fearful-rough to the ruffian, and a thunderbolt to
the liar.""M Above all, the focus was on both the capacity and, indeed,
the responsibility of the lawyer to cut through obfuscatory testimony by
means of effective examination techniques."5
Rules of Evidence (No. IV)-Incompetency of Parties as Witnesses at Common-Law, 8 AM. JURIST &
L. MAG. 1, 45 (1832) (calling for the clarification of common-law principles governing when a court
can compel a witness to testify); Rules of Evidence (No. V1)-Admission of Parties in Criminal
Procedure, 13 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 50, 72 (1835) (asserting that a criminal defendant "should be
examined, unless guilt on his part, or imbecility on the part of the judge, should be considered as
affording valid grounds of exemption"); Testimony of Persons Interested in a Suit, supra note 146, at
23 (urging courts to "admit persons as competent witnesses on trial, although interested in the event
of the cause" (emphasis omitted)).
148. Rules of Evidence (No. 1V)-Incompetency of Parties as Witnesses at Common-Law, supra
note 147, at 6.
149. Rules of Evidence (No. I)-Incompetency of Witnessesfrom Interest, supra note 147, at 43-
44.
150. See Testimony of Persons Interested in a Suit, supra note 146, at 22-23.
151. Id. at 20.
152. See TWINING, supra note 141, at 75-79.
153. Hearsay Evidence and Confessions or Admissions of the Party, 20 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.
68, 73 (1838).
154. David Paul Brown, Golden Rules for the Examination of Witnesses, 2 PA. L.J. 174, 175
(1843). The article was reprinted in 10 LAW REP. 475 (1848), published in Boston.
155. "Falsehood," Brown reminded the novice lawyer, "is not detected by cunning, but by the
light of Troth. . . ." Brown, supra note 154, at 175. Brown conceived of the lawyer as nothing short
of the nineteenth-century ideal of the artist-as-creator. Brown ventured that:
1999]
HeinOnline -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  865 1998-1999
Texas Law Review
By the late 1850s, oral examination by lawyers was seen as far and
away the best means of sorting through competing narratives and arriving
at determinations of fact.'56 The editors of the American Law Register
argued that cross-examination was nothing less than "the most perfect and
effectual system for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingen-
uity of mortals." 57 In the words of the editors of the Monthly Law
Reporter, the "searching" questions of the effective cross-examiner
"pursue[d] the dishonest and reluctant witness through the mists of
indistinctness, the errors of incorrectness, the omissions of incompleteness,
the evasions of dishonesty, or the falsehoods of intentional mendacity."' 58
B. Critique and Abolition of the Rules of Disqualification for Interest
The new focus on cross-examination as the best method for determin-
ating facts was in considerable tension with the common law's traditional
reliance on disqualification rules to keep compromised testimony out of the
fact-finding process. As a result, courts began to admit the testimony of
witnesses who had previously been disqualified. Massachusetts allowed
atheist testimony as early as 1818; 9 Michigan became the first state to
abolish the rule of disqualification for interested nonparty witnesses in
1846;6 ° and Connecticut led the way in admitting civil parties in
1848.161 The rule disqualifying criminal defendants from being witnesses
[t]he trial of a cause may be aptly compared to the progress of a painting-you first lay
your ground-work, then sketch your various figures, and finally, by the power and
colouring of argument, separate them, or group them together, with all the advantages of
light and shade.
Id. at 176. Or maybe, Brown speculated, the lawyer was best compared to the composer: "[P]erhaps,
it may more justly be likened to a complicated piece of music, wherein a single false note may destroy
the entire harmony of the performance." Id. Either way, as painter or composer, the lawyer was
playing a critical role in the common-law proceedings, crafting them virtually from scratch in a solo
performance that, at its best, could rise to virtuoso proportions. See id. at 175-76.
156. Excoriating the practice of eliciting testimony by written interrogatories in equity, the Monthly
Law Reporter trumpeted cross-examination as unquestionably the best truth-detecting institution. "Oral
interrogation and cross-interrogation. . .[is] the only proper and most efficient mode of extracting the
truth from unwilling, willing or indifferent lips . .. ." Examination of Witnesses in Equity, 21
MONTHLY L. REP. 705, 707 (1859). "So miserably, so deplorably inefficient [was] the chancery mode
of examining witnesses, that the shrewdest solicitors never cross-examine a witess .... ." Id. at 711.
The Law Reporter was not contrasting cross-examination with the disqualification rules, but in its praise
of cross-examination as opposed to interrogatories in chancery, it made clear the central place that
cross-examination had come to hold in the fact-finding process.
157. Of the Disqualification of Parties as Witnesses, supra note 147, at 263-64. The passage is
a striking anticipation of Wigmore's famous aphorism. See5 WIGMORE, supra note 87, § 1367, at 32
("[Cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth.").
158. Examination of Witnesses at Common Law, 22 MONTHLY L. REP. 577, 580 (1860).
159. See Hunscom v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. (13 Tyng) 184, 184 (1818).
160. 22 MICH. REV. STAT., ch. 102, § 99 (1846).
161. An Act for the Regulation of Civil Actions (adopted June 27, 1848) (codified at CONN. REV.
STAT., tit. I, ch. x, § 141 (1849)). On the abolition of the disqualification rules see generally Joel N.
[Vol. 77:825
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in their own trials lasted somewhat longer than the rule of disqualification
of interested witnesses and parties in civil cases, 62 in large part because
opponents of the reform reasonably feared that the incentive to commit per-
jury was greater in criminal trials.'63 But by the 1850s, the entire array
of disqualification rules silencing potential witnesses that had characterized
the law of evidence at common law came to be seen by many as highly
anachronistic; by the 1880s the whole panoply of disqualification rules had
collapsed.
Indeed, the disqualification rules had become the butt of jokes about
the legal system. Dickens, whose scathing critique of chancery practice in
Bleak House stands to this day as the paradigm reductio ad absurdum of
legal technicality, was said to have written that the introduction of
examination of the parties was "a death-blow given to humor. Nothing can
be more humorous than to make a solemn pretense of inquiring into the
truth, and exclude the two people who, in nine cases out of ten, know most
about it.""'4  Common-law practice, then, must have been growing
Bodansky, The Abolition of the Pany-Witness Disqualification: An Historical Survey, 70 KY. L.J. 91
(1981-82).
162. In 1864, Maine became the first state to abolish the rule disqualifying criminal defendants;
other states soon followed, led by California, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Vermont in 1866.
By 1869, 12 states had abolished the disqualification rule for criminal defendants. By 1900, only
Georgia retained the rule. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 & n.6 (1961); Bodansky,
supra note 161, at 92-93; Fisher, supra note 83, at 658, 668. Fisher has noted a fascinating geograph-
ical pattern in the abolition of the disqualification rules. Almost universally, they were abolished in
the North before they were abolished in the South. Fisher argued persuasively that the politics of
slavery and abolition functioned as "triggers" in the abolition of criminal defendant disqualification
rules in Northern states. Northern states, the argument goes, were compelled to admit criminal
defendants' testimony to ward off charges of hypocrisy in their opposition to racial disqualification rules
in the South. See id. at 584. Although this same racial dynamic cannot explain the abolition of the
witness and civil party disqualification rules in the North, it can explain the lag between most Northern
and Southern states' abolition of the civil party and witness rules. When a Southern state abolished its
rule against civil party testimony, it faced an intractable dilemma: It had to decide what to do with
cases involving black parties. Allowing blacks to testify against whites did not seem acceptable, but
neither did allowing a white party to testify against a black party who was prevented from doing so.
See id. at 673-74. Rather than face this dilemma, Fisher argued, Southern states simply declined to
end the civil party disqualification. See id. at 674.
163. See Bodansky, supra note 161, at 107-11. Fisher argued in addition that the greater incentive
for a defendant to perjure himself in a criminal trial posed a greater threat to the integrity of the oath.
See Fisher, supra note 83, at 663-64. The lag between the abolition of the rules disqualifying interested
witnesses and parties in civil trials and the abolition of the rules disqualifying criminal defendants
proved to be important in determining the route by which the constitutional self-incrimination clauses
came to have meaningful roles in American common-law trials. Self-incrimination concerns were
voiced by the opponents of admitting criminal-defendant testimony. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 578;
2 WIGMORE, supra note 81, § 579, at 828; Bodansky, supra note 161, at 115-17. If criminal defen-
dants had been made competent to testify on their own behalf in the 1840s or 1850s, the first flurry of
constitutional litigation would most likely have taken up the question of whether the constitutional self-
incrimination clauses barred criminal defendant testimony altogether.
164. This quotation was attributed to Dickens by the anonymous author of an 1855 law reform
tract. See Competency of Parties as Witnesses for Themselves, supra note 147, at 1.
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painfully boring for Dickens. As a decision reprinted in New Yorker John
Livingston's Monthly Law Magazine in 1854 stated:
[t]he whole tendency of modem decisions is to relax the strict rules
of evidence, with a view to lay every thing before courts and juries,
which ought to have an influence upon the cases before them, and to
leave the objections, as much as is possible . . . to the credit of the
testimony and witnesses. 65
The passage reprinted by Livingston may have overstated the extent to
which the nineteenth-century law of evidence presented juries with all
available evidence: Even as the common law of evidence was abandoning
the rule of disqualification for interest, after all, it was developing the
modem hearsay exclusion rule."6 But this oversight notwithstanding, the
rule of disqualification for interest was being eclipsed in the era of
lawyerized common-law proceedings t67
C. Narrowing the Common-Law Witness Privilege
In the same years in which courts and commentators began to change
the way they thought about the disqualification rules and the law of
evidence more generally, the witness privilege contracted in several
important respects. Courts and treatise writers, who placed new emphasis
on the benefits of oral examination and cross-examination, were increas-
ingly skeptical of the disqualification rules that kept probative evidence out
165. Condensed Reports of Recent Cases. Evidence-Impeachment of Witness, 2 LIVINGSTON'S
MONTHLY L. MAG. 595, 596 (1854) [hereinafter Condensed Reports] (reprinting State v. Parker, 7 La.
Ann. 83, 86 (1853)). One clear example of the shift in emphasis away from rules designed to admit
only reliable evidence is evident in an 1860 attack in the Monthly Law Reporter on the rule that a party
could not impeach its own witness. The rule, as stated by Greenleaf, was rooted in the principle that
a party, by calling a witness, vouched for the reliability of the witness. See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note
122, § 442, at 491. But for the editors of the Monthly Law Reporter, the attempt to ensure that all
witnesses were trustworthy was an archaic absurdity in a world in which counsel possessed the tools
of cross-examination. See Examination of Witnesses at Common Law, supra note 158, at 586-92.
166. See Langbein, supra note 89, at 1184, 1186-90. Of course, insofar as the rationale of the
hearsay rule was excluding testimony that could not be subjected to effective cross-examination, the
hearsay rule was perfectly consistent with the emphasis on cross-examination as a means of getting to
truth.
167. It is interesting to note that it was in this same period, the first half of the nineteenth century,
that property requirements for jury service and voting were abolished. That these developments were
nearly simultaneous suggests something of a convergence of legal reforms abolishing the use of formal
property-related criteria to determine the competence of citizens to participate in law-making activities.
On jury service requirements, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 877-82 (1994); on voting and the decline
of property requirements for white men, see Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early
American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342-48 (1989) and Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look
Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473,476-81
(1997).
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of the common-law trial. Similarly, courts and treatise writers advocated
cutting back the scope of the witness privilege, which they perceived as
another rule that reduced the amount of evidence that lawyers could subject
to cross-examination. Both doctrines-disqualification and the witness
privilege-had the effect of keeping potentially valuable evidence out of the
spotlight of examination and cross-examination, and in the first half of the
nineteenth century both increasingly appeared to be unacceptable obstruc-
tions to the fact-finding process of the common-law courts.
The earliest and sharpest contraction of the witness privilege occurred
in Lord Melville's Case (1806),61 in which a panel of English judges
held that answers to questions subjecting a witness to a civil suit were not
protected by the witness privilege.'69 American courts and commentators
were well aware of the decision in Lord Melville's Case,70 and though
some showed resistance to the holding,' it was increasingly adopted into
American practice."7
Treatise writers and courts also began to require witnesses to give
testimony that might subject them to moral disgrace. Courts and commen-
tators argued that the privilege to decline to give answers that would
168. 6 Parl. Deb. (1 Ser.) 166 (1806).
169. Id. at 223-26. This holding was codified in an act of Parliament in the same year, providing
that a witness could not refuse to answer questions on the grounds that the answer might subject him
to civil liability. See An Act to Declare the Law with Respect to Witnesses Refusing to Answer, 1806,
46 Geo. 3, ch. 37 (Eng.). On Lord Melville's Case and the controversy arising out of it, see Smith,
supra note 25, at 159-61.
170. The American Law Journal reprinted the decision in its first volume. See Lord Melville's
Case, I AM. L.J. 223 (1808).
171. See, e.g., Connor v. Bradey, 1 Ant. N.P. Cas. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). American com-
mentators also criticized Lord Melville's Case and held fast to the old rule of a privilege that encom-
passed civil liability. In A Digest of American Cases on the Law of Evidence, Samuel Bayard of New
Jersey restated a broad privilege: "A witness is privileged from declaring any thing which will be
injurious to his interest." BAYARD, supra note 34, at 124 (emphasis omitted).
Swift also resisted the narrowing of the witness privilege instituted by Lord Melville's Case. In
addition to questions that were incriminating or that had a tendency to degrade, Swift stated that "any
question that will render [a witness] liable to an action, charge him with debt, or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture" was one that a witness could decline to answer. SWIFr, supra note 49, at 77.
Swift conceded that 8 of the 12 judges deciding the question in the impeachment proceedings of Lord
Melville had held otherwise, yet he insisted that the "question never has had a deliberate decision
before the higher tribunals of this country." Id. at 78. Moreover, "at Nisi Prius the opinion has been
entertained, that a witness cannot be compelled to testify to facts that render him liable to a civil
action." Id. at 77-78.
172. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. ch. 7, art. 8, § 71, at 405 (Packard 1829) (enacting the rule that
witnesses were compellable to answer questions subjecting them to civil suits); Stewart v. Turner, 3
Edw. Ch. 458, 461 (N.Y. Ch. 1841) ("But that [the witness's] answer may establish or tend to establish
that the witness owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit is no excuse for refusing to answer
a question relevant to the matter at issue. . . ."); Poole v. Perritt, 28 S.C.L. (I Spears) 121, 122-23
(1842) (holding that a witness had a privilege not to answer self-incriminating questions, but noting that
possible exposure to civil liability did not give rise to such a privilege).
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subject the witness to moral infamy was limited to situations in which the
testimony in question pertained merely to collateral issues such as the
witness's credit rather than issues directly related to the facts in
question. 17
Similarly, the witness privilege ceased to be a rule enforced by courts,
or a principle invocable by the parties, and became a purely personal
privilege, invocable and waivable solely at the option of the witness. As
noted above, early case law and treatises held self-incriminating questions
to be prohibited per se, not merely privileged. 74 Alternatively, the
sources suggested that courts were to play active roles in policing self-
incriminating questions, or that the rule against compelling testimony
against interest could be invoked by counsel. 75 By the third and fourth
decades of the century, however, this approach to the witness privilege was
roundly condemned by appellate court decisions that restricted to the
witness himself the decision whether to decline to answer; as under self-
incrimination doctrine today, courts' authority to caution the witness was
to "be exercised sparingly and with great caution."17 6  While the witness
173. See 1 COWEN & HILL, supra note 44, at 741-47 (discussing the treatment of the moral infamy
rule by treatise writers). Chitty's Practical Treatise stated that a witness could not refuse to answer
questions subjecting himself to civil liability; it did, however, state that witnesses were "not obliged
to admit to or answer any matter which tends to throw a shade over [their] moral character, although
it involves no offense for which [they] could be indicted." 1 CHITTY, supra note 44, at 426; see also
People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 250, 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) (noting a distinction between the colla-
teral issue of a witness's credit and the testimony material to the case and adding that in order to be
privileged on the ground of disgrace, testimony had to "directly shew the infamy").
174. See supra subpart II(A).
175. See id.
176. United States v. Darnaud, 25 F. Cas. 754,765 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 14,918) (declining
to give prophylactic warnings to witnesses about their privilege not to incriminate themselves); United
States v. Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680, 682 (C.C.E.D. La. 1854) (No. 16,111) (stating that the "privilege
belongs exclusively to the witness" because "[t]he party to the suit cannot claim its exercise, nor object
to its waiver by the witness," and noting that the former practice of ruling incriminating questions
illegal per se had been abandoned); United States v. Craig, 25 F. Cas. 682, 684 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827)
(No. 14,883) (stating that incriminating questions are not illegal); State v. Patterson, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.)
244, 253-54 (1842) (holding that although there is much doubt as to whether a witness can be
compelled to answer questions that "have a tendency to his disparagement or disgrace," in North
Carolina the law is clear that such questions may at least be asked); People v. Carroll, 3 Parker 73,
83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) ("A party cannot object that an answer to the question asked may involve the
witness in a criminal prosecution. Such an objection must be made by the witness, but not by the party
... ."); People v. Bodine, I Denio 281, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (noting that a witness may object
to an incriminating question herself); Mitchell v. Hinman, 8 Wend. 667, 671-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832)
(assuming that the privilege cannot be enforced by the trial court unless the witness objects to
answering a question); Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254, 259-60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (stating that
privilege is purely "personal"); see also 1 CHrTY, supra note 44, at 426 (noting a change from the
"formerfj" practice of active judicial intervention into incriminating questions); 1 COWEN & HILL,
supra note 44, at 748 ("It lies, however, with the witness to claim the privilege. The party cannot
object to the inquiry. The witness has generally been left to do this without the interposition of the
court." (citations omitted)). But see State v. March, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 489, 490-91 (1854) (stating in
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privilege had once rendered incriminating questions void, increasingly such
questions were treated as voidable at the witness's option.
Finally, as Part V discusses in greater length, the scope of the immun-
ity required to compel a witness to testify to incriminating facts narrowed
during these years. Beginning in the 1820s, common-law jurisdictions
began to pass immunity statutes that granted witnesses testimonial immunity
instead of the transactional immunity that had characterized earlier statutes.
And although some courts struck down the testimonial immunity statutes
as violative of the constitutional self-incrimination clauses, most state
courts would prove receptive to the new, narrow immunity statutes.
D. Justice John Appleton of Maine and the Assault on the Common-Law
Witness Privlege
In the United States, no one pushed the critique of the common-law
witness privilege further than Justice John Appleton of the Supreme Court
of Maine."7 Appleton, a disciple of Bentham, emerged as an outspoken
critic of the rules disqualifying parties and interested witnesses in the
1830s. I8  Appleton arranged the rules in two conceptually distinct
classifications: testimony in furtherance of the interested witness's interests,
and testimony against his interests.'79 In the case of parties, Appleton
made the same bifurcation: the party who offered self-serving testimony of
his own accord, contrasted with the party who faced potentially hostile
questions from an opponent.'"n
In Appleton's view, it was obvious that a party seeking to give testi-
mony in his own interest should have been competent to testify. If the
dicta that North Carolina law should not allow incriminating questions to be put to witnesses); State
v. Garrett, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 357, 358 (1853) (noting that North Carolina courts allow incriminating
questions to be put to a witness, but that "[j]udges of great eminence have refused to permit a question
tending to degrade a witness to be put to him").
177. George Fisher has offered a cogent critique of the idea that Appleton had a forceful, causal
role in changing the American law of evidence. See Fisher, supra note 83, at 666-71. Appleton's
contributions were, as Fisher observes, little more than restatements of Bentham. See id. at 667. Yet
whether or not Appleton can be said to have been an important force in the American law of evidence,
like Bentham, he appears to have represented the radical edge of a broader shift in the common-law
approach to fact-finding.
178. See, e.g., J.A. [John Appleton], Admission of Parties in Criminal Procedure, 13 AM. JURIST
& L. MAG. 50, 71 (1835) [hereinafter Appleton, Admission of Parties]; John Appleton, Incompetency
of Parties as Witnesses at Common-Law, 8 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 1 (1832) [hereinafter Appleton,
Incompetency of Parties]. Appleton's articles were reprinted as a book advocating reform in the law
of evidence. See JOHN APPLETON, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE STATED AND DISCUSSED 61, 119
(Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1860). On Appleton's career and contribution to nineteenth-
century law and law reform, see DAVID M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW:
JOHN APPLETON AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM (1990).
179. See Appleton, Incompetency of Parties, supra note 178, at 11.
180. See id. at 11, 17.
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testimony were truthful, Appleton reasoned, it would aid the fact-finder in
making accurate findings.' 8 ' If the testimony were untruthful, effective
cross-examination would uncover its inconsistencies.In1
The situation in which parties and interested witnesses were compelled
to answer potentially incriminating questions under the court's contempt
power, on the other hand, presented a more difficult question, because this
situation implicated the powerful tradition of opposition to compelled self-
incrimination. According to Appleton, the supposed unreliability of inter-
ested testimony was a weak rationale for excluding an interested witness or
his testimony in this circumstance because the opposing party (or, in crim-
inal cases, the prosecutor) could be trusted not to call a witness who would
deceive the court to the opposing party's detriment.8 I In Appleton's
view, triers of fact would always be better off with more evidence than
with less, even if of dubious reliability,8" and the parties themselves
could be expected to regulate the reliability and trustworthiness of the
witnesses called to testify. 115
Appleton believed that the only plausible objection to making interes-
ted witnesses and parties competent to be compelled to give testimony
against interest was the "hardness" of the situation in which the questions
placed the witness or party.8 6 But the "hardness" rationale of the nemo
tenetur principle was not a sufficient reason to exclude party or interested
third-party testimony either. The "hardness" of the situation for the party
compelled to testify inhered not in the act of testifying, Appleton argued,
but in the punishment the law attached to the party's wrongdoing."8 The
"hardness" argument thus proved too much. It was an argument against
punishment, not an argument against compelled testimony. "Just as much
as [a witness] would wish to escape punishment, just so far would he wish
to avoid saying or doing ... what might lead to such results." 88
Explicitly echoing Bentham, Appleton suggested that if "the criminals
181. See id. at 12 ("For if false testimony should not be delivered .... no mischief is done.").
182. See id. at 16 (noting that if a plaintiff "exaggerates, the defendant has the best means and the
strongest inducements to detect and point out these exaggerations, the testimony of each being seen and
examined by the other, the parties being mutually interrogated and cross-interrogated"). In addition,
Appleton contended that juries would be more likely to scrutinize the testimony of a witness who was
interested in the result of the suit, either as a party or otherwise. See id.
183. See Appleton, Admission of Parties, supra note 178, at 62.
184. See id. at 72 (arguing that a "judge who is fit for his station will never exclude any witness
for fear, that after hearing, he may erroneously decide-to do so, would be saying, that he can decide
upon the truth of a witness, better without than with hearing him" (emphases in original)).
185. See Appleton, Incompetency of Parties, supra note 178, at 16.
186. See id. at 17 (noting that witnesses required to give evidence against themselves are faced
with a great temptation to perjure themselves).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 67-68.
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[were] to frame a code for their own special protection, their first provision
would be to protect themselves from all inquiry into their conduct." 8 9
Appleton's arguments were directed against both the witness privilege
and the rules disqualifying parties as witnesses in civil and criminal cases,
but the witness privilege was the object of special scorn for Appleton.
"The issue," he wrote, "is between justice and injustice-between right and
wrong. "t Beginning with the Benthamite premise that "there is no
inquiry, which is material and relevant, which may not be proposed, and
which being proposed should not be answered,"191 Appleton argued that
the witness privilege was nothing more than a "privilege of crime.'" '
Only the guilty witness could be protected by the witness privilege,
according to Appleton, and innocent defendants would be hurt when culp-
able witnesses were allowed to remain silent.1
93
Other American lawyers and judges picked up Bentham's arguments
against the witness privilege, perhaps through Appleton's work."9 Judge
Campbell of the Federal Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, for example, was apparently familiar with Bentham's views of
the witness privilege when he decided the case of United States v.
Quitman.1" Upholding an order that the defendant, John Quitman, show
cause why he should not have to give a bond to ensure his observance of
the laws of the United States concerning neutrality between foreign powers,
Campbell held that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
was not violated when an adverse inference is made from a person's refusal
189. Id. at 71. For many of these same points in an article that, although not by Appleton, bore
a striking resemblance to Appleton's work (which in turn bore a strong resemblance to Bentham's), see
B., Of the Disqualification of Parties as Witnesses, 5 AM. L. REG. 257 (1857). David Gold has
identified "B." as Irving Browne, editor of the Albany Law Journal. See GOLD, supra note 178, at 187
n. 11. Browne drew the distinction between the two elements of the disqualification rule: that parties
could not testify on their own behalf on grounds of interest and that they could not be compelled to
testify for the opposite party. See B., supra, at 257-58. Like Appleton, Browne associated the second
element with the tag nemo tenetur. See id. at 258.
190. APPLETON, supra note 178, at 246.
191. Id. at 253.
192. Id. at 247 (emphasis omitted).
193. See id. Appleton was careful to distinguish the witness privilege from the privilege accorded
to the accused. Maine's constitutional self-incrimination clause was expressly limited to the accused,
providing that "[in all criminal prosecutions the accused ... shall not be compelled to furnish or give
evidence against himself." ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 6.
194. As noted above, Professor Fisher cautiously discounts Appleton's influence, rightly noting
that Appleton's intellectual contributions were little more than mediocre restatements of Bentham. See
Fisher, supra note 83, at 667. Once again, my point is not that Appleton singlehandedly shifted the
American approach to the witness privilege, or even that he had a major causal role in that shift, but
rather that-like Bentham-he was at the radical edge of a broader trend to sharply contract the witness
privilege during the same years.
195. 27 F. Cas. 680 (C.C.E.D. La. 1854) (No. 16,111).
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to testify under oath.'96 Campbell relied upon Bentham's critique of the
privilege:
The profound author of the "Treatise on Judicial Evidence" inquires
whether, if all the criminals of every class had assembled and framed
a system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which
they would have established? Innocence can have no advantage from
it; innocence claims the right of speaking, must speak, while guilt
alone invokes the security from silence. The supreme court of Ohio
say[s that] . . . "For a witness to refuse to testify, because his
testimony may criminate him, is at once to pronounce his own
turpitude. Not a man in a thousand would, without reason, venture
upon so perilous a situation."' 97
Judge Denio of the New York Court of Appeals shared Campbell's
Benthamite impatience with the witness privilege. "[N]either the law nor
the Constitution," he argued,
is so sedulous to screen the guilty as the argument [for a broad
witness privilege] supposes. If a man cannot give evidence upon the
trial of another person without disclosing circumstances which will
make his own guilt apparent or at least capable of proof, though his
own account of the transactions should never be used as evidence, it
is the misfortune of his condition and not any want of humanity in
the law.' 98
American lawyers also read criticisms of the witness privilege in
articles reprinted from England. In 1854, the Monthly Law Reporter,
based in Boston, reprinted an article from the London Law Review arguing
in favor of the enactment of a generalized immunity statute that would have
conferred immunity on all witnesses from the introduction of their com-
pelled testimony into their own subsequent criminal prosecutions.119 The
proposed immunity statute would not, however, have provided immunity
from the introduction of the "fruits" of the testimony (i.e., any evidence
derived from the compelled testimony).' Such an immunity statute
196. See id. Quitman had been called before a grand jury and refused to answer questions about
the violation of United States neutrality laws on the grounds of privilege; in response, the court made
him take out a bond to secure his compliance. See id.
197. Id. (alluding to BENTHAM, TREATISE, supra note 142, at 241, and quoting Wamerv. Lucas,
10 Ohio 336, 340 (1840)).
198. People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74, 83 (1861).
199. See Self-Crirnination-Option of Jury Trial, 16 MONTHLY L. REP. 121, 121 (1853).
200. Id. at 121. The unnamed author wrote:
We have said that the road to truth and justice is ... stopped up; and that the road to
falsehood and injustice is also thrown open .... The innocent is sacrificed that the
guilty may escape; for the ground of the rule is, that if the question is answered it may
enable a prosecutor to obtain evidence which would convict the witness. Surely so gross
an anomaly cannot be suffered any longer to disfigure our law.
Id. at 124-25.
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would have abrogated the witness privilege across the board. Ultimately,
as Part V discusses, it was precisely this kind of immunity statute that
forced courts to articulate the relationship between the constitutional self-
incrimination clauses and the common-law witness privilege.
E. The Beginnings of a Constitutionalized Witness Privilege
By the fourth, fifth, and sixth decades of the nineteenth century, courts
had substantially undermined the broad common-law rules that had kept
self-damaging witness testimony out of the courts. As observers noted, the
"whole tendency of modem decisions is to relax the strict [common-law]
rules of evidence."201 It was precisely these rules that had rendered the
early constitutional self-incrimination clauses superfluous. Thus, it should
come as no surprise that it was the critics of the broad common-law wit-
ness privilege and disqualification rules who, beginning in the 1830s, were
the first to address the constitutional status of the privilege against self-
incrimination. As the passages by Judges Denio and Campbell quoted
above suggest, the advocacy of a new and sharply narrower witness privi-
lege prompted courts and commentators to ask whether their reforms had
constitutional implications. 2'
Appleton, for example, wrote in 1835 that "principles of common and
constitutional law alike throw a protection around the accused. Nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare, translated into our own language, has been
inscribed into the constitutional provisions of the land."203 Indeed, the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses created something of a problem for
Appleton. He was convinced that the original "object" of the provisions
"was to protect entirely" the criminal defendant "from any interrogatories
adverse to his own interest."' Yet he also firmly believed that this was
an indefensible rule:
Shall, then, the accused, when his own interests are at stake, in his
own cause, in his own trial, against his wish, and for the avowed
purpose of establishing his guilt by his own answers be compelled,
not by the rack or torture, but by the ordinary process of court, and
under the ordinary penalties for perjury, to answer any and all
pertinent questions relating to the cause on trial, which may be
proposed either by the prosecutor or the court?25
201. Condensed Reports, supra note 165, at 596 (reprinting State v. Parker, 7 La. Ann. 83, 86
(1853)).
202. Katherine Hazlett believes that Judge Campbell's opinion in Quitman represents the first
reported federal case in which the privilege against self-incrimination was addressed as a constitutional
question. See Hazlett, supra note 37 (manuscript at 8-9).
203. Appleton, Admission of Parties, supra note 178, at 61 (first emphasis added).
204. Id. at 62.
205. Id. (foomote omitted).
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Thus, when Appleton mentioned the constitutional self-incrimination provi-
sions in the context of the witness privilege, he was relieved to argue that
the constitutional protections were strictly limited to protecting criminal
defendants.' °  The Constitution, he contended, referred "only to the
interrogation of the defendant in the criminal prosecution to which he is a
party," and not to the questioning of a witness.2 7
Appleton's distinction between the constitutional status of criminal
defendants and witnesses is a critical moment in the history of the privilege
against self-incrimination, but not because he was right or wrong about the
"actual intent" of the Framers, nor because the position he took was parti-
cularly startling. Appleton's opposition to the common-law rules protec-
ting witnesses from self-incriminating testimony pushed him to articulate
an opinion about the relationship between the common-law witness privi-
lege and the constitutional self-incrimination clauses. In other words,
Appleton's opposition to the broad common-law protection afforded to
witnesses, like the similar opposition of Judges Denio and Campbell,
forced him to advance an argument about the constitutional status of the
witness privilege. The constitutional self-incrimination clauses were now
in play, brought into the debate over common-law fact-finding procedures
not by the supporters of a broad constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, but by the strongest opponents of such a rule.
V. The Immunity Statutes and the Constitutionalization of the Witness
Privilege
The nascent inquiry into what precisely the constitutional self-
incrimination clauses meant-a question first broached by critics of the
broad common-law witness privilege such as Appleton-came into focus
when state legislatures passed a series of new, narrow immunity statutes.
New York State took the lead in enacting these new immunity statutes, and
this Part now turns to look specifically at New York. When the new, nar-
rower immunity statutes were challenged in the courts, the question of what
the constitutional self-incrimination clauses meant was squarely presented.
A. New York's Early Transactional Immunity Statutes
New York's colonial history has proven fertile ground for controversy
over the history of the privilege. The debate among historians has centered
on a series of legislative enactments requiring sworn testimony by sus-
pected criminals. In their 1944 book, Law Enforcement in Colonial New
206. For the language of the Maine Self-Incrimination Clause, see supra note 193.
207. APPLETON, supra note 178, at 246.
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York,2"8 Julius Goebel and T. Raymond Naughton argued that there was
no privilege against self-incrimination in colonial New York. 2°9  In
particular, they pointed to a series of colonial statutes instituting oaths of
purgation, under which a suspected person could be summoned by a justice
of the peace and compelled to testify under oath as to whether he had
violated any of a number of regulatory offenses, such as selling liquor to
Indians;2"0 engaging in unfair trade practices with Indians;21 harboring
fugitive slaves or information about fugitive slaves;2 12 trading with the
French;211 or disloyalty to "his Majesties Kingdom & Government in
favour of a popish pretender." 214  Refusal to testify under the oaths of
208. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) (1944).
209. Goebel and Naughton wrote:
We think that the existence before the Revolution of a privilege of defendants is an
illusion. The fruit grown from the seed of the maxim neno teneturprodere seipso was
an exotic of Westminster Hall, and of it neither the local justices in England nor in New
York had eaten, or if they had, they took good care to keep their knowledge to
themselves.
Id. at 656.
210. See An Act to Prevent Selling or Giveing of Rumm or Other Strong Liquors to the Indians
in the County of Albany, ch. 187, 1709 N.Y. Laws 79, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note
73, at 657. In pertinent part, the Act provided:
[l]t shall & may be tawfull for ye sd Mayor Recrdr or any two Justices of the Peace of
the Town or County of Albany who shall Suspect any Person or Persons whatsoever to
have offended Contrary to ye intentions of this Act, to send for him Her or them so
Suspected & to tendr unto such Person or Persons on oath whether he She or they hath
Sold given or other ways disposed of any of ye liquors before mentioned to an Indian or
Indians wthin ye sd County of Albany between ye sd first day of June & ye sd first day
of Septembr & such Person or Persons not appearing being duly Summond or Confessing
upon ye sd oath or refuseing to take ye same shall be thereby Convicted of ye offence &
be subject to & Suffer ye same paines & Penalty as if the same had been prooved by oath
or affirmation ....
Id. at 658; see also An Act to Prevent the Selling & Giving of Rum or Other Strong Liquors to the
Indians, ch. 317, 1716 N.Y. Laws 112 reprinted in 1 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 888, 889-90
(allowing city or county officials to require those suspected of breaking the law to swear an oath stating
that they had not done so); An Act Appointing Comissioners to Let to Farm the Excise of Strong
Liquors in the Cities and Countys in This Colony, ch. 463, 1725 N.Y. Laws 138, reprinted in 2
COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 243, 245 (requiring suspected offenders to swear their innocence
or be held liable).
211. See An Act for Encouraging the Indian Trade at Albany, ch. 282, 1714 N.Y. Laws 95,
reprinted in 1 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 828, 830 (allowing government officials to compel
an oath from those accused of unfair trading practices).
212. See An Act for Preventing Suppressing and Punishing the Conspiracy and Insurection of
Negroes and Other Slaves, ch. 250, 1712 N.Y. Laws 88, reprinted in I COLONIAL LAWS, supra note
73, at 761, 763-64 (requiring those accused of harboring slaves to swear their innocence).
213. See An Act for the Further and More Effectual Prohibiting of the Selling Indian Goods to
the French, ch. 425, 1722 N.Y. Laws 128, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 98, 98-
99 (requiring those accused of trafficking with the French to swear that they had not done so).
214. An Act for Securing of His Majesties Government of New York, ch. 781, 1744 N.Y. Laws
520, reprinted in 3 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 424, 424-25 (requiring those suspected of
treason to take a loyalty oath). Further acts instituting oaths of purgation covered infringements on the
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purgation was the equivalent of confession.2 '5  Goebel and Naughton
concluded that the oath statutes demonstrated
that so far as New York Province was concerned there was no
attempt made to privilege a defendant or to treat his testimony as
incompetent; but on the contrary, a great deal was done to make sure
that in one form or other his testimony would be secured and that it
would count against him.216
Leonard Levy strongly criticized Goebel and Naughton in his 1968
Origins of the Fifth Amendment, accusing them of engaging in bald specula-
tion from inadequate sources, thus failing to follow their own methodologi-
cal strictures.1 7  Levy conceded that the privilege against self-
incrimination "was indeed an illusion, as Goebel and Naughton declared,
under the acts of the Assembly [instituting oaths of purgation] from 1701
to 1759. "218 But Levy also showed that the privilege of a witness to
decline to answer incriminating questions under oath had been hotly con-
tested and sometimes upheld in a number of high profile New York cases
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.1 9  Most
importantly, Levy argued that Goebel and Naughton had failed to take into
account the late-eighteenth-century immunity statutes that were enacted in
New York. 2  After 1770, the oath of purgation statutes passed in New
York contained provisions granting any witness that was compelled to fur-
nish self-incriminating testimony absolute immunity from prosecution or
act encouraging the recruitment of seamen, see An Act for Reviving an Act for Encouraging of
Seamen, ch. 197, 1709 N.Y. Laws 78, reprinted in 1 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 680, 681,
trading with or selling alcohol to slaves, see An Act for the More Effectual Preventing and Punishing
the Conspiracy and Insurrection of Negro and Other Slaves; for the Better Regulating Them and for
Repealing the Acts Herein Mentioned Relating Thereto, ch. 560, 1730 N.Y. Laws 157, reprinted in
2 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 679, 679-80, selling alcohol to servants, see An Act to Restrain
Tavern Keepers and Innholders from Seling Strong Liquors to Servants and Apprentices and from
Giving Large Credit to Others, ch. 651, 1737 N.Y. Laws 190, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL LAWS, supra
note 73, at 952, 953-54, and evading tariffs on commerce with Indians, see An Act to Suport the
Troops at Oswego and to Regulate the Indian Trade There, ch. 568, 1731 N.Y. Laws 164, reprinted
in 2 COLONIAL LAWS, supra note 73, at 705, 710.
215. See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 208, at 657-58.
216. Id. at 659.
217. See LEVY, supra note I, at 374. Levy wrote:
Historians who "cleave to a scintilla of evidence theory" are properly reprimanded by
Goebel and Naughton: they disapprove of those who take a proposition as proven with the
minimum of citation, who base a rule on a single case, or refer to statutes only when
stating a judicial practice. "This is the way of advocacy, not of scholarship. . . . The
ends of legal history are not served by the mere establishment of a prima facie case."
The injunction, a sound one, has not been observed by Goebel and Naughton in
their discussion of the right against self-incrimination.
Id. (citing GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 208, at xxxi) (footnote omitted) (omission in original).
218. Id. at 382.
219. See id. at 377-82.
220. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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penalty for the underlying transaction. 2 ' On the basis of the immunity
provisions contained in the New York statutes, Levy concluded that the
privilege against self-incrimination in New York practice, at least by the
1770s, matched the privilege that obtained in Westminster Hall.'
B. The Immunity Statutes: From Transactional to Testimonial
More recently, Akhil Amar and Rene6 Lettow have focused on a later
set of New York immunity statutes in their inquiries into the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination. In the 1861 case People cc rel.
Hackley v. Kelly,' New York's Court of Appeals was confronted with
the question of whether a witness could be compelled to furnish self-
incriminating testimony under an immunity statute that provided merely
that the compelled testimony itself could not be introduced in the witness's
own criminal prosecution. 4  In other words, Kelly presented the court
with the question of the constitutionality of a testimonial immunity statute,
under which the witness was compelled to furnish self-incriminating testi-
mony in return for immunity from the introduction of that compelled testi-
mony into evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
The startling fact about Kelly is the narrowness of the immunity statute
at issue. The immunity statutes that Levy found in late colonial New York
granted absolute immunity from subsequent prosecution for the crimes
underlying compelled testimony.' And as this Article's discussion of
the early-nineteenth-century privilege has noted, the immunity statutes
enacted in England and early New York State through the 1810s were
broadly drawn transactional immunity statutes. 6  Like Levy's late colo-
nial statutes, they too provided witnesses absolute immunity from subse-
quent prosecution for the acts underlying their compelled testimony. The
221. See LEVY, supra note 1, at 402-03.
222. See id. at 404 ("When the Revolution began, colonies and mother country differed little, if
at all, on the right against self-incrimination."). Eben Moglen has updated the Goebel and Naughton
versus Levy controversy. In Moglen's view, pre- and post-Revolutionary criminal procedure in New
York was incompatible with a privilege against self-incrimination for criminal defendants. In
particular, the wide use of summary procedure and the absence of defense counsel in most of the run-
of-the-mill criminal cases in the common-law courts meant that there could not have been an effective
right to silence for the accused. Summary procedure, with its informal and unprofessionalized tenor,
was unlikely to follow the dictates of formal common-law criminal procedure. In fact, it was centered
around the interrogation of the criminally accused. Meanwhile, in the common-law courts, the absence
of defense counsel in most criminal cases made silence an unattractive option. Thus, according to
Moglen, the principles behind the constitutional self-incrimination clauses had little if any effect on
actual legal practice in New York or any of the other American jurisdictions of the Early Republic.
See Moglen, supra note 3, at 1091-94.
223. 24 N.Y. 74 (1861).
224. Id. at 80-81.
225. See LEVY, supra note 1, at 401-02.
226. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
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statute at issue in Kelly, on the other hand, enacted in 1853, took a
decidedly narrower approach to immunity. And it was this new narrow
statutory approach to self-incrimination immunity that ultimately constitu-
tionalized the witness privilege in American law.
1. The Transformation of the New York Immunity Statutes.-If New
York's late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century immunity statutes were
transactional, how did New York move to the testimonial immunity statutes
at stake in Kelly? The New York legislature enacted transactional immun-
ity statutes as late as 1813.7 But starting in 1820, the legislature began
to frame its immunity provisions in a new, narrower fashion that provided
witnesses testimonial immunity from the in-court use of their compelled
testimony in subsequent criminal prosecutions rather than transactional
immunity from subsequent prosecution. The first such statute prohibited
champerty and provided that in all civil suits, the plaintiff was compellable
to testify at the defendant's option in order that the defendant be able to
prove champerty. The act established that "any evidence derived from the
examination of the plaintiff ... shall not be admitted in proof on any
criminal prosecution against such plaintiff ... for a violation of the
provisions of this act."' Almost two decades later, during the financial
crisis of the Panic of 1837, the legislature enacted a statute allowing a
defendant in a suit on a note to call the plaintiff in order to establish that
the note was usurious.29  The act provided that any testimony so com-
pelled could not be "used" against the plaintiff so testifying in any
subsequent criminal prosecution.2uo
227. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text. In 1813, New York State enacted an
ambiguous immunity statute in an act to prevent duelling-a statute that was neither clearly transactional
nor clearly testimonial in nature. See An Act to Prevent Duelling, ch. 45, § 4, [1813] 2 N.Y. Laws
192, 192 (providing that "any person offending against this act, shall be a competent witness against
any other person offending in like manner, and may be compelled to appear and give evidence..
touching the premises, but shall not thereby be criminated himself" (emphasis added)).
228. An Act to Prevent Abuses in Proceedings Before Justices of the Peace, ch. 159, § 2, 1820
N.Y. Laws 140, 141.
229. See An Act to Prevent Usury, ch. 430, 1837 N.Y. Laws 486 (dating the passage of the act
on May 15, 1837).
230. Id. §§ 2, 8. The usury legislation of 1837 was enacted in the midst of a raging controversy
in antebellum America over whether credit transactions should be deregulated. See Lawrence M.
Friedman, The Usury Laws of Wisconsin:A Study in Legal and Social History, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 515,
516-21. Emerging proponents of a free market credit regime argued that, as with tangible
commodities, no fixed just price for credit existed other than that dictated by the shifting forces of
supply and demand. In their view, as John Ramsey McCulloch, a Scottish disciple of Adam Smith and
David Ricardo whose work was reprinted widely in the United States, wrote, "whatever may have been
the causes of the efforts so generally made to regulate and limit the rate of interest, it is certain that,
far from succeeding in their object, they have had a precisely opposite effect." JOHN RAMSEY
MCCULLOCH, INTEREsr MADE EQUITY 14 (New York, G. & C. Carvill 1826). McCulloch stated that
"provided there was no method of defeating" the law prohibiting usurious loans, "there must be an end
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In the late 1840s and the 1850s, New York enacted a series of testi-
monial immunity statutes. In 1853 the legislature created the immunity
statute at issue in Kelly: a testimonial immunity procedure for use in the
prosecution of public officials for bribery."3 Similar provisions directed
specifically at official corruption in New York City were enacted by the
state legislature twice during the decade.22 And in 1855, an act aimed
at stamping out public drunkenness included not one but two testimonial
immunity provisions. The first immunized persons arraigned for drunken-
ness in order to draw out evidence about fellow violators of the anti-
intemperance act;" the second immunized prospective jurors so that they
could be compelled to testify as to their own prior violations of the act
during the jury selection process.2
2. Explaining the Shift to Testimonial Immunity Statutes.-As a gen-
eral matter, the new, narrow immunity statutes appear to have been passed
with the intention of facilitating the enforcement of laws that regulated or
prohibited difficult-to-detect consensual activity. A Tennessee court noted
that its legislature had enacted an immunity provision for gaming prosecu-
tions because "[t]he vice was of such general prevalence, and often so
baffled detection because of the fact that gamblers and persons haunting
gaming houses, could alone, as a general thing, give information
thereof."" Likewise, in New York, the Court of Appeals attributed
of all borrowing, except when the market rate of interest was below the statutory rate.. .. Luckily,
however, the mutual interest and ingenuity of borrowers and lenders have always proved an overmatch
for the enactments of the law." Id. at 15. The immunity statute in the 1837 New York legislation,
then, appears to have been an attempt to enforce the law of usury against violators' "mutual interest
and ingenuity." Id. Relevant passages of McCulloch's book are reprinted in DAVID BRION DAVIS,
ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN CULTURE 160, 160-61 (1979). The creation of new procedural tools to aid
debtors in establishing usury defenses to suits by creditors suggests a qualification to Morton Horwitz's
argument that antebellum legislatures steadily restricted the scope and power of traditional prohibitions
on usury. See HORWITZ, supra note 135, at 241-45. As Horwitz observes, however, New York was
slower than other states in cutting back on its usury regulations. See id. at 244. More work is needed
to determine whether other states employed similar procedural mechanisms to increase the enforceabil-
ity of usury regulations.
231. See An Act to Amend the Existing Law Relating to Bribery, ch. 539, § 14, 1853 N.Y. Laws
1012, 1012-13.
232. See An Act to Amend the Charter of the City of New-York, ch. 446, § 52, 1857 N.Y. Laws
874, 893-94; An Act Further to Amend the Charter of the City of New-York, ch. 217, § 14, 1853
N.Y. Laws 410, 413 (both amending the city charter to include a testimonial immunity provision aimed
at public corruption in New York City).
233. See An Act for the Prevention of Intemperance, Pauperism and Crime, ch. 231, § 12, 1855
N.Y. Laws 349, 351 (providing that a person arraigned for drunkenness be examined by a magistrate
about further violators, but that "testimony so given shall not in any case be used against [the person
arraigned], in any civil or criminal action, except upon an indictment and trial for perjury").
234. See id. § 16, at 352 (providing that any juror may be asked about prior violations of the Act,
but that "no answer that he may make shall be used against him in any action or prosecution, which
may be commenced against him, under any provision of this act").
235. Hirsch v. State, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxter) 89, 90 (1874). The Hirsch court was presented with
a transactional immunity statute, but the rationale applied equally to testimonial statutes.
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immunity statutes to a desire to facilitate enforcement of the law. 6  An
interest in prosecuting difficult-to-detect criminal activity, however, cannot
by itself explain the shift from transactional immunity statutes to testimon-
ial immunity statutes. Both types of immunity provisions, after all, aimed
at facilitating law enforcement. Instead, the reason for the shift from
transactional to testimonial immunity statutes appears to have been that
legislatures began adopting the new approach to common-law fact-finding
procedures that rejected the old evidentiary rules of disqualification.
In Benthamite fashion, commentators supported the new, narrower tes-
timonial immunity statutes and expressed skepticism about the utility of the
broad common-law witness privilege and disqualification rules. In 1848
the editors of the London Law Review displayed a sentiment increasingly
prevalent in American practice when they evaluated a series of civil cases
in which apparently wrongdoing witnesses had invoked the witness privi-
lege to the detriment of apparently innocent parties. "Now, what was the
effect of the rule of law in each of the above cases?" the editors asked.
"[W]as it not to impede the administration of justice? [W]as it not to
defeat right and help wrong? [A]nd in each case for the benefit of a
wrong-doer?" 7  Opposition to the insidious practical impact of the
witness privilege led the editors to recommend enactment of a generalized
immunity act that would give courts the discretion to immunize witnesses
in order to compel self-incriminating testimony. 8
The Boston Monthly Law Reporter in 1854 employed a similarly
Benthamite opposition to the witness privilege to make the case for a
generalized immunity statute that would provide the witness testimonial
immunity from the admission of compelled testimony in a subsequent crim-
inal prosecution. The witness privilege, argued the Law Reporter article
prevents truth from being arrived at and justice done, and also
causes falsehood, and consequent injustice to prevail.
... [T]he road to truth and justice is thus stopped up; and...
the road to falsehood and injustice is also thrown open .... The
innocent is sacrificed that the guilty may escape; for the ground of
236. The "plain object" of the immunity statutes, according to the Court of Appeals, "was to
enable these various tribunals, whether magistrates, grand juries, courts or legislature, to make their
investigations into alleged abuses effectual, and enable them to prosecute their inquiries successfully,
and to that end protect witnesses whose testimony might otherwise be withheld, but without which the
investigation would fail." People v. Sharp, 14 N.E. 319, 339 (N.Y. 1887). Like the statute at issue
in Hirsch, the statute in Sharp was a transactional immunity statute.
237. Law ofDiscovery-Sef-Crimination, 7 LAw REV. 19, 26 (1848).
238. Id. at 30. Although the Law Review recommended a transactional immunity provision, it
argued in the alternative that a generalized immunity provision should: "lay it down as a general rule,
that no statement extracted by the pressure of a Court for a civil purpose should ever be admissible as
evidence to subject an examinant to any punishment, penalty, or forfeiture." Id.
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the rule is, that if the question is answered it may enable a
prosecutor to obtain evidence which would convict the witness.
Surely so gross an anomaly cannot be suffered any longer to
disfigure our law.239
The solution offered by testimonial immunity promised to remove the
obstacle posed by the witness privilege to determining truth and ensuring
justice in the common-law trial. And by limiting the immunity to
testimonial, rather than transactional immunity, such an approach would
also allow the state to uncover new wrongdoing by compelling witnesses
to disclose their own criminal activity. Accordingly, the editors argued
that
[t]he advantage of removing obstacles to the investigation of truth,
and preventing falsehood from prevailing, is the direct gain which
the proposed alteration of the law would give. The loss which we
should incur [i.e., compulsion of the witness's testimony] appears to
be only an additional gain. It is said that if the witness is compelled
to answer, he may furnish the means of his own conviction. The
supposition, therefore, is, that he has committed the offence
respecting which he is interrogated. The mischief apprehended is,
that he may be punished for it. Is that a loss or a gain to the
administration of justice? We apprehend that this alleged loss is only
an incidental gain.240
Supporters of narrow testimonial immunity statutes thus brought the
rhetoric of the antidisqualification-rule reformers to the question of the
witness privilege. From the standpoint of fact-finding, both the witness
privilege and the solution of broad transactional immunity were highly
suspect. Considering the option of transactional rather than testimonial
immunity, the Law Reporter stated that
[w]e do not consider this as the fit course to pursue. Such an
immunity [i.e., transactional immunity] would be liable to very great
abuse. Offenders against whom there existed ample evidence without
their own confession, might obtain impunity by getting themselves
called as witnesses. . . . The only qualification which can be safely
added to the repeal of the rule, is that contained in the bill, that no
answer given by the witness or party . . . shall be given in evidence
against him upon any prosecution or other proceeding of a criminal
nature, save only on an indictment for perjury assigned upon his
241
answer. ....
239. Self-Crimination-Option of Jury Trial, 6 MONTHLY L. REP. 112, 124-25 (1853).
240. Id. at 125.
241. Id. at 128.
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Just as the invocation of the witness privilege defeated truth-seeking, so too
did grants of transactional immunity threaten to defeat the administration
of justice. Narrowly drawn testimonial immunity statutes, on the other
hand, promised to reconcile the witness privilege and the use of immunity
grants with the fact-finding functions of the common-law trial.
Indeed, the immunity statutes were not only a means of circumventing
the witness privilege. They were also partial abolitions of the disqualifica-
tion rules, targeting particular substantive areas in. which party or
interested-witness testimony was of particular importance. New York's
1813 legislation creating immunity for those who testified regarding duels,
for example," provided that "any person offending against this act shall
be a competent witness."243 Likewise, the 1837 usury legislation abol-
ished the party disqualification rule in usury cases by allowing defendants
in contract suits to call the plaintiff as a witness "in the same manner as
other witnesses."' 4 As legislatures narrowed the common-law witness
privilege, they narrowed and enacted limited abolitions of the party
disqualification rule.
3. The Field Code and the Immunity Statutes.-Two further testimo-
nial immunity provisions in New York's 1848 Code of Procedure, the
famous Field Code, and its subsequent amendments confirm the close ties
that existed between the shift to narrower immunity acts and the reforms
in the law of evidence that swept away the rule of disqualification for
interest.
The antebellum codification debates 45 were closely related to the
abolition of the interest disqualification rule. Supporters of codification
and proponents of the abolition of the disqualification rule both aimed to
eliminate rules that had come to be viewed as anachronistic procedural
technicalities, needlessly complicating common-law litigation and obstruc-
ting the process of fact-finding.'4 Moreover, both found inspiration in
the writings of Bentham, who was perhaps the foremost advocate of both
codification and the abolition of the disqualification rules. 47
242. As noted above, see supra note 227, the precise scope of the immunity granted in the 1813
act was ambiguous.
243. An Act to Prevent Duelling, ch. 45, § 4, [1813] 2 N.Y. Laws 192.
244. An Act to Prevent Usury, ch. 430, §§ 2, 8, 1837 N.Y. Laws 486, 487-88.
245. The codification debates are often misleadingly referred to as a codification "movement."
In fact, codification in the antebellum era represented less a "movement" than a particular installment
of a recurring dialectic in American law between popular antilegalism and professional law reform.
See Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 36 VAND. L. REV. 431, 433-36 (1983) (reviewing CHARLES
M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM
(1981)).
246. See COOK, supra note 245, at 138-41.
247. See id. at 74-78.
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It should not be surprising, then, that the Field Code abolished the
rule of disqualification for interest.' In addition, while the Code
provided that parties remained incompetent to testify on their own
behalf,2 49 it allowed parties to examine their adversaries as witnesses."
Moreover, one of the central goals of Field and other codifiers was to
abolish the fanciful legal fictions that common-law pleading had generated
for certain situations.25 Consequently, the Code of 1848 required that
pleadings be verified. The verification requirement, however, created new
problems related to self-incrimination. By requiring that pleadings be
verified, the Code considerably expanded the breadth of the assertions and
denials that a party was required to make under oath. The verification
requirement thus included an immunity provision providing "that no
pleading [] verified ... shall be used in a criminal prosecution against the
party f- as proof of a fact admitted or alleged in such pleading."252
248. See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING: CODE OF
PROCEDURE § 351 (Albany, Charles Van Benthuysen 1848) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
249. See id. §§ 344, 351.
250. See id. § 344 ("A party to an action may be examined as a witness, at the instance of the
adverse party."). In their Final Report, the Code Commissioners advocated complete abolition of the
disqualification rule for parties as well as for interested witnesses, see FINAL REPORT BY THE
COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING: CODE OF PROCEDURE § 1708 and accompanying note
(Weed, Parsons & Co., Albany 1849), but the New York legislature did not abolish the disqualification
rule for parties testifying on their own behalf until 1857. See An Act to Amend Section Three Hundred
and Ninety-Nine of the Code of Procedure, ch. 353, 1857 N.Y. Laws 744.
251. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 248, at iv.
252. Id. § 133. In the same section, the Code provided that verification might be omitted when
the party "would be privileged from testifying as a witness to the same matter." Id. The 1848 Code,
in other words, established both that the party need not verify the pleadings when a testimonial privi-
lege was implicated, and that testimonial immunity would attach to the pleadings. Because parties had
the option of not verifying their pleadings, it hardly comes as a surprise that the testimonial immunity
clause appears never to have been litigated. The cases only addressed the question of when a party was
permitted to submit unverified pleadings. See Maloney v. Dows, 2 Hilton 247, 259-61 (N.Y.C.P.
1858); Wheeler v. Dixon, 14 How. Pr. 151, 152-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856); Clapper v. Fitzpatrick, 3
How. Pr. 314, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
The verified pleadings requirement had a strange history. In the amendment of the Code in
1849, the provisions regarding self-incrimination were omitted, leaving only the requirement that when
any pleadings in a case were verified, all subsequent pleadings (except demurrers) were to be verified
as well. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 248, § 157. Then in 1851 the legislature amended the section
yet again to allow omission of verification in cases in which admission of the truth of an allegation
would subject the party to a felony prosecution. The legislature also restipulated that no verified
pleading was to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution "as proof of a fact admitted or alleged
in such pleading." An Act to Amend the Code of Procedure, ch. 479, 1851 N.Y. Laws 876, 888.
Finally, in 1854 the legislature returned to the original language of the 1848 Code, providing simply
that omission of verification was permitted "where the party called upon to verify would be privileged
from testifying as a witness to the truth of any matter denied by such pleading." An Act in Relation
to Pleadings in Courts of Record, ch. 75, 1854 N.Y. Laws 153. See generally Wheeler v. Dixon, 14
How. Pr. 151, 152-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (describing the history of the self-incrimination provisions
in the Code's verification of pleadings section).
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Three years after the initial promulgation of the Code, a second
immunity provision was attached to it. The 1851 amendments to the Code
included a change to the provision requiring judgment debtors to appear
before a judge and be examined under oath with respect to the payment of
the debt. The amendment stated that no person was excused from answer-
ing merely because the examination would tend to convict him of fraud.
In order to extinguish the privilege in this instance, the amendment
included a testimonial immunity clause providing that the judgment debtor's
answer was not to be used as evidence against him in any criminal proceed-
ing or prosecution. 53
4. Testimonial Immunity Statutes as the Standard.-Over the period
of only a few decades, then, legislatures in New York shifted to narrow
testimonial immunity provisions, away from the broad transactional
immunity provisions that had characterized immunity statutes as late as
1820. New York was hardly alone in this; during these same years a
number of states adopted narrow testimonial immunity statutes,2 4 as did
England. 55
At the federal level, Congress collapsed the move from transactional
to testimonial immunity into five short years. In 1857 Congress debated
an act conferring transactional immunity on witnesses testifying before
congressional committees investigating political corruption.5 6 Over the
strenuous objections of Senator Lyman Trumbull, who argued that
253. See An Act to Amend the Code of Procedure, ch. 479, § 292, 1851 N.Y. Laws 898. In a
variation on the disqualification reforms enacted by the legislature, another 1851 amendment to the
Code provided that one codefendant or coplaintiff could be called by another "as to any matter in which
he is not jointly interested or liable," but that "the examination thus taken shall not be used in behalf
of the party examined, unless he is examined at the instance of the adverse party." Id. § 397, at 903.
254. Compare, for example, two antebellum Pennsylvania gambling statutes. In 1847 the state
legislature enacted a transactional immunity provision to facilitate the enforcement of its gambling laws.
See An Act for the Suppression of Gambling, ch. 79, § 4, 1847 Pa. Laws 111. In 1860 the legislature
repealed the 1847 Act and enacted in its place a narrower testimonial immunity provision. See Act of
Mar. 31, 1860, ch. 374, § 58, 1860 Pa. Laws 382. Many cases of the period address this new form
of testimonial immunity statute. See Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624, 649-50 (1855); State v. Quarles,
13 Ark. 307, 308-10 (1853); Kneeland v. State, 62 Ga. 395, 398-99 (1879); Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga.
255, 258 (1853); Bedgood v. State, 17 N.E. 621, 623-24 (Ind. 1888); State v. Enochs, 69 Ind. 314,
317 (1879); Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153, 156 (1860); Commonwealth v. Emery, 107 Mass. 172,
181-86 (1871); Ex parte Buskett, 17 S.W. 753, 754-55 (Mo. 1891); State v. Nowell, 58 N.H. 314,
315-16 (1878); Currier v. Concord R.R. Corp., 48 N.H. 321, 333 (1869); LaFontaine v. Southern
Underwriters Ass'n, 83 N.C. 133, 140-44 (1880); Smith v. Crane, 12 Vt. 487,490-91 (1840); Temple
v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 900-01 (1881); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 218,221
(1873).
255. See 2 TAYLOR, supra note 72, § 1310, at 1176-77 (describing the enactment of transactional
immunity statutes through the 1820s, but noting the shift to testimonial immunity statutes beginning in
the 1850s); see also Queen v. Leatham, 121 Eng. Rep. 589, 591 (Q.B. 1861) (holding that a witness
can be compelled to give incriminating testimony when guaranteed testimonial immunity).
256. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 426-32, 434-45 (1857).
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transactional immunity would allow even "the greatest criminal" to
escape,25 7 Congress enacted the broad immunity act extending
transactional immunity to all persons compelled to furnish self-
incriminating testimony before either house of Congress or any
congressional committee.25  The act was subject to almost immediate
abuse, 9 and in 1862 the act was amended in accordance with Senator
Trumbull's original recommendation to provide only testimonial
immunity.2 ° Finally, in 1868, Congress passed an additional immunity
act extending the reach of the 1857 act, as amended in 1862 to provide
only testimonial immunity, to judicial proceedings.26' Congress thus
reproduced, albeit in an abbreviated time frame, the transformation of the
immunity statutes in New York and other American jurisdictions during the
middle decades of the nineteenth century.
C. Constitutionalizing the Privilege in New York State: Litigating the
Immunity Statutes
Although the attacks on the broad common-law witness privilege
launched by John Appleton and others had begun the process of forcing
American lawyers and judges to address the question of the witness
privilege's constitutional status, it was only with a series of cases litigated
under the newly narrowed immunity statutes that the witness privilege
emerged as a significant constitutional rule.
257. Id. at 437 (statement of Senator Trumbull).
258. See An Act More Effectually to Enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of
Either House of Congress, and to Compel Them to Discover Testimony, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155
(1857).
259. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 428-29 (1862) (describing abuses of the transac-
tional immunity rule by wimesses seeking to indemnify themselves against criminal prosecution).
Senator Trumbull described the consequences of the transactional standard as follows:
The statute of 1857 was passed hastily; we all recollect that it grew out of a particular
matter, and was known to be imperfect when it passed. It has operated so as to discharge
from prosecution and punishment persons who were brought before these committees and
testified touching matters that they might have been prosecuted for. In fact this holds out
an inducement for the worst criminals to appear before our investigating committees.
Here is a man who stole two million in bonds, if you please, out of the Interior
Department. What does he do? He gets himself called as a witness before one of the
investigating committees and testifies something in relation to that matter, and then he
cannot be indicted.
Id. at 428 (statement of Senator Trumbull). On the background of the federal immunity statutes, see
J.A.C. Grant, Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government, 9
TEMP. L.Q. 57, 63-64 (1934); Hazlett, supra note 37; and Note, supra note 71, at 1571-78.
260. See An Act Amending the Provisions of the Second Section of the Act of January Twenty-
Fourth, Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-Seven, Enforcing the Attendance of Witnesses Before Committees
of Either House of Congress, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862).
261. See An Act for the Protection in Certain Cases of Persons Making Disclosures as Parties, or
Testifying as Witnesses, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
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1. The Usury Cases.-Prior to the enactment of the 1837 usury act
that conferred testimonial immunity on plaintiffs in suits at law on notes
alleged to be usurious,262 a defendant seeking to make a defense of usury
in a common-law action on a promissory note in New York's courts was
prevented by both the disqualification rule and the witness privilege from
compelling the testimony necessary to substantiate the usury defense.
Under the disqualification rule, the plaintiff was not compellable to testify
and thus could not be called by the defendant in order to establish the fact
of usury; under the witness privilege, even if the defendant could call the
original payee on the note in order to prove the usury, the payee could not
be compelled to incriminate himself.26 3  Moreover, when the defendant
at law sought discovery by filing a bill in equity, he was precluded from
avoiding the debt altogether by the equitable maxims "he that will have
equity must do equity" and "equity will not enforce a penalty." z64
In New York's 1829 Revised Statutes, the legislature sought to make
it easier for defendants in suits at law on usurious notes to prove the usury
in a parallel action in chancery. The Revised Statutes provided that it was
not necessary for a defendant at law to pay or offer to pay any interest on
the sum loaned in order to compel discovery in chancery. 65  The
legislature's amendment of usury law procedure prompted the chancellor
in the 1832 case of Livingston v. Harfis2z to address the extent to which
the legislature could change equitable discovery rules. With respect to the
rule that a party seeking equity must do equity, the chancellor held that the
legislature could amend or abolish even this cardinal rule of equity jur-
isdiction because it "relate[d] merely to the principles upon which this
court acts in the exercise of its general jurisdiction."'267 But then the
court turned to a question that had not theretofore arisen in reported cases
in New York State: What was the relationship between the rule obtaining
both at common law and in equity, under which a witness could not be
compelled to disclose testimony that would expose him to a penalty, and
the constitutional self-incrimination clause? According to the chancellor,
the Constitution had
262. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
263. See Cloyes v. Thayer, 3 Hill 564, 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); Bums v. Kempshall, 24 Wend.
360, 362-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840), aft'd, 4 Hill 468, 469 (N.Y. 1842); Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. 174,
177-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Connor v. Bradey, I Ant. N.P. Cas. 135, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809);
see also Livingston v. Harris, 3 Paige Ch. 528, 532 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (noting the difficulty of
"establish[ing] the fact of usury by the ordinary modes of proof adopted in courts of common law").
264. Livingston, 3 Paige Ch. at 533.
265. See 1 N.Y. REV. STAT. ch. 4, tit. 3, § 8 (Packard 1829).
266. 3 Paige Ch. 528 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
267. Id. at 533-34.
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wisely provided that a party shall not be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. And this principle, by the
common law, was extended to proceedings in civil cases, where the
witness was called upon to make a disclosure which might subject
himself to forfeiture, or penalty, or to any loss in the nature of a
penalty. It would therefore be inconsistent with this principle of the
common-law, and with the spirit of the Constitution, to compel a
defendant to be a witness against himself, where the effect of the
disclosure which he was required to make would be to subject him
to a forfeiture of the money actually loaned, and to which no other
person had any equitable claim.2 s
The court thus concluded that the legislature could not compel a discovery
that would subject a witness to a forfeiture or penalty. The chancellor's
analysis seemed to recognize a distinction between a constitutional self-
incrimination clause limited to criminal cases and a more expansive
common-law rule covering civil forfeitures and penalties. Yet arguing that
the broader common-law rule was consistent with "the spirit of the
Constitution," the court enforced the broader common-law rule against the
legislature.
The chancellor's analysis in Livingston largely evaded the question by
glossing the common-law rule as consistent with the "spirit" of the consti-
tutional clause. With the enactment of the 1837 testimonial immunity pro-
vision for usury cases, however, usury litigation took a distinct constitu-
tional turn that forced courts to clarify Livingston's impressionistic equation
of the common-law and constitutional privileges.
The New York usury act of 1837 provided that defendant-borrowers
in actions on usurious notes could compel plaintiff-lenders to testify (either
at law or equity) in order to establish the usury and conferred testimonial
immunity on the plaintiff-lender. 9  Perrine v. Striker270 was the first
case decided under the act. The complainant in Perrine sought a perma-
nent injunction against the bringing of a suit on an allegedly usurious note
and requested discovery under the 1837 act to prove the usury."
Demurring to both the request for discovery and the injunctive relief sought
by the bill, counsel for the lender argued that "[t]he act of 1837, requiring
the defendant to answer on oath, for the purpose of enforcing a forfeiture
against him, is in conflict with the provision of the constitution, which
declares that no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a
268. Id. at 534.
269. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
270. 7 Paige Ch. 598 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
271. Id. at 598-99.
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witness against himself." 2 2 The chancellor rejected the constitutional
claim on the ground that although the constitutional privilege required that
the lender be immunized from the admission of his compelled testimony in
any subsequent criminal case against him, it did not require that the lender
be insulated from subsequent prosecution:
The objection that the discovery sought by the bill may subject the
defendant to a crimnal [sic] prosecution is not well taken. The
eighth section of the act of May, 1837, to prevent usury, expressly
provides that the answer of a defendant in such a case shall not be
used against him before any grand jury, or on the trial of any
indictment against him. Whether any criminal prosecution can be
instituted in any form against the usurer, it is not material to inquire;
for the legitimate construction of the section must be . . .that his
answer shall not be received as evidence on the trial of any criminal
prosecution against him. 73
The court went on to state that the common-law witness privilege had been
broader than its constitutional analogue:
By the common law, a defendant in a suit in this court could not be
compelled to answer any charge, or interrogatory, which might
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or any loss in the nature of a
forfeiture. And this principle was also applicable to witnesses in
suits at law; who could not be compelled to disclose the fact of
usury, where such disclosure would have the effect to deprive them
of the recovery of the whole debt. 4
The common-law privilege, then, had encompassed a wide range of self-
damaging testimony. But only the constitutional privilege placed limits on
the legislature, and in the chancellor's view, the instant proceeding was not
a criminal case within the meaning of the constitutional privilege:
The seventh section of the seventh article of the constitution
declares, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. But I am not prepared to say that this
is a criminal case, within the meaning of this provision of the
constitution; although the effect of the discovery sought must
necessarily be to prevent a recovery of the money actually lent, and
is therefore in the nature of a forfeiture. 5
The constitutional self-incrimination clause, in this view, attached only to
testimony in criminal cases. As a result, an immunity statute that
272. Id. at 600.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 601.
275. Id. at 602.
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precluded the introduction of compelled incriminating testimony into
evidence in a subsequent prosecution was consistent with the constitutional
privilege.
Four years later, the question of whether a real plaintiff-in-interest
could be compelled to testify under the act of 1837 came before what was
then New York's highest court-the Court for the Correction of Errors-in
Henry v. Bank of Salina.27 6 "It is true," wrote Chancellor Walworth,
that
by the common law, a witness was not compelled to answer any
question, nor was a party to a suit in chancery bound to discover any
matter, which would subject him to any loss in the nature of a
penalty or forfeiture. But the constitutional provision for the
protection of the rights of parties and witnesses is not so broad. It
is, therefore, in the power of the Legislature to change this humane
principle of the common law, so far as it can be done without
violation of the Constitution.2"
Walworth thus drew a distinction between the threat of criminal sanctions,
which brought testimony within the scope of the constitutional self-
incrimination clause, and the threat of mere civil penalties and forfeitures,
which he viewed as falling within the protection of the common-law wit-
ness privilege but not within the scope of the constitutional self-
incrimination clause. As for the question of the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion for usury, Walworth held that the 1837 usury act satisfied the require-
ments of the constitutional self-incrimination clause by conferring testimo-
nial immunity on plaintiffs who were compelled to testify under its
auspices."
In addition to the usury statute, several of the other testimonial immu-
ity statutes enacted by the New York legislature prompted courts in New
York to decide on the scope of its constitutional self-incrimination clause.
276. 5 Hill 523 (N.Y. 1843). Under the 1837 Act, "plaintiffs" could be compelled by the
defendant to testify as to the fact of the usury. In cases such as Henry, plaintiffs sought to evade the
Act by having their case prosecuted by some third party. They argued that the real plaintiff-in-interest
was no longer "the plaintiff" within the meaning of the 1837 act and thus was no longer within the
grant of immunity provided by the testimonial immunity provision of the Act. Therefore, the argument
went, the real plaintiff-in-interest could not be compelled to testify as to the self-incriminating fact of
the usury.
277. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
278. See id. at 525. The act, Walworth wrote, "remove[d] the constitutional difficulty, in
compelling [plaintiffs] to answer, by declaring that the testimony given by any plaintiff. . . under the
provisions of that Act, shall not be used against such person before any grand jury, or on the trial of
any indictment against him." Id. The chancellor thus understood the 1837 act to extend to usury cases
the proposition established in England in 1806 by Lord Melville's Case. See id. at 526.
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Wheeler v. Dixon279 held that the verification of pleadings provision in
the amended Field Code did not violate the state constitutional
privilege. 2u  And in People v. Quant,28' decided in 1855, a three-judge
panel rejected a constitutional attack on the 1855 anti-intemperance act and
its testimonial immunity provision.'
In each of the cases, especially the usury cases, the courts sharply
distinguished the common-law privilege from the constitutional privilege
on the ground that the former protected against civil penalties and
forfeitures, whereas the latter was limited to some more narrowly defined
class of criminal sanctions.3 In addition, the usury cases strongly
intimated that testimonial immunity alone was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of New York's constitutional self-incrimination clause.
2. People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly and the Constitutionalization of
Testimonial Immunity.-The New York Court of Appeals settled the ques-
tion of the scope of immunity required by the constitution in People ex rel.
Hackley v. Kelly,' decided in 1861. Andrew Hackley had been sum-
moned before a New York City grand jury investigating corruption in the
city council. 2  Hackley refused to answer the grand jury's questions,
citing both the "ancient common-law rule, that no man is held to accuse
himself,",1 6 and the state constitutional self-incrimination clause, the
"sixth section of the first article of the Constitution of this State." 287
279. 14 How. Pr. 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
280. Id. at 153. In a showing of inconsistency that indicated the newness of the distinction
between the common-law and constitutional privileges, the Wheeler court ignored the 1843 holding of
the Court for the Correction of Errors in Henry and in dicta cited the New York Constitution's self-
incrimination provision for the proposition that "[a] witness is not bound to speak when the answer may
subject him to a prosecution for a crime or misdemeanor, or to any penalty or forfeiture, or anything
in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, or has a tendency to degrade his character." Id. The court thus
reconflated the common-law and constitutional privileges, attributing the broad characteristics of the
former to the latter.
281. 12 How. Pr. 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
282. See id. at 88. The court might more properly be said to have skirted the constitutional
question raised by the testimonial immunity provision because that particular provision was not
implicated in the case at bar. Referring to the section of New York's 1846 Constitution containing the
self-incrimination clause, the court noted: "It will be perceived that no part of this section has any
application to the question presented by this appeal. . . . If other parts of the act conflict with this or
any other section of the constitution, it will not affect the validity of those provisions free from such
objections." Id.
283. The Livingston case, it will be remembered, distinguished between the common-law and con-
stitutional rules, but enforced both against the legislature. Livingston v. Harris, 3 Paige Ch. 528, 534
(N.Y. Ch. 1832).
284. 24 N.Y. 74 (1861).
285. Id. at 76. Hackley was asked, "What did you do with the pile of bills received from Thomas
Hope, and which he told you amounted to fifty thousand dollars?" Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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Under the testimonial immunity provisions of the acts to prevent public
corruption enacted in 1853 and 1857, all offenders against the acts were
competent witnesses to testify and their testimony was inadmissible "in any
prosecution, civil or criminal, against the person so testifying. " 21s Thus,
as Judge Hiram Denio wrote, "[t]he question to be determined" was
"whether these provisions are consistent with the true sense of the
constitutional declaration, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case, to be a witness against himself."' 9
Denio's answer was a resounding yes. Like the courts in the usury
cases, Denio distinguished between the "common-law doctrine which
excuses a person from giving testimony which will tend to disgrace him,
to charge him with a penalty or forfeiture, or to convict him of a
crime,"2' ° on the one hand, and the constitutional self-incrimination
provision on the other. The latter only provided that the state could not
"compel a witness to testify on the trial of another person to facts which
would prove himself guilty of a crime without indemnifying him against the
consequences."29 "If the case is so situated," Denio stated, "that a
repetition of it on a prosecution against him is impossible, as where it is
forbidden by a positive statute, I have seen no authority which holds or
intimates that the witness is privileged. 2I
After Kelly, New York had firmly distinguished between the common-
law witness privilege and the constitutional Self-Incrimination Clause. The
former offered the witness shelter from a range of self-accusing testimony,
including testimony exposing him to civil penalties or moral disgrace. The
latter was narrowly limited to protecting the witness-whether he was a
party to the case at bar or a third-party witness-from being compelled to
give testimony that could subsequently be introduced in a criminal case
against him.293
288. An Act to Amend the Existing Laws Relating to Bribery, ch. 539, § 14, 1853 N.Y. Laws
1012, 1013.
289. Kelly, 24 N.Y. at 81.
290. Id. at 82-83.
291. Id. at 83.
292. Id. at 83-84.
293. It should be noted that some scholars have claimed that the application of the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to witnesses, as opposed to defendants and suspects in pretrial
proceedings, was a doctrinal innovation of the late nineteenth century. See Hazlett, supra note 37
(manuscript at 1); Lewis Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
Constitutional or Common-Law?, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 107, 139 (1960); Nesson & Leotta, supra note
4, at 1637-39. It is true that the witness privilege was not understood as a constitutional rule in the first
half of the nineteenth century. But as I have argued here, the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination was simply never invoked in early-nineteenth-century American legal practice due to
overlapping common-law doctrines. Moreover, as Kelly demonstrates, when the state analogues of the
Fifth Amendment finally did become factors in American legal practice, it was at least in part to
wimesses that they were first applied. Hazlett accurately observes that the early federal case law simply
ignored the Self-Incrimination Clause, but her claim that the first cases to consider the constitutional
1999]
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VI. Constitutionalizing the Common Law: The Return to Early-
Nineteenth-Century Common-Law Standards in Late-Nineteenth-
Century Constitutional Self-Incrimination Doctrine
After Kelly, the constitutional self-incrimination clauses had been
definitively interpreted and brought into American legal practice as narrow
constraints on the government's capacity to compel the production of self-
regarding testimony. Indeed, Kelly quickly became the majority rule in
state and federal courts alike.294 By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, the newly defined constitutional self-incrimination clauses had
been expanded dramatically. In part, the re-expansion of the late-
nineteenth-century privilege was the result of the ready availability of a
body of common-law privilege cases that gave a broad reading to the scope
of the privilege. But the late-nineteenth-century courts were also reacting
to a real dilemma created by the proponents of a narrow constitutional rule.
The broad common-law privilege of the early nineteenth century had made
sense as part of a distinctive approach to fact-finding in the courtroom.
provision excluded witnesses from its scope is less certain. See Hazlett, supra note 37 (manuscript at
7). The Quitman case cited by Hazlett, see United States v. Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680 (C.C.E.D. La.
1854) (No. 16,111)-a case discussed above, see supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text-is
ambiguous. The court in Quitman stated that
[t]he Constitution of the United States does not allow the examination of a witness in any
criminal case against himself, except with his consent. The common-law of evidence
extends the exemption, and he is not required to answer in any case either as a witness
or a party, the effect of which answer might be to implicate him in a crime or
misdemeanor, or subject him to a forfeiture.
Quitman, 27 F. Cas. at 682 (emphasis added). In my view, the Quitman case is best understood as
applying the Self-Incrimination Clause to witnesses. The critical question is whether the word
"witness" in the first sentence refers to a criminal defendant testifying as a witness in his own case,
or to a nonparty witness whose testimony (i.e. "examination") was subsequently submitted as evidence
in a criminal case against him. Two factors militate for the latter view. It is not clear how a criminal
defendant could "consent" to be examined in his own criminal case before the abolition of the rule
disqualifying criminal defendants from testifying. Moreover, the use of the phrase "witness or party"
in the second sentence suggests that the first sentence's use of the word "witness" may have specifically
excluded parties.
294. See In re Counselman, 44 F. 268, 270 (C.C.N.D. III. 1890), revd sub nom Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. McCarthy, 18 F. 87, 89 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); In
re Krueger, 14 F. Cas. 870, 871 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 7,942); United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas.
670, 671-72 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1872) (No. 16,717); In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261,261 (D. Nev. 1871)
(No. 13,548); United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1273, 1275 (D. Or. 1871) (No. 14,671); Stanwood
v. Green, 22 F. Cas. 1077, 1079 (S.D. Miss. 1870) (No. 13,301); United States v. Mathoit, 26 F. Cas.
1197, 1200 (D. Or. 1870) (No. 15,740) (dicta); Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624, 649-50 (1855); State
v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307, 310 (1853); Kneeland v. State, 62 Ga. 396, 398-99 (1879); Bedgood v. State,
17 N.E. 621, 623 (Ind. 1888); State v. Enochs, 69 Ind. 314, 315-17 (1879); Wilkins v. Malone, 14
Ind. 153, 154-55 (1860); Commonwealth v. Emery, 107 Mass. 172, 182 (1871); Exparte Buskett, 17
S.W. 753, 754-55 (Mo. 1891); State v. Nowell, 58 N.H. 314 (1878); Currier v. Concord R.R. Corp.,
48 N.H. 321, 332 (1869); LaFontaine v. Southern Underwriters Ass'n, 83 N.C. 133, 141 (1880);
Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 895-96 (1881); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.)
624, 632-33 (1873); see also Queen v. Leatham, 121 Eng. Rep. 589 (Q.B. 1861) (validating an act
compelling a witness to give incriminating testimony when guaranteed testimonial immunity).
HeinOnline -- 77 Tex. L. Rev.  894 1998-1999
Making the Fifth
But as the old model of common-law fact-finding was abandoned in favor
of a model driven by counsel and cross-examination, the privilege came to
appear increasingly anachronistic. Thus, even as judges and legislators
argued in favor of a narrow constitutional privilege, they found it exceed-
ingly difficult to articulate a principled basis for even their narrow version
of self-incrimination rules. By their lights, the new mode of fact-finding
in the common-law trial left no real basis for the privilege; their narrow
reading of the self-incrimination clauses was in large part an attempt simply
to read out of the state and federal constitutions a provision that no longer
made sense to them.
In the absence of a principled account of the self-incrimination clauses,
the door was left open for the subsequent re-expansion of the privilege
under a new theory. Accordingly, under the aegis of a broad constitutional
right to privacy, late-nineteenth-century courts reworked the broad
common-law rules of self-incrimination and put them to new use.
A. The Dilemma of the Narrow Mid-Nineteenth-Century Privilege:
Finding a Rationale for the Constitutional Privilege
As we have seen, judges such as Appleton, Campbell, and Denio, who
were instrumental in distinguishing the common-law privilege from the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses, interpreted the constitutional
clauses narrowly.295 Indeed, in their view, the constitutional clauses
were something of an embarrassment, to be explained away in narrow
readings of the constitutional provisions. Appleton, for one, had been a
leading figure in the abolition of the disqualification rules and in the
reorientation of the common-law approach to fact-finding. To him the self-
incrimination rules were little more than holdovers in a new age of liberal
witness competency rules and cross-examination. 2'
Leading lights in the mid-nineteenth-century Congress exhibited the
same deep ambivalence about the self-incrimination clauses. Like
Appleton, Campbell, and Denio, they resisted broad readings of the federal
Self-Incrimination Clause, but failed to advance a rationale that could
account for the clause. Thus, when Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois
protested that the transactional immunity statute of 1857297 went "too far"
and would allow "the greatest criminal [to] escape" merely by giving
"testimony on some immaterial point," 298 he conceded that a "witness
should not be prosecuted for an offense by himself which his own
295. See supra text accompanying notes 194-207 and 285-93.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
297. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
298. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 437 (1857) (statement of Senator Trumbull).
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testimony alone discloses."2' But Trumbull articulated no principled
reason for this concession other than a need to avoid rendering the
constitutional provision wholly meaningless.
Senator Charles Sumner made explicit the dilemma of the new view
of the self-incrimination clauses. Sumner, like his friend and correspon-
dent Appleton, was a strong opponent of the common-law rules excluding
particular classes of witnesses from testifying under oath. Thus, when
Sumner fought to abolish the exclusion of black witnesses from testifying
under oath in federal courts in 1864, his critique of the racial disqualifica-
tion rule was implicitly a critique of other disqualification rules as
well."° "In the early Common-law," Sumner argued to his Senate
colleagues, "numbers [of witnesses] were excluded who are now admitted
to testify."30' However, he continued, "the plain tendency of recent
legislation, and also of judicial decisions, in England and in the United
States, has been to limit the exclusion of witnesses, allowing the court and
jury, on hearing their testimony, to estimate its weight and value. "13r 2
Citing to Bentham and Appleton, Sumner observed that the "whole system
of exclusion" had come to be "covered with ridicule."0 3
Sumner, then, was deeply committed to abolishing the rules of
disqualification. 3°  Like the disqualification rules, the common-law
witness privilege and broad transactional immunity requirements kept
evidence out of the hearing of judge and jury and prevented finders of fact
from sifting through evidence to make reliable determinations of fact.
Accordingly, in 1862, when Trumbull proposed to amend the 1857 immun-
ity act from a transactional standard to a testimonial standard, Sumner led
the debate on the Senate floor in favor of Trumbull's amendment. 35  But
like Trumbull some five years before, Sumner did not advance a rationale
for the privilege itself, only a rationale for reading it narrowly. Indeed,
Sumner admitted that but for the Self-Incrimination Clause, he "should not
be disposed to follow the common law at all."316  "[T]he jurisprudence
of other civilized countries, derived from the Roman law," he argued, "on
299. Id. (statement of Senator Trumbull).
300. Professor Fisher's work brought Sumner's views to my attention. See Fisher, supra note 83,
at 676-78.
301. CHARLES SUMNER, Exclusion of Witnesses on Account of Color, in 11 CHARLES SUMNER:
His COMPLETE WORKS 2, 27 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1900).
302. Id.
303. Id.; see also CHARLES SUMNER, Opening the United States Courts to Colored Witnesses, in
11 SUMNER, supra note 301, at 389, 394 ("Let the witness always be admitted to testify, leaving the
jury to be judges of his credibility.").
304. See SUMNER, supra note 303, at 395 (announcing his support for abolition of the rule disqual-
ifying civil parties).
305. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1862).
306. Id. (statement of Senator Sumner).
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this question is preferable to the . . . common law. There is no other
jurisprudence, under which a witness is not expected to answer any ques-
tion that is put to him, no matter whether it impeach his character or his
honor, or even may render him criminal.""3 7 Because of the text of the
Constitution, Sumner conceded that some privilege against self-
incrimination was necessarily the law of the land, but he refused to
"consent that it shall receive any expansion, especially when such
expansion may interfere with the public interests.""'
The real weakness of the narrow mid-nineteenth-century view of the
privilege against self-incrimination, then, was its failure to articulate
principled grounds on which the courts and Congress could interpret the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses. The privilege had come to be seen
as little more than an historical anomaly imposed on American law by
concerns that were no longer clearly understood and that certainly were no
longer pressing. As the government would argue in the case of McAlister
v. Henkel3" several decades later, "every consideration of a proper
protection of the rights of the body politic demand[ed] that the privilege
should not be extended beyond the limits which are to be fixed by
reference to its historical origin."30
This failure to articulate more than an ad hoc rationale for the priv-
ilege raised two critical problems for the narrow view of the self-
incrimination clauses. If the privilege were an anomaly best limited to its
"historical" scope, the history of the common-law privilege from the early
part of the century offered a wealth of precedents supporting a remarkably
broad privilege. Case law from the early part of the century could be
found supporting a privilege that was more than merely personal to the
witness, that encompassed a witness's civil interests and protected him
against moral disgrace, and that could only be abrogated by a grant of
transactional immunity.31 Moreover, absent a coherent theory of the
principles underlying the self-incrimination clauses, the field was wide open
307. Id. (statement of Senator Sumner).
308. Id. (statement of SenatorSumner). SenatorBenjamin Wade concurred in Sumner's estimation
of the constitutional provision: "Like the Senator from Massachusetts [Sumner], I have never been able
to see the wisdom or the justice of such a rule existing even at the common-law, and I believe the civil-
law rule was infinitely better." Id. (statement of Senator Wade). Accordingly, Wade advocated
limiting the immunity provided by the Self-Incrimination Clause to a narrow testimonial scope. See
id. (statement of Senator Wade).
309. 201 U.S. 90 (1906); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (companion case to
McAlister).
310. Brief for the United States at 15, McAlister (No. 341). The government explained that
although "[t]he privilege has become deeply fixed in our system of jurisprudence" and would "never
be abolished," "the progress of Anglo-Saxon civilization and the enlightened administration of justice
... have made it less and less necessary for the protection of the rights of persons." Id.
311. See supra Part II.
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for the development of a new rationale to explain and rejuvenate those
broad common-law precedents.
B. The Common-Law Alternative and the Search for a New Rationale
Even as Kelly and similar cases were articulating the scope of the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses by distinguishing the constitutional
provisions from the common-law privilege, another view of the clauses
began to emerge. Contrary to Kelly, this interpretation held that the broad
common-law rules governing self-damaging witness testimony were wholly
constitutionalized by the self-incrimination clauses.
The view that the self-incrimination clauses constitutionalized the
common-law privilege had a weak antebellum pedigree. Joseph Story, for
one, had claimed that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause was
"but an affirmance of a common-law privilege."312 But because of the
overlapping common-law rules of privilege and disqualification, antebellum
lawyers and judges had no occasion to work out in any systematic way the
relationship between the common-law rules and the constitutional
provisions.313 As legislatures began to enact narrow testimonial immun-
ity statutes in the mid-nineteenth century, however, some legislators began
to articulate a robust relationship between the common-law rules and the
constitutional provisions. Representative Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky,
for example, argued that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause,
properly understood, constitutionalized the principle that no person was
compellable to testify to that which "render[s] him infamous."" 4
Likewise, Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire argued that the self-
incrimination clauses in the state and federal constitutions "protect[ed] a
witness from answering to matters which shall criminate or disgrace
himself."315 The implications of this view were startling and, in some
ways, even broader than the early-nineteenth-century common-law witness
privilege. If Marshall and Hale were right that the constitutional self-
incrimination clauses protected a witness from being compelled to give
testimony that would disgrace him, then not even transactional immunity
might have been sufficient to extinguish the witness's privilege. The
privilege would have become a true right to silence. 16
In the post-Civil War years, it became routine for courts to claim that
the constitutional self-incrimination clauses constitutionalized the common-
312. 3 STORY, supra note 38, § 1782, at 660.
313. Story, for example, merely indicated that the Constitution codified the common-law
privilege's protections against "torture in order to produce a confession of guilt." Id.
314. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 431 (1857) (statement of Representative Marshall).
315. Id. at 434 (statement of Senator Hale).
316. In 1896 four justices of the Supreme Court came to precisely this conclusion. See infra note
[Vol. 77:825
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law rules, especially in cases requiring the courts to rule on immunity
statutes and the new rules of witness competency." 7 Like the narrower
interpretation adopted by the Kelly court and by Appleton, Trumbull, and
Sumner, however, this approach to the constitutional self-incrimination
clauses suffered from serious weaknesses. As we have seen, self-
incrimination doctrine in the early nineteenth century made virtually no
reference to the constitutional self-incrimination clauses and gave little
indication that they re-enacted the common-law privilege."' Indeed, the
proponents of the view that the self-incrimination clauses constitutionalized
the common-law failed to recognize that the early-nineteenth-century
common-law rules relating to a witness's self-regarding testimony had
changed significantly over the course of the first half of the nineteenth
century. The privilege, for example, had moved from being a per se bar
on self-damaging testimony to being a personal privilege invocable by the
witness; so, too, had the witness privilege ceased to encompass a witness's
civil interests. Neither change, however, had prompted any objection that
narrowing the common-law rules posed a constitutional problem.
Moreover, those who took the view that the constitutional clauses cod-
ified the common-law privilege also faced a difficult challenge in articula-
ting a new set of principles to account for self-incrimination doctrine. In
the early nineteenth century, the common-law witness privilege against self-
incrimination had been one of a panoply of rules that structured the
common-law courts' approach to fact-finding. But by the post-Civil War
years the common-law approach to determining issues of disputed fact had
undergone a fundamental reorientation. Thus, the proponents of a constitu-
tionalized common-law privilege advocated a constitutional rule that was
now out of step with common-law fact-finding. As a result, the courts and
lawyers who moved toward the broad constitutionalized privilege in the last
decades of the nineteenth century began to advocate a theory of the priv-
ilege that previously had played a minimal role in the history of the
privilege in every-day American practice. In place of the early-nineteenth-
century conception of the privilege as a rule promoting fact-finding, the
late-nineteenth-century privilege was increasingly rationalized as the
guarantor of a broadly conceived right to privacy.
317. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897) ("[A] maxim, which in England
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional
enactment.") (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896)); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 574 (1892) (observing that the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause "corresponds with the common law maxim, nemo teneturseipsum accusar"); Rogers v. Superior
Court, 78 P. 344, 347 (Cal. 1904) (discussing the "settled policy of this country and England that no
one shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding"); see also Ex parte
Boscowitz, 4 So. 279, 280 (Ala. 1888); State v. Thaden, 45 N.W. 447,447 (Minn. 1890) (both failing
to distinguish between the common-law and constitutional privileges).
318. See supra subpart (I)(B).
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C. The Late-Nineteenth-Century Re-expansion of the Privilege Under the
Privacy Rationale
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, advocates of a broad
constitutional privilege modeled on the common-law privilege turned to
privacy as the primary rationale for the self-incrimination clauses. 9 To
be sure, in the 1850s and 1860s, opponents of immunity statutes had
suggested the privacy rationale for the privilege in congressional
debate." But Congress rejected the privacy argument in the 1860s when
it enacted narrow testimonial immunity statutes. That argument, however,
became central to self-incrimination law beginning with the Supreme
Court's decision in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States.32' The
Supreme Court reasoned in Boyd that the protection of "the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life"3" explained the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause. Self-incrimination doctrine, the Court
explained, existed "for the security of person and property "3u against the
"arbitrary power" of the state.324
After Boyd, privacy became the privilege's dominant rationale. In the
Court's late-nineteenth-century Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence, it
was held that "the principles that embody the essence of constitutional
liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of the government and
its employ[ee]s of the sanctity of a man's home, and the privacies of his
life. ''31 These, the Court held, were the "principles of humanity and
civil liberty, which had been secured in the mother country [England] only
after years of struggle."326
The Supreme Court's privacy rationale for the privilege quickly
proved to be enormously influential, as lower federal courts and state
courts adopted it to reinterpret the constitutional law of self-
319. On the rise of privacy as the central rationale of the privilege in the late nineteenth century,
and on the centrality of the Boyd case, see infra notes 321-27 and accompanying text, I follow Stuntz.
See Stunz supra note 4, at 418-28; William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MiCH. L. REV. 1016, 1048-54 (1995).
320. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 430 (1862) (statement of Senator James Bayard)
(proclaiming the importance of not "permit[ing] a man to be subjected to the torture of being obliged
to give evidence against himself"); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 442 (1857) (statement of
Senator George Pugh) (arguing that no "tribunal should be empowered . . . to torture a witness, and
compel him to the alternative of perjury, or exclusion from the regard of his fellow-men" and that such
a policy represents the excesses of "a wanton curiosity, or of a desire to oppress and ruin the witness").
321. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
322. Id. at 630.
323. Id. at 635.
324. Id. at 630.
325. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894).
326. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897); see also Brief for Appellant at 74, Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (No. 340) (arguing that under English law "any invasion of the right
of privacy [was] a trespass" and that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments constitutionalized that principle
as a matter of constitutional criminal procedure).
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incrimination. 27 Most importantly, the privacy rationale supplied a basis
for renewed expansion of the constitutional privilege. As a result, the
courts reinvigorated variations on the old common-law doctrines that had
characterized the privilege in the first years of the nineteenth century.
1. "Person": Corporations and the Privilege.-By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the common-law privilege had become a personal
privilege, invocable only by the witness to decline to give testimony that
was personally incriminating. 32 But the late nineteenth century
witnessed the return of the idea that the privilege was something other than
purely personal. In particular, American courts flirted with extending the
privilege so as to allow corporate officers to invoke it not only in their
personal capacity, but also on behalf of their corporate employers.329
Indeed, a number of courts apparently assumed, while not directly holding,
that corporations could claim self-incrimination clause privileges.33 The
Supreme Court had held, after all, in Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific R.R.,331 that corporations were persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Wigmore, moreover, had stated unambiguously that corpora-
tions were covered by the constitutional privilege.332  Accordingly,
several courts took the readily apparent next step of squarely holding that
corporations could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination through
their officers.333
327. See, e.g., Exparte Chapman, 153 F. 371, 374-75 (C.C.D. Idaho 1907); In re Hale, 139 F.
496, 503 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905), aff'd, In re Hess, 134 F. 109, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1905); Hale, 201 U.S.
at 43; Gindrat v. People, 27 N.E. 1085, 1086 (il. 1891) (all discussing self-incrimination in terms of
privacy and citing Boyd); Exparte Wilson, 47 S.W. 996, 1000 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (applying the
Texas Constitution's self-incrimination clause to "private books and papers" and citing Boyd).
328. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. For a restatement of the proposition in contemp-
orary law, see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976).
329. The best discussion of the relation between the late-nineteenth-century privilege and corpora-
tions is Stuntz, supra note 4, at 427-31.
330. See In re Knickerbocker Steamboat Co., 136 F. 956, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1905) (assuming that
the privilege could have been invoked "by the corporation itself" but holding that it had been
improperly invoked by corporate counsel); Wertheim v. Continental Ry. & Trust, 15 F. 716, 728
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) (observing that courts may compel corporations to produce papers, but only
subject to the "same duties and privileges as an individual"); Southern Ry. v. Bush, 26 So. 168, 174
(Ala. 1899) (assuming that a corporate officer could have claimed the privilege on behalf of the
corporation); State v. Strait, 102 N.W. 913, 913-14 (Minn. 1905) (approving the disclosure of docu-
ments to a bank trustee because the privilege belonged to the bank and because the documents were
semi-public); see also In re Moser, 101 N.W. 588, 593 (Mich. 1904) (holding that the clerk of a non-
corporate employer cannot constitutionally be subpoenaed to produce the books and records of his
employer).
331. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
332. See 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2259, at 3116 (1st ed. 1905).
333. See Central Stock & Grain Exch. v. Board of Trade, 63 N.E. 740, 743 (Ill. 1902) (allowing
a corporate party to decline to produce documents "on the claim of constitutional privilege"); People
ex rel. Morse v. Nussbaum, 67 N.Y.S. 492, 499 (App. Div. 1900) (holding, in an action to annul
1999]
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To be sure, the expansion of the privilege to include corporations was
short-lived. In the 1906 case of Hale v. Henke13 4 the Supreme Court
held that corporations were unable to claim the privilege because the
privilege was personal to the witness testifying and, thus, a corporate
officer could not claim the privilege on behalf of the corporation.335 But
the privacy rationale for the privilege had supplied strong support for
extending the privilege to corporations. The appellants in Hale argued that
it would be a "wanton assault upon the right of privacy" to preclude
corporations from the shelter of the Self-Incrimination Clause.336 And
two dissenting justices, quoting from Boyd's broadly worded privacy
rhetoric, argued that, properly understood, the Self-Incrimination Clause
did apply to corporations.337
2. "Criminal Case": Boyd and the Constitutionalization of Civil
Interests.-If the privacy rationale had the effect of pushing the limits of
self-incrimination doctrine toward the protection of corporations, it also
had the effect of re-invigorating self-incrimination doctrine's protection of
nominally civil interests. And while the Court ultimately retreated from
the implications of extending the privilege to corporations in Hale, the
extension of the privilege in the context of civil interests had a lasting
impact on self-incrimination law. We saw in Part IV that by the mid-
nineteenth century the common-law witness privilege had been narrowed
to exclude the protection of a witness's civil interests. In 1874 Congress
enacted a provision requiring any person suspected of customs fraud "to
produce . . . book[s], invoice[s], or paper[s]"338 at the request of the
government. Any books, invoices, or papers so produced were admissible
to prove allegations of customs fraud in civil forfeiture cases brought by
the government. 3 9 Interpreting the Self-Incrimination Clause consistently
with the common-law witness privilege that now protected only against
criminal sanctions, the lower federal courts uniformly upheld the statute on
corporate contracts, that officers could decline to testify on grounds of the constitutional privilege
despite a state immunity provision indemnifying officers from criminal sanctions); Davies v. Lincoln
Nat'l Bank, 4 N.Y.S. 373, 373 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (holding that because an examination of a corporate
officer "is ... an examination of the defendant [corporation] itself," it is impermissible to "obtain
testimony which will subject the [corporation] bank to a penalty or forfeiture").
334. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
335. Id. at69-71; see also McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91 (1906) (holding that the privilege
"is personal to the witness himself, and that he cannot set up the privilege of another person or of a
corporation as an excuse for refusal to answer").
336. Appellant's Brief in Reply at 21, Hale (No. 340).
337. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 83-89 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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the grounds that in rem forfeiture proceedings were not "criminal case[s]"
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.'
In 1886, however, Boyd marked a departure from the rule of the lower
federal courts and a return to the earlier common-law protection of a
witness's civil as well as criminal interests."4 Stating that the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments together served important privacy interests, 2 the
Court held that the Self-Incrimination Clause applied to proceedings that,
"though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal."' "If
the government prosecutor," asked the Court, "elects to waive an
indictment, and to file a civil information against the claimants-that is,
civil in form-can he by this device take from the proceeding its criminal
aspect . . . and extort from [the claimants] a production of their private
papers ... ?"'
The Boyd Court's holding proved highly influential, and it was soon
taken up by state courts to expand the protections offered by state constitu-
tional self-incrimination provisions. In New York, for example, the consti-
tutional self-incrimination clause was held to bar the state from treating a
liquor dealer's failure to deny charges that he had violated the liquor law
as presumptive evidence of guilt and grounds for revocation of the dealer's
liquor tax certificate. 5  As in Boyd, the powerful new rhetoric of pri-
vacy and the ready availability of broad common-law precedents sustained
340. See United States v. Mason, 26 F. Cas. 1189, 1191 (N.D. II!. 1875) (No. 15,735) ("[This
is not a criminal offense."); United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 153-54 (E.D. Wis.
1875) (No. 16,515) (distinguishing in rem forfeiture proceedings from criminal cases for Fifth
Amendment purposes); United States v. Distillery No. Twenty-Eight, 25 F. Cas. 868, 869 (D. Ind.
1875) (No. 14,966) ("This proceeding is entirely independent of any criminal prosecutions .... );
Mayers, supra note 293, at 135 n.95 (discussing United States v. Thirty-Five Cases of Plate Glass, an
unreported 1885 case in which the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York rejected
application of the Self-Incrimination Clause to a forfeiture proceeding based on a fraud charge); see
also United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 417,418-19 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,417) (holding that
an act of 1868, providing that no evidence obtained by means of any judicial proceeding from any
witness could be introduced into evidence in a criminal case against the witness, did not abrogate the
act of 1867 allowing customs officers to seize books and papers in support of customs fraud forfeiture
proceedings, in part because such proceedings are not criminal cases); In re Platt, 19 F. Cas. 815, 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,212) (upholding the compelled production provision on the grounds that (1)
the provision was consistent with historical practice in customs enforcement, and (2) the provision's
ends were legitimate and its means were appropriate).
341. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-34 (1886).
342. Id. at 630 ("In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.").
343. Id. at 634.
344. Id. Although the owner of the goods was "not the nominal party," the Court reasoned, he
was "the substantial party to the suit ... and, in a case like the present, he is entitled to all the
privileges which appertain to a person who is prosecuted for a forfeiture of his property by reason of
committing a criminal offence." Id. at 638.
345. See In re Peck, 60 N.E. 775, 776-77 (N.Y. 1901); see also In re Cullinan, 81 N.Y.S. 567,
568-70 (App. Div. 1903) (reaching the same result even after the legislature removed the requirement
that the liquor dealer's denial be verified under oath).
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the expansion of the constitutional privilege into the domain of ostensibly
civil interests.'
3. The Scope of the Privilege: Counselman and the
Constitutionalization of Transactional Immunity.-The most significant of
the expansions of the late-nineteenth-century privilege concerned the scope
of the immunity required to abrogate the privilege. Once again, the late-
nineteenth-century courts returned to early-nineteenth-century common-law
standards, and once again, the rationale for this return to broader standards
was the privacy interest served by the privilege.
The critical case in expanding the scope of the immunity doctrine was
Counselman v. Hitchcock347 in 1892. As noted above, Congress in 1868
had enacted an immunity statute excluding testimony obtained in any judi-
cial proceeding from subsequent introduction in a criminal case against the
witness or party producing that testimony.' The statute, in other
words, conferred testimonial immunity in order to compel witness
testimony. Like those state courts following the rule of the Kelly case,349
the lower federal courts had unanimously upheld the immunity statute.
But when the statute was challenged at the Supreme Court for the first time
in Counselman, the Court struck it down as failing to provide immunity as
broad as the Self-Incrimination Clause required.35' "[A] statutory
enactment," the Court wrote, "to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offence to which the question
relates. 352
The Court relied in part on the broad holding of Boyd, decided just six
years earlier, to support Counselman's broad requirement of transactional
immunity.353 Most of all, the Court relied on language that Chief Justice
346. See, in addition, the case discussed by Stuntz, Boyle v. Smithman, 23 A. 397 (Pa. 1892), in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that forcing an oil merchant to disclose statutorily required
records relating to the storage of oil would violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 398.
See generally Stuntz, supra note 319, at 1051-52; Stuntz, supra note 4, at 424.
347. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
348. See An Act for the Protection in Certain Cases of Persons Making Disclosures as Parties, or
Testifying as Witnesses, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
349. See supra note 294.
350. See In re Counselman, 44 F. 268, 270 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1890), rev'd sub nom Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. McCarthy, 18 F. 87, 89 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); In
re Krueger, 14 F. Cas. 870, 871 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 7,942); United States v. Wilson, 28 F. Cas.
670, 671-72 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1872) (No. 16,717); In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261,261 (D. Nev. 1871)
(No. 13,548); United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1273, 1275 (D. Or. 1871) (No. 14,671); Stanwood
v. Green, 22 F. Cas. 1077, 1079 (S.D. Miss. 1870) (No. 13,301); United States v. Mathoit, 26 F. Cas.
1197, 1200 (D. Or. 1870) (No. 15,740) (dicta).
351. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 585-86.
352. Id. at 586.
353. Id. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
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John Marshall had used to describe the common-law privilege in the case
of United States v. Burr.3' Marshall had described, in language adopted
by the Counselman Court, a privilege whose scope suggested the need for
a broad immunity that would protect the witness against, at minimum, the
use and the use-fruits of compelled testimony:
Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is
necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It appears to the
court to be the true sense of the rule, that no witness is compellable
to furnish any one of them against himself. It is certainly not only
a possible, but a probable case, that a witness, by disclosing a single
fact, may complete the testimony against himself; and to every
effectual purpose accuse himself as entirely as he would by stating
every circumstance which would be required for his conviction.3 55
In turning to the early-nineteenth-century common-law privilege and to
Burr, the Counselman Court brought together the available body of broad
early-nineteenth-century common-law precedents and the Court's new
privacy rationale for the Self-Incrimination Clause.356 The privilege
against self-incrimination had come full circle, returning to its early-
nineteenth-century scope, but now removed from the early-nineteenth-
century structure of fact-finding and possessed of a new constitutional
status.3
354. 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (No 14,692e).
355. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 566 (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 40).
356. It should be noted that the language from Burr quoted in Counselman is not precisely in
support of Counselman's holding insofar as the excerpt from Burr was not about immunity at all. See
AMAR, supra note 4, at 223 n.206. Moreover, as Akhil Amar notes, despite the Chief Justice's broad
language in Burr, the witness was required to answer the question at issue on the ground that his
current possession of potentially incriminating knowledge did not justify an inference of such know-
ledge at the time of the criminal act. See id. Yet the broad language was susceptible-even if
mistakenly-to being applied to the issue of immunity. Chief Judge Cardozo so applied it in the case
of Doyle v. Hofstader, 177 N.E. 489 (N.Y. 1931), when he held for the New York Court of Appeals
that because compelled testimony "may still supply the links whereby a chain of guilt can be forged
from the testimony of others," the "immunity is not adequate" unless "the risk of prosecution is ended
altogether." Id. at 491; see also People ex rel Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 68 N.E. 353, 356 (N.Y. 1903)
(citing the language in Burr to support a requirement of transactional immunity). It should be
remembered, moreover, that an immunity issue did arise during the Burr trial, and that the court's
language on this issue suggested a broadly construed rule of immunity. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
357. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Court came within a single vote of using the
new rhetoric of privacy and the available body of broad common-law precedent to hold that even trans-
actional immunity was insufficient to compel a witness to testify. In Brown, the Court held by a bare
5-4 majority that the transactional immunity statute enacted in Counselman's wake passed constitutional
muster. Id. at 594-610. In one sense, the dissenters' argument that the privilege was "absolute," id.
at 630 (Field, J., dissenting), was broader than the common-law rule. The common-law rule, after all,
had been characterized by a long-standing practice of transactional immunity statutes. See supra
sections II(C)(2); V(B)(1). On the other band, the dissenters drew upon the broad common-law prec-
edents of the early nineteenth century, especially those indicating that the privilege protected against
1999]
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Like the Boyd case, Counselman had an immediate impact on self-
incrimination law in the state courts. 358 With the Supreme Court's stamp
of approval on a broad constitutional law of transactional immunity, state
constitutional case law established the same transactional standard in these
years. 359  New York was no exception. Kelly was overturned sub
silentio in 18943' and finally reversed explicitly in 1903.361
VII. Some Beginning Thoughts on the Implications of Constitutional
Self-Incrimination Doctrine's Common-Law Origins for Self-
Incrimination Clause Jurisprudence
This Article has argued that the history of the witness privilege across
the nineteenth century looked something like an hourglass. A broad wit-
ness privilege at the turn of the nineteenth century contracted sharply in the
middle decades of the century only to expand once again at century's end.
The privilege, however, was now constitutional law rather than common
law. Moreover, whereas in 1800 the privilege had, along with the disqual-
ification rules, functioned to facilitate the fact-finding process, by 1900 the
common law had reoriented its approach to fact-finding, abandoning the
disqualification rules and the broad common-law privilege. Accordingly,
the constitutional privilege-even a narrow constitutional privilege-was a
rule in search of a rationale.362 And by the late nineteenth century,
judges had used the self-incrimination clauses to constitutionalize a broad
constitutional right to privacy. In cases like Boyd and Counselman, courts
compelling a witness to give evidence tending to subject him to moral disgrace. See Brown, 161 U.S.
at 633-37 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Lessee of Galbreath v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeates 515
(Pa. 1803) and Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 428 (Pa. 1802)); see also supra notes 49-52 and accom-
panying text (describing the early-nineteenth-century rule extending the witness privilege to questions
that would subject the witness to civil liability or moral disgrace).
358. The Court had not yet incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause against
the states and indeed would expressly decline to do so in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Accordingly, the Court's influence was by way of example rather than as binding authority.
359. See, e.g., Exparte Cohen, 38 P. 364, 365 (Cal. 1894); Exparte Clarke, 37 P. 230, 231
(Cal. 1894); State v. Drew, 124 N.W. 1091, 1093 (Minn. 1910); Exparte Carter, 66 S.W. 540,541-
44 (Mo. 1902); In re Beer, 115 N.W. 672, 673-75 (N.D. 1908); Commonwealth v. Frank, 48 A.2d
10, 11-13 (Pa. 1946); In re Hearing Before Joint Legislative Comm. of House and Senate Created by
Joint Resolution No. 622, 196 S.E. 164, 166-71 (S.C. 1938); Miskimins v. Shaver, 58 P. 411,417-20
(Wyo. 1899). It should be noted that prior to the decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964),
state constitutions that had built-in testimonial immunity provisions continued to be governed by a
narrower testimonial immunity rule. See, e.g., State v. Rodrigues, 52 So. 2d 756, 758 (La. 1951);
Commonwealth v. Cameron, 79 A. 169, 169 (Pa. 1911); In re Kelly, 50 A. 248, 249 (Pa. 1901).
360. See People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 38 N.E. 303, 306 (N.Y. 1894) (holding that "nothing
short of absolute immunity from prosecution" sufficed to circumvent New York's constitutional self-
incrimination clause, but not addressing the conflict with Kelly).
361. See Lewisohn, 68 N.E. at 357 (repudiating the holding in Kelly).
362. Cf. Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 922 (characterizing the Fifth Amendment Self-
Incrimination Clause as "a mandate in search of a meaning").
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were able to draw on a readily available stock of broad common-law prece-
dents from the early nineteenth century, but in doing so they failed to
distinguish-as their mid-century predecessors had-between the
Constitution and the common-law.
A. What Does It All Mean for Contemporary Constitutional Criminal
Procedure? A Diagnosis
The difficulty with the late nineteenth century's re-expansion of the
privilege was that it anachronistically put old, broad common-law doctrines
to a new and theoretically unprincipled use. As many commentators have
pointed out,363 and as the Supreme Court has now agreed,"4 the pri-
vacy rationale offered for the privilege made little sense. Even as the Boyd
Court announced the importance of protecting "the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life, "365 courts were allowed-without apparent
objection-to compel a person to testify to matters deeply personal but
noncriminal.3" Moreover, the capacity to compel testimony through
immunity statutes indicated that even the broad late-nineteenth-century
privilege did not effectively serve privacy interests as such.367 Indeed,
the privacy rationale's insurmountable difficulty was the inconsistency of
its application, both internally to the law of evidence as well as across
different substantive areas of the law.368  Worse yet, the late-nineteenth-
363. For recent critiques of the privacy rationale, see Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 890-91;
David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-lncrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1063, 1107-37 (1986); Stuntz, supra note 319, at 1018-19.
364. See United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2232-34 (1998) (rejecting the privacy rationale
for the privilege).
365. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
366. See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 689-90 (1968). As Judge Friendly suggested,
it is a far graver violation of privacy for a defendant in an annulment suit to be obliged
to testify as to inability or unwillingness to engage in intercourse or insistence on the use
of contraceptives, or for a mother to have to reveal her son's possession of a murder
weapon, than for a motorist to be required to admit that he exceeded the speed limit.
Id. at 689.
367. Justice Souter brings out this point in Balsys. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2232. Of course,
if one more justice had voted with the dissenters in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the privi-
lege would have been absolute, and the privacy rationale would at least have made sense internally to
the structure of the privilege. Even then, however, inconsistencies with other doctrines in the law of
evidence and with other areas of the law would have seriously undermined the capacity of the privacy
rationale to provide an adequate account of the privilege.
368. For a revealing example of the inconsistent applications of late-nineteenth-century privacy
rhetoric, compare Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 281-82, 314-23 (1992)
(describing the expansion of restrictive regulations of abortion and contraception over the second half
of the nineteenth century), with Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150-73 (1996) (describing the ways in which the judicial recognition
of the value of privacy during the late nineteenth century effectively immunized the perpetrators of
domestic abuse).
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century turn to privacy constitutionalized broad self-incrimination
doctrines, thus overturning over half a century of democratic lawmaking
and short-circuiting subsequent legislative deliberation over proper pro-
cedures of law enforcement. 69
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence in our own
time still bears the traces of many of these difficult-to-justify privacy
protections,3 71 though this may change after the Court's decision in the
Balsys case. 37' And yet to the extent that the Court has chipped away at
its own broad self-incrimination doctrines, it has articulated few guiding
principles capable of explaining the law of self-incrimination. 3' Thus,
the ad hoc limitations on self-incrimination clause jurisprudence have in
one sense reproduced the dilemma of mid-nineteenth-century judges and
lawyers who were unable to develop an adequate account of the state and
federal self-incrimination clauses. Today's self-incrimination doctrine is
thus characterized by an inconsistent combination of difficult-to-justify
broad rules and a hodgepodge of miscellaneous exceptions. Consider, for
example, that physical evidence is compellable regardless of any claims of
constitutional privilege.3" Except when it is the fruit of privileged
testimony.374 Unless that testimony took place in the station house rather
than the court room.375 Records a person is required by the government
to keep are not protected by the privilege.376 Unless the government's
records requirement is aimed at precisely those activities that are least
defensible.3' Suspects are told they have a right to stop police
369. On the feedback effects that partial judicial regulation of criminal justice can have for demo-
cratic politics, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 73 (1997).
370. See Stuntz, supra note 319, at 1048-60 (describing the tension between the privacy rationale
of the privilege against self-incrimination and the basic functions of the post-New Deal regulatory state).
371. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2232-34 (holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not reach
concern about foreign prosecutions and rejecting the privacy rationale for the Clause).
372. See Dolinko, supra note 363; Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its
Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 6-10 (1986); William J.
Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988) (all lamenting the
absence of a rational explanation for the privilege).
373. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966).
374. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
375. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that the fruits of non-Mirandized testi-
mony are admissible).
376. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) (holding that the government "can
constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection"); see also Baltimore
City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556, 555-56 (1990) (holding that an order
requiring a mother to produce a child to a social welfare agency did not violate the privilege against
self-incrimination because the act of production "is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory
regime"); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (upholding a state requirement compelling accident
witnesses to remain at the scene and give authorities their name and address).
377. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968) (reversing a conviction for failing
to register and pay an occupational tax for being a professional gambler on the grounds that the
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questioning.37 Yet the very rules that require such a warning give police
a strong incentive to violate that usually remedy-less "right."37 9
B. Sketching a Remedy Rooted in the History of the Privilege in American
Legal Practice: Reliability, Legitimacy, and the Privilege as a
Guarantor of the Fact-Finding Process in Criminal Cases
History rarely yields determinate answers to particular contemporary
interpretive problems in the law. As Robert Gordon has argued, more
often than not the lawyer and the historian engage in two different
projects.3" Whereas the lawyer seeks to extract patterns and trends from
a useable past, the historian finds multiplicity and indeterminacy in
historical experience.3"' This is not to say, of course, that history offers
nothing to the lawyer. The prominent place of historical arguments in
American law and American legal scholarship makes that abundantly
clear." At their best, historical studies of the law can, as Gordon
suggests, historicize the present: reveal existing ways of looking at legal
institutions and doctrines as contingent rather than inevitable, open to new
understandings rather than necessarily set in stone.3u
For Fifth Amendment self-incrimination doctrine, the history of the
common-law privilege offers just such an alternative way to think about an
existing set of legal rules. If the privacy rationale that emerged so strongly
in the late nineteenth century offers little help in constructing a principled
basis for self-incrimination doctrine, we may instead be able to learn a
good deal from the common-law approach to self-incrimination that the
constitutional law of the late nineteenth century left behind. This is not to
say that the broad doctrines of the common-law privilege ought to be
grafted wholesale onto modem constitutional self-incrimination law. The
registration requirement singled out "'a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities'"
(quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965))); see also Haynes
v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 95-101 (1968) (reversing a conviction for possessing a sawed-off
shotgun that had not been registered as required by federal law).
378. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
379. See Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the Innocent Have Confessed, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al (detailing the police practice of continuing interrogations in violation of
Miranda).
380. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1055 (1981).
381. For more sustained recent considerations of the relationship between historical inquiry and
legal interpretation, see Michael C. Dorf, A Nonoriginalist Perspective on the Lessons of History, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 359-61 (1996); William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The
Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1103-08 (1997); Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1023 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601 (1995).
382. On the recent resurgence of historical interpretation in legal scholarship, see LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 139-60 (1996).
383. See Gordon, supra note 380, at 1048.
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common-law privilege, as this Article has argued, functioned alongside the
disqualification rules as part of a distinctive eighteenth-century approach to
fact-finding. Our own fact-finding procedures-though perhaps arcane and
complicated themselves 34-have long abandoned the reliance on disquali-
fication rules and oaths that characterized the eighteenth-century trial. As
a result, any attempt to reinvigorate the old rules of the common-law
privilege would suffer from the same difficulties encountered by the late-
nineteenth-century courts when they read an anachronistic set of doctrines
back into the Self-Incrimination Clause. Nonetheless, the principles
underlying the operation of the privilege in the early nineteenth century, if
properly "translated" 3" for the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries,
offer coherent and sound grounds for rebuilding the law of self-
incrimination on the basis of guaranteeing the fact-finding process in
criminal trials.
In part, guaranteeing outcomes requires that they be reliable. This
requirement sounds both in liberal political theory and in democratic
legitimacy. On the one hand, liberal principles of justice cannot be
reconciled with the conviction of persons for crimes they have not
committed.3 6  On the other hand, democratic self-government requires
some minimum standard of accurate determination of facts to which
enacted laws may be applied. 387  And indeed, much of the structure of
the early-nineteenth-century common-law witness privilege makes sense as
an attempt to give effect to a now-abandoned and seemingly peculiar theory
of how best to achieve reliable results in the trial process.
Yet reliability is not the only consideration in guaranteeing the
outcome of the criminal trial. Reliability alone certainly cannot account for
the structure of the common-law self-incrimination rules in the early
nineteenth century. The fact-finding process of the criminal trial relied
384. See MIRIAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 7, 7-25 (1997) (providing a comparative
perspective on the "peculiar" common-law fact-finding process).
385. Lawrence Lessig, Ficdelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365, 1371-75 (1997);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395,426-
38 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAs L.
REV. 1165, 1171-73, 1189-1211 (1993); (all describing "translation" as the process of taking a text out
of its original context and placing it in another). In Lessig's terms, the task of translating the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause raises an "Erie-effect" problem in that the transformation in
common-law fact-finding that I have described represents a transformation of uncontested discourse,
or "a fundamental change in the nature of how some activity in law is perceived within the law."
Lessig, Understanding, supra, at 435.
386. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[It is a] fundamental
value determination in our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.").
387. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the
Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1417, 1426 (1997) ("When a jury convicts
a defendant who violated a law passed by the legislature, it vindicates the larger democratic process.").
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heavily on obtaining information from the mouth of the accused. Pretrial
questioning of the accused was the pervasive practice in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, and that evidence was often a critical part
of the prosecution's case against the accused at trial.388 Moreover, the
absence of defense counsel from criminal trials in the late eighteenth
century meant that defendants-although unsworn because incompetent to
testify on their own behalf-were required to engage in a considerable
amount of talk during their trial in order to mount any kind of defense.8 9
Consequently, despite the existence of deep anxieties about the reliability
of confession evidence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries,39° the common-law privilege cannot adequately be explained
solely by concern for the reliability of self-regarding testimony.
This does not mean, however, that the principles underlying the early-
nineteenth-century common-law privilege were either wholly unrelated to
reliability or wholly unrelated to furthering the fact-finding process.3 9'
A critical part of any fact-finding process is that its results not only be
reliable but that they be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the
community.3"2 And the common-law privilege, like the disqualification
rules, served to preserve the legitimacy of the fact-finding process.393
Like the common-law disqualification rules, the privilege precluded testi-
mony from persons having a strong interest in disregarding the sanction of
the oath. The consequence of these rules, then, was to avoid having to
reconcile contradictory sworn statements that might threaten the legitimacy
of the oath as a guarantor of the outcome of the common-law trial.
388. See Langbein, Historical Origins, supra note 3, at 1059-62; Moglen, supra note 3, at 1094-
99.
389. See Langbein, Historical Origins, supra note 3, at 1052-56; Moglen, supra note 3, at 1105-
11.
390. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357 (describing confession evidence as "the
weakest and most suspicious of all testimony").
391. The reliance of the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century criminal trial on evidence from
the mouth of the accused has prompted Donald Dripps to claim that the history of the privilege cannot
possibly be rooted in reliability concerns and must instead be found in concerns for protecting political
and religious dissent. See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure: "Here I Go Down That
Wrong Road Again, ' 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1624-25 (1997). While it would indeed be incorrect to
argue that the common-law privilege against self-incrimination rested entirely on a deep concern for
the reliability of evidence taken from the mouth of the accused (and it should be noted that it is not
clear that anyone-least of all Amar-has made such a claim), it is not true that if the rationale for the
privilege cannot be found in promoting reliability alone, it must reside in concerns outside the fact-
finding process altogether.
392. By the phrase "legitimate in the eyes of the community" I mean to employ the Weberian
account of legitimation rather than a competing idea of legitimacy as something to be found in moral
or political philosophy. That is, I use the idea of legitimation here as referring to the possibility that
legal rules or institutions will lead to "[a]ction . . .[that is] guided by [a] belief in the existence of a
legitimate order." 1 MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOcIETY 31 (Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978).
393. See Fisher, supra note 83, at 624-26.
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Since the mid- to late nineteenth century, and for the foreseeable
future, American law has substituted the jury determination of fact for the
oath as the legitimator of the results of the criminal trial.394 And,
indeed, the jury in its role as guarantor of the result of the trial functions
remarkably like the common-law witness privilege and the disqualification
rules once did. In part, the jury is designed to promote truth seeking.
Thus, for example, we require unanimity in criminal trial jury verdicts,
arguably because unanimous jury verdicts promote accuracy in the determi-
nation of issues of fact.3  Yet if reliability and accuracy were all we
wanted out of our finder of fact, we might not choose a jury at all; we
might quite reasonably choose to entrust the fact-finding process to a
professional expert, trained in the weighing of competing claims.396 We
do not, of course. And we do not because the criminal jury serves the
important function of legitimating the outcome of the criminal case,3"
especially in those cases in which a conviction results in the state exercising
its power to take away a person's liberty.398
There should be few illusions about the capacity of broad principles,
such as "legitimacy" or "reliability," to lead conclusively to particular
interpretive results. Holmes, after all, taught us long ago that "[g]eneral
principles do not decide concrete cases." 399  Yet legitimacy and reliability
are hardly new principles to the constitutional law of criminal procedure.
394. See id. at 698.
395. See Primus, supra note 387, at 1453-54.
396. This, after all, is the method used in Western European law. See DAMASKA, supra note 384,
at 32.
397. The jury, of course, can also be said to serve other interests that are less directly related to
the jury's role as finder offact-for example, promoting political participation on the part of thejurors.
See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
203, 219 (1995).
398. The absence of a directed verdict of guilty means that it is only the jury that can convict a
defendant. The possibility of a directed verdict of acquittal means that an acquittal need not be accom-
panied by the legitimating power of the jury. It should be noted that the jury legitimates outcomes in
at least two different, though related, ways. First, the jury functions as a safeguard against abuse of
power by law enforcement authorities. In this first sense, the jury legitimates outcomes by functioning
as a delegation of the people in the criminal trial. See id. at 218. The jury also legitimates outcomes
in a second sense insofar as they blunt the inevitable anger that will accompany particularly unpopular
outcomes. In part, this may explain why juries are unaccountable for their determinations and why
their decisions are largely unreviewable. Thurman Arnold had this second sense of legitimation in
mind when he wrote that
the contradiction between the ideal of permanent unyielding law which must be enforced
without respect to persons, and the ideal of justice, which can never ignore persons...
is resolved as most conflicts are resolved, by inventing a devil who can be blamed for the
inconsistencies of the system. In the American trial the part of the devil is taken by the
jury.
THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 144 (1935). Arnold argued that "the reason
for the existence of the jury is to absorb the criticism of the numerous unsatisfactory results in the trial
of cases, and thus to deflect it against the judicial system itself." Id. at 144-45.
399. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Reliability, of course, is one of the touchstones of criminal procedure.4
In turn, reliability is often taken to be a critical component of the legiti-
macy of criminal proceedings."' Legitimacy concerns, however, also
exist independently of the reliability of criminal proceedings in our consti-
tutional law.41 2  Indeed, neither reliability nor legitimacy appears to be
a sufficient condition in the establishment of a just and workable criminal
law enforcement system. A concern for the appearance of legitimacy alone
would, in the short run at least, sanction mass trickery on the part of law
enforcement officials. And no system of criminal law could long survive
based solely on reliability without legitimacy in the eyes of the community.
Even so, the legitimacy principle is subject to several objections that
ought perhaps be discussed at the outset. One objection would concede
that the continued legitimacy of the criminal law enforcement apparatus is
in fact an important interest that constitutional criminal procedure should
account for, but would claim that allowing a defendant to decline to testify
at his trial is simply not one of the rules on which the legitimacy of the
system hangs. In essence, this is an empirical objection that denies that
people in fact believe that the privilege is critical to the legitimacy of
criminal law enforcement. 3 The Fifth Amendment, on this view, is just
400. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires the application
of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in criminal verdicts).
401. See, e.g., id. at 364 (explaining that the reasonable doubt standard is "indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law").
402. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (distinguishing
"basic fairness" from "the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system");
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that
"the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the
process and its results").
403. See generally Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis.
L. REV. 379, 389-400 (critiquing contemporary views of whether legitimacy exists in the American
legal system). Someone making this objection might also point to the absence of a self-incrimination
rule in European criminal procedure. Criminal law enforcement does not face a legitimation crisis in
Western Europe merely because Continental countries do not have robust self-incrimination rights for
criminal defendants. Civil-law jurisdictions permit a broad array of testimonial privileges in civil
litigation, often broader than common-law jurisdictions' privilege against self-incrimination. See
DAMASKA, supra note 384, at 12-13. But in criminal cases in civil-law jurisdictions, the presiding
judge fires questions directly at the defendant, often resulting in great psychological pressure. The
questioning may continue, even though the defendant refuses to answer, but there is no possibility of
holding the defendant in contempt for doing so. As one authority puts it, "Enfin, la personne poursuivi
peut toujours se refuser A rdpondre si elle estime cette attitude plus conforme aux int~rets de la defence
et sous reserve, pour les magistrats et jurds, du droit de tirer de cette attitude toute consequence utile
a la formation de leur conviction." BOYER MERLE AND ANDRE VITU, TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINAL:
PROCtDURE PtNAL, para 152. Many thanks to Professor John Spencer of Felwyn College, Cambridge
for helping me with the civil-law roles.
This comparative perspective led the Supreme Court to decline to incorporate the privilege
against self-incrimination until 1964. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908) ("[The
privilege] has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the
common-law . . . ."), rev'd, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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as likely to create disrespect for the law insofar as it blocks accurate
outcomes. 4°4  Moreover, this critique suggests that it is a common intui-
tion that those who take the Fifth are guilty.4' 5 How, then, could requir-
ing a defendant to testify in his own defense seriously threaten the
legitimacy of the criminal law?
The answer to this objection is that, properly understood, the Self-
Incrimination Clause need not create insuperable obstacles to accurate
outcomes. Even if criminal defendants are not required to testify at trial,
they might be subject to a pretrial examination, the fruits of which could
be used against them." 6 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the
public's common intuition is in fact that criminal defendants who decline
to testify are guilty. It is likely that the nonparty witness who takes the
Fifth will be seen as hiding guilt. But this does not appear to be nearly as
true in the case of a defendant who refuses to testify. People believe that
O.J. did it, but they do not hold that view because of his refusal to
testify. '  Indeed, it appears that there are good common-sense reasons
why an innocent criminal defendant would not wish to testify.40 8
A second objection to the legitimation argument is conceptual rather
than empirical. On this objection, the legitimating function of constitu-
tional criminal procedure rules can never become part of the rules'
rationale. This is so because if the ultimate touchstone of a rule of
constitutional criminal procedure is its function as a legitimator of
outcomes in the eyes of the community, the rule ought not be a
constitutional rule at all. By hypothesis, such a rule properly serves its
404. See Dolinko, supra note 363, at 1088.
405. See id.
406. See infra section VII(C)(1); Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 858-59.
407. Detective Mark Fuhrman's invocation of the Fifth, on the other hand, appears much more
damning. On Fuhrman and the legal implications of the "privilege against cross examination," see
generally Nesson & Leotta, supra note 4 passim (proposing that juries be allowed to draw inferences
from invocation of the privilege by a nondefendant witness on cross-examination). The data presented
by David Dolinko to support his argument that the privilege does not serve a legitimating function does
not undermine my argument. Dolinko observes that during the 1950s some 68% of survey respondents
believed that those who took the Fifth in congressional anticommunist investigations were, in fact,
communists. See Dolinko, supra note 363, at 1089 n.140 (citing Harold W. Horowitz, Loyalty Tests
for Employment in the Motion Picture Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV. 438, 448-49 (1954) (citing Note,
Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HARV. L. REV. 498, 513 n.103
(1953) (citing BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1952, at 36))). First, those that invoked the Fifth
during these investigations were overwhelmingly witnesses as opposed to defendants. Second, there
is an important distinction between a belief about the likelihood of guilt and a belief about the legiti-
macy of the proceedings in which a person claims the Fifth Amendment. Factors promoting legitimacy
can be, but need not be, reliability-enhancing. See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren & Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200 (1983)
(contending that some reliability-enhancing procedures "also articulate- fair process norms that have
value independent" of their instrumental value). Third, data gathered during the highly charged anti-
communist investigations hardly seems to create a reliable basis for judgments about the function of
the privilege in ordinary criminal trials.
408. See infra section VII(C)(2).
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function only so long as it is seen by the majority of the community as a
required element of the criminal process. If ever the rule falls out of
democratic favor, it will no longer sustain its own rationale. And, if it
remains in democratic favor, it need not be a constitutional rule at all.'
Consequently, on this view, the legitimacy rationale cannot account for the
constitutional and thus antimajoritarian status of criminal procedure rules.
This critique is a powerful one, but its critical mistake is to assume
that the relevant community for which the outcomes of criminal trials must
be legitimated is society as a whole. In fact, the relevant community might
better be said to consist of the groups most directly affected by criminal
law. In particular, three distinct if overlapping groups are particularly
relevant: the offenders themselves; the communities disproportionately
victimized by criminal activity; and the communities that identify them-
selves as disproportionately likely to contain potential criminal defendants.
It is legitimization of the criminal process in the eyes of each of these
groups with which self-incrimination doctrine should concern itself.
The relentless fact of contemporary criminal law is that all three of
these groups in the criminal process are overwhelmingly poor and dispro-
portionately minority.41 This is an enormous crisis for our nation and
our criminal law-one that hardly can be said to turn on the Self-
Incrimination Clause alone. Nonetheless, the fact that criminal law
disproportionately affects discrete communities has important implications
for the conceptual critique of the legitimation argument. For if it is true
that the legitimation function is aimed at not society as a whole, but rather
at particular communities within society, then the objection that legitima-
tion is not properly a constitutional rationale is wide of the mark.
Legitimation would remain an important rationale to be pursued through
constitutional law because it is not necessarily the majority of Americans
who must see the system as legitimate; rather, it is those groups of
Americans most affected by criminal law enforcement who must see the
system as legitimate.
409. This objection, of course, is hardly specific to criminal procedure. It would be an effective
critique of any constitutional rule that was said to be sustained by the rationale that, in fact, the people
wanted it. The point is that if the people really want the rule, they will have it regardless of its status
as a constitutional rule. And if they do not really want it, then the rationale that has been offered for
it makes no sense.
410. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 22-23 (1997) (reporting that in 1992
blacks made up 44.8% of those arrested for violent crimes and, by the early 1990s, actually outnum-
bered in absolute terms whites in prison); MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3
(1995) (estimating that in 1995 one in three black men between the ages of 20 and 29 was under the
supervision of criminal justice authorities); Richard Klein, The Eleventh Amendment: Thou Shalt Not
Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 379 n.102 (1993)
("Eighty-five percent of criminal defendants in the District of Columbia financially qualify for court-
appointed counsel." (citation omitted)).
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Of course, the further objection might arise that if some of the groups
most affected by crime are those communities in which the ravages of
criminal activity are most abundant, it is precisely such communities for
whom a truth-defeating privilege might be most objectionable. But this
objection reveals exactly why furthering the legitimacy of criminal law
enforcement offers such promise as an interpretive principle for self-
incrimination clause doctrine. For the legitimacy principle cuts both ways:
It supplies a rationale for the privilege as well as a rationale for limiting
the scope of the privilege. The privilege against self-incrimination,
properly understood, would thus not entail insuperable obstacles to fact-
finding. If built around a theory of fact-finding, the constitutional privilege
would give real attention to reliability and accuracy concerns. The rule
that the defendant is not required to testify against his will, with all of its
power to legitimate outcomes, need not be inconsistent with truth-seeking
in criminal law enforcement.
C. Applications
With two principles drawn from the common-law witness privilege of
the Early Republic-furthering reliability and promoting legitimacy in
criminal law fact-finding-this Article returns once again to the three Fifth
Amendment situations discussed at the opening: the suspect at pretrial
examination, the criminal defendant at trial, and the nonparty witness.4 '
1. The Suspect at Pretrial Examination.-The history recounted in
this Article has focused on the privilege in the courtroom rather than in the
pretrial examination. In part, this is because the extension of the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to include the pretrial examination
is a relatively recent phenomenon. 412  Nonetheless, reliability and legiti-
macy offer a cogent critique of Self-Incrimination Clause doctrine in the
pretrial examination.
From the perspective of promoting reliability, the law of self-
incrimination in the interrogation room as it has evolved since Miranda
makes a good deal of sense. Rather than preserving its truth-defeating use
plus use-fruits immunity rule in the pre-trial context,413 the Court has
held that the fruits of an illegal interrogation in the police station context
are admissible in any subsequent criminal trial of the suspect.14 But
411. See supra subpart (I)(B).
412. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But cf. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897) (discussing the Fifth Amendment in a pretrial confession case).
413. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
414. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (holding that a confession subsequent to a
Miranda violation is admissible, in part because excluding such a confession would not serve the "goal
of assuring trustworthy evidence"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449 (1974) (holding that
[Vol. 77:825916
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from the perspective of promoting the legitimacy of the criminal law
enforcement process, the law of self-incrimination in the examination room
appears to have done little to curb police abuse. Lies and deceit are
common practice in the police station, often with the law's blessing.
4 15
Moreover, the absence of effective monitoring techniques allows physical
abuse to persist with few realistic checks.4 16
The difficulty encountered by current self-incrimination doctrine
appears to be a conflict between the goal of reliability and the principle of
legitimacy. The rules narrowing the scope of the exclusionary rule for
illegal police station interrogations 417 have exacerbated the problem of
abuse even as they advanced the goal of truth-seeking. By decreasing the
incentives to obey Miranda, the law of self-incrimination has led to
pervasive violations of its own propositions. Police appear routinely to tell
suspects of their rights to counsel and to stop questioning at any time, only
to violate those rights should the suspect choose to invoke them.
48
Indeed, in one California police training video, an assistant district attorney
for Orange County announces to police trainees that when they continue
questioning outside the scope of Miranda, they are "not doing anything
testimony that is the fruit of an illegal interrogation is admissible because there is "no reason to believe
that [a nonparty's] testimony is untrustworthy simply because [the suspect] was not advised of his right
to appointed counsel" (emphasis in original)); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (both holding that a statement made pursuant to a
Miranda violation may be admitted for impeachment purposes).
415. See, e.g., Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir.) (holding that a confession was
voluntary despite the fact that the police falsely told the defendant that his fingerprints were at the scene
of the crime), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1684 (1998); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 904 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding a confession voluntary and, thus, admissible despite "scare tactics, false representations ...,
good cop/bad cop routine, and ... [a] reference to the 'chair'"); State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 515, 519
(S.D. 1998) (holding that a defendant's confession was voluntary despite false reports regarding the evi-
dence against him and assurances that he would be able to leave and see his girlfriend after talking to
the police). But see United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.), vacated,
517 U.S. 1231 (1996); United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (both
arguing for a rational choice approach to the voluntariness inquiry that would prohibit police
misrepresentation).
416. For proposals of more effective monitoring in order to root out police violence, see Amar
& Lettow, supra note 4, at 898-900 (proposing magistrate examinations in which the defendant could
be compelled to testify as an alternative to the current practice of police station interrogations in which
the accused ostensibly has a right to remain silent); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An
Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 486-98 (1995) (proposing the videotaping of
interrogations as an alternative to Miranda procedures). On abusive physical force by the police, see
generally POLICE VIOLENCE (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996); JEROME H. SKOLNICK &
JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993); see also Stuntz,
supra note 319, at 1064-68 (arguing that the law of criminal procedure's focus on privacy has had the
effect of distracting courts from the real problem of police abuse).
417. See supra note 414.
418. See Jan Hoffman, Police Tactics Chipping Away at Suspects'Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1998, at I (describing the increasing prevalence of police ignoring the requirement that an interrogation
stop at the suspect's request or at the suspect's request for a lawyer).
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unlawful not violating any statute ... not violating the Constitution
. . . not violating [the suspect's] civil rights."4"9 The result is a law of
self-incrimination that licenses its own violation.
One of the signal achievements of Miranda was that it required the
police to announce to the criminal suspect that the police considered
themselves bound by legal rules and procedures. In turn, "'[t]he great
advantage of police compliance with the law is that it helps to create an
atmosphere conducive to community respect for officers of the law that in
turn serves to promote their enforcement of the law.'"420 Miranda
warnings served to establish for the suspect that the police were not
renegades acting without regard to the rule of law. But the systemic
violation of Miranda's guarantees because of the absence of a meaningful
deterrent has precisely the opposite result, subverting the rule-of-law values
of the Miranda process.
Reconceived from the perspectives of reliability and legitimacy, the
law of the pretrial examination might look considerably different. The
proposal by Amar and Lettow for a pretrial hearing presided over by a
magistrate or judge would go a long way toward furthering these
goals.4"' In the pursuit of reliability, Amar and Lettow's magistrate
hearing would preserve or even expand the application of the narrow
testimonial exclusion rule. Moreover, the magistrate hearing would place
new emphasis on monitoring the examination itself so as to prevent police
abuse, thereby protecting the legitimacy of criminal law enforcement.
The legitimacy principle, however, suggests one departure from
Amar's theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause as applied to the pretrial
suspect. Under the Amar approach, the Self-Incrimination Clause has very
little to say about torture in the pretrial examination process. Because the
core of the violation occurs when the torture is applied to the suspect,
torture is something that Amar would deal with mostly under the aegis of
the Fourth Amendment. 4" As a result, the approach advocated by Amar
would permit the use of the fruits of confessions compelled by torture as
evidence in a prosecutor's case in chief against the confessee.4u3  The
419. When the Warning Is Little More Than a Speed Bump, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, § 1, at
40.
420. Roger J. Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 41 J. ST. B. CAL. 458, 478
(1966), quoted in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843 n.33 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
421. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 898-900.
422. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 251 n.43 (asserting that the use of a coercive measure, such as
forcibly pumping a suspect's stomach against his will and without justification, is a Fourth Amendment
violation when the search is performed, not at a later time); Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 927.
423. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 70, 76-77. Instead of an exclusionary rule for the fruits of
torture, Amar would remedy police abuse by punitive damage awards and administrative discipline.
See id. at 221 n.199.
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legitimacy-based approach, on the other hand, provides a basis for exclud-
ing the fruits of confessions compelled by torture. Torture as a mode of
evidence gathering is beyond the pale in contemporary law enforcement.
Reliability factors notwithstanding, no legitimate criminal law enforcement
procedures can rest on torture as a mode of developing the prosecution's
case.
2. The Criminal Defendant at Trial.-If reliability were the central
concern in criminal procedure, it might militate for allowing prosecutors
to examine defendants at trial. Indeed, this might seem to be the final step
in the process begun in the mid-nineteenth century, by which interested
witnesses and then civil parties were made competent witnesses who might
be compelled to testify. Completing the abolition of the incompetency
rules by allowing prosecutors to call defendants at trial might have the
attractiveness of creating a certain symmetry in the criminal trial.424 The
defendant, after all, is free to call the victim or the person that filed the
complaint to the stand. Moreover, insofar as the jury is one of our
primary guarantors of legitimacy,4' it might appear that providing the
jury with more information with which to make its determination would
have the salutary effect of enhancing the legitimacy of the outcome.
The problem is considerably more complicated than this, however.
The mid-nineteenth-century development of cross-examination as the cen-
tral means by which the finder of fact can sift through contradictory
testimony represents a major advance from the eighteenth-century common-
law trial's reliance on oaths and disqualification rules. Yet cross-
examination has its shortcomings as well, not the least of which is its
capacity to confuse the awkward or uneducated defendant caught in the
vice of a powerful and potentially obfuscating cross-examination.4 26
Thus, allowing defendants to decline to take the witness stand may in some
424. On symmetry as a goal of the privilege against self-incrimination before the abolition of the
criminal defendant disqualification rule, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 116 (1998).
On symmetry in criminal procedure generally, see Jesse Furman, The Ideal of Symmetry in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure (May 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law
Review).
425. See supra notes 394-98 and accompanying text.
426. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2251, at 3 I0 ("The privilege protects the innocent defendant
from convicting himself by a bad performance on the witness stand.") (quoted in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257 (1967) ("If
counsel can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or
indecisive, that will be [counsel's] normal course."); AMAR, supra note 4, at 68, 84-87, 92 (discussing
the problem of the innocent but awkward defendant). As Professor Amar observes, the problem of the
awkward but innocent defendant was more significant in a pre-Gideon world, see Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the constitutional right of indigent defendants in
noncapital felony cases to have counsel appointed), but it continues to have force today. See AMAR,
supra note 4, at 85.
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cases actually serve the goal of reliability.427 This would be all the more
true if the system were capable of gathering reliable evidence from the
defendant at the pretrial examination without resorting to abusive means.
The case of the defendant at trial implicates legitimacy concerns as
well as reliability concerns. The basic structure of the criminal trial in
which the defendant need not take the stand has become one of the core
markers of legitimacy in American legal culture. In other words, the
privilege against self-incrimination is built in to our American ideas about
criminal proceedings. Thus, for better or for worse, the notion that "our
system prefer[s] an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice"428 is so ingrained that a great deal of the legitimacy of
criminal proceedings may now rest upon it.
3. The Nonparty Witness.-The tension between the demands of reli-
ability and the privilege is most glaring in the case of the nonparty witness.
The criminal activity protected by the nonparty witness's privilege may be
directly related to the ongoing proceedings (indeed, in the extreme case the
nonparty witness may be the real perpetrator), or it may be wholly unre-
lated to the matter at hand. Either way, the nonparty witness's privilege
hinders the reliable resolution of the proceedings, especially when that
witness is able to claim the privilege outside the hearing of the jury.429
Still, good reasons exist for a narrow privilege against self-
incrimination in the case of the nonparty witness-reasons that once again
harken back to the interests of reliability and legitimacy. The reliability
interest is less obvious in this case, but to the extent that a nonparty
witness is provided with some form of immunity for his testimony, that
testimony is likely to be more reliable. The witness's incentive to perjure
himself will be decreased that much further. The concern for perjury
alone, however, does not adequately support a witness privilege: In many
other circumstances, after all, we admit questionable or interested testi-
mony and rely on vigorous cross-examination to separate the wheat from
the chaff.
Legitimacy, however, does appear to provide a rationale for establish-
ing the limited testimonial immunity set out by the New York Court of
427. To the extent that the problem is cross-examination's capacity to confuse a witness, there
might be a range of intermediate responses such as regulating the ways in which prosecutors are able
to cross-examine defendants. As dangerous as cross-examination may be to a flustered and frightened
innocent criminal defendant, however, we do rely on it to sort out untruthful testimony. Allowing
criminal defendants to take the stand without facing withering cross-examination would give carte
blanche to good storytellers to try to weave a sympathetic story to thejury. See DAMASKA, supra note
384, at 80 (noting the epistemic and symmetry interests underlying cross-examination).
428. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
429. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 902; Tague, supra note 43, at 3-6.
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Appeals in Kelly in 1861.430 In the federal system, a witness's grand
jury testimony is admissible in a subsequent prosecution of the witness,
even in cases in which the witness is subpoenaed to testify before the grand
jury because he is already suspected of wrongdoing.43' Thus, absent
such immunity, an aggressive prosecutor could easily circumvent the rule
allowing criminal defendants to decline to testify in their own criminal
case. The prosecutor would simply call a prospective defendant before a
grand jury432 and require him to testify at pain of contempt in order to
introduce the transcript of the questioning at the defendant's subsequent
criminal trial.433 Such a maneuver might or might not share the reliabil-
ity problems that attached to the problem of the awkward and confused
innocent witness at trial.4' But it would create a considerable
legitimacy-related concern to allow prosecutors so easily to circumvent the
defendant's trial privilege to decline to testify.
Moreover, the legitimacy principle supplies a ceiling as well as a floor
for the witness privilege. By themselves, the legitimacy concerns prompted
by a prosecutor's power to circumvent the criminal defendant's trial
privilege do not decisively mediate between a narrow testimonial immunity
standard and a broader use plus use-fruits standard, or even a transactional
standard. As we noted above, however, the legitimation principle cuts
both ways: criminal law enforcement maintains its legitimacy in the eyes
of the public not only by observing certain restrictions but also by
maintaining a certain level of effectiveness.435 When people like Oliver
North are allowed to evade prosecution because of a broad immunity rule,
not only are the guilty allowed to walk free in plain sight, but public
430. See supra section V(C)(2).
431. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 182, 186 (1977); United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 566, 580-82 (1976); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 359-62 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 611 (1997); United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595,601 (6th Cir. 1987).
The grand jury testimony is treated as an admission by a party opponent. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(A). There are a number of states in which the rule is the contrary. See Culbreath v. State,
113 So. 465 (Ala. App. 1927); People v. Cochran, 145 N.E. 207 (Il. 1924); State v. Corteau, 270
N.W. 144 (Minn. 1936); State v. Fary, 117 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1955); People v. Laino, 176 N.E.2d 571
(N.Y. 1961).
432. Note that the limitation on post-indictment evidence gathering by the grandjury would require
that the prosecutor summon the suspect to the grand jury prior to the initiation of formal criminal
charges. See United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
433. Consider, for example, the scenarios envisioned by Professor Amar under which a prosecutor
might simply recess a criminal trial, walk across the street or into a different room, and compel the trial
defendant to testify at pain of contempt in order to introduce that testimony into evidence upon the
recommencement of the criminal trial. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 128-29, 206 n.55.
434. Presumably the extent to which a flustered defendant's awkward performance was evident
on the face of a dry record would vary from case to case.
435. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
395 n.158 (1997) (observing that overly aggressive enforcement of criminal procedure rights may result
in "greater distrust of [law enforcement] by law-abiding members of the community").
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confidence in law enforcement is also undermined.436  Because the
legitimation principle cuts both ways, the narrow testimonial immunity
standard appears to strike the optimal balance between promoting effective
law enforcement and preserving a meaningful trial privilege for the crim-
inal defendant.
VIII. Conclusion
The historiography of self-incrimination in Anglo-American law has
been preoccupied with the extraordinary trial and the politicized
prosecution, beginning with the political trials of the seventeenth
century437 and continuing into our own era with the anticommunist witch
hunts of the 1950s.438 Moving away from the history of exceptional
proceedings, however, provides the key to accounting for the peculiar place
of the privilege in American legal practice. In the Early Republic, self-
incrimination doctrine was just one part of a broader common-law
approach to fact-finding. The constitutional self-incrimination clauses were
thus rarely invoked in legal practice. Instead, self-incrimination was a
broad common-law doctrine that closely resembled the common-law wit-
ness incompetency rules. But in the mid-nineteenth century, common-law
courts developed a new approach to fact-finding that abandoned the
common-law witness incompetency regime. As a result, lawyers and
judges were required for the first time to determine the meaning of the
constitutional self-incrimination clauses.
The history of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause since
the late nineteenth century has been in large part the story of attempts to
make sense of the privilege against self-incrimination under a new regime
of common-law fact-finding. Controversy and heated rhetoric have
abounded; rationales have been advanced and discarded; and the Supreme
Court has issued bold decisions only to undermine or overturn them. A
return to fact-finding as the central function of self-incrimination doctrine
would face considerable obstacles, not the least of which is over a century
of case law that has frequently pointed in very different directions. Such
a return to fact-finding might, however, serve us well.
436. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), withdrawn in part and superseded in
part, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
437. See LEVY, supra note 1, at 271-79 (describing the trial of seventeenth-century religious
dissenter John Lilbume).
438. See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 10-13, 14-18 (1955)
(defending the privilege against self-incrimination in light of McCarthy-era anticommunism).
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"Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests
Justin Hughes*
Intellectual property is traditionally justified as an ex ante incentive
structure to produce social wealth by "promot[ing] the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts."' It has also been observed that intellectual property
can be a means to protect the personality interest or "personhood" of
individual creators.2 A person may view her intellectual creations as a
* Attorney-Advisor, Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
20231, justin.hughes@uspto.gov. B.A. 1982, Oberlin; J.D. 1986, Harvard. The text of this article
was written prior to the author's joining the Department of Commerce; the views expressed here are
the author's and do not necessarily reflect any position of the Patent and Trademark Office or the
Department of Commerce.
This article has benefitted from the helpful comments of Keith Aoki, George Fisher, Owen
Jones, Peter Jaszi, and George Shepherd. My thanks also to Eleanor Meltzer, Joseph Smallhoover,
and Alain Dangeard who provided help on particular topics.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see, e.g., YALE BRAUNSTEIN Er AL., ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS As APPLIED TO COMPUTER SOFrWARE AND DATABASES i (U.S. Department of Commerce,
1977) ("[Ilf one wishes to encourage the private provision and use of scientific and artistic works, the
net value of output and goods services to the public ... can be increased by the broadest possible
specification of property rights by means of copyright."); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 27 (1991)
(encouraging economists to research intellectual property issues, which could play a key role in
affecting America's future competitiveness); William R. Johnson, The Economics of Copying, 93 J.
POL. ECON. 158, 172 (1985) (concluding that restrictions on copying may enhance social surplus under
certain circumstances); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (explaining that copyright law is in part designed to provide
incentives to create a work subject to the law's protection).
2. See, e.g., Steven Cherensky, Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595,
646, 646-53 (1993) (suggesting that an inventor's work is a "product of original thought," and therefore
inventors have a "personality stake in their inventions"); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality:
A Common Law Basis for the Protection of Moral Rights, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (stressing that
even though American courts have provided for some protection of personality rights through
copyright, privacy, defamation, unfair competition, and contract laws, such protection lacks the sub-
stantial and coherent basis it has under French law); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists
and Inventors, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998) [hereinafter Hughes, Personality]; Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 335 (1988) [hereinafter Hughes,
Philosophy]; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968 (1982)
(suggesting that, because "property may have an important relationship to certain character traits that
partly constitute a person," the expectation of continuing control over such property should be
protected); Vibeke Sorensen, Thoughts ofa Computer Artist, 75 OR. L. REV. 309, 315 (1996) (arguing
that displaying artwork on the Internet involves "putting it in the electronic town square for everyone
to view for free," but reporting that she still provides a copyright notice to protect as much of her work
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